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CHAPTER I
Introduction

Statement of the Problem
The subject of depression has puzzled and mystified people and,
in general, has been an area of controversy for over

2,000

years.

Yet in spite of the numerous theoretical papers regarding its
etiology and psychopathology, there is a dearth of systematic
studies aimed at testing hypotheses generated by the various
theories.

One reason for this may be that the earlier views,

such as Freud's formulation of an internalized struggle between
superego and ego, are too remote from observables in clinical
material to be reduced to operational terms for testing.
During the last decade and a half, Beck (1967) has attempted
to stipulate certain characteristics that appear to be at the
core of the depressive constellation and which are also testable.
In the early 1960's, Beck (1961, 1963, 1964, 1967) conducted a
series of studies of clinical depression which led to the
development of a cognitive formulation of depressive symtomatology
and an approach to the treatment of depression that dealt pri
marily with cognitive factors.

He postulated a "cognitive triad,"

consisting of a negative conception of the self, of the external
world, and of the future as central to the depressive constellation.
This view has received some support from a series of systematic
investigations (Beck & Hurvich, 1959; Beck, 1961; Beck & Ward,

1
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1961).

Recently, Beck (1970, 1972, 1974, 1976) has theorized that

emotions in general may follow from the meanings attributed to
events and that emotional disturbances result when events are
given distorted interpretations.
many forms of psychopathology —

He hypothesized further that
such as anxiety, phobias,

obsessions, as well as depression —

may be associated with

characteristic cognitive distortions and that these disturbances
will respond to therapy aimed at the correction of these
distortions.

A depressed person, then, may be helped by changing

his errors in thinking, i.e., his dysfunctional attitudes, rather
than by concentrating on his depressed mood.
While conducting research with Aaron T. Beck, I realized that
the lack of an objective method to quantify the relative presence
or absence of these cognitive distortions was a basic limitation
affecting efforts to test empirically the hypotheses inherent in
this type of therapy.

If reliable and valid means for measurement

were available, a number of additional avenues for research dealing
with the formal thought processes in depression would be opened.
The primary purpose, therefore, of this study was to design a
written instrument aimed at identifying the common assumptions
underlying the typical idiosyncratic cognitions of depressed
individuals, as espoused within Beck's approach.

A second-
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level goal of this research was to determine the relationship
between these attitudes and depressive tendency.
The Cognitive View of Emotions
Within the clinical realm, analysis of phenomena from a
cognitive information-based perspective is not new (cf. Kelly,
1955; Rotter, Chance, & Phares, 1972); yet recent years have
witnessed increasing emphasis on refining and operationalizing
a "cognitive learning" approach (e.g., Bandura, 1969; Estes,
1971; Staats, 1972).

In addition, a rapidly accumulating

body of evidence and considerable speculation suggest that
this convergence toward a cognitive-behavioral perspective
holds substantial clinical promise (Bergin, 1970; D'Zurilla &
Goldfried, 1971; Goldfried, Decenteceo & Weinberg, 1974;
Lazarus, 1967, 1971, 1976; Mahoney, 1974; Meichenbaum, 1972;
Ullman, 1970).

Arieti (1968), a psychoanalyst, has called

cognition the "Cinderella" of the field of psychiatry.

He

emphasized that "a great deal of human life has to do with
conceptual constructs.

It is impossible to understand the

human being without such important cognitive constructs as
the self-image, self-esteem, self-identity, identification,
hope, or projection of the self into the future" (p. 1637).
Until recently, researchers and therapists have regarded
affective and cognitive development as relatively independent
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of one another.

According to Singer (1973), however, the intimate

relation between affect and cognition is rooted in the infant's
early efforts at accommodating to its novel and everchanging
environment.

He assumes, with Tomkins (1962), and Izard (1971),

that environmental novelty activates the interest affect, which
in turn sustains efforts at exploration and accommodation.

Mastery

or successful accommodation reduces excitement and activates joy,
whereas a complex mass of unassimilable material may produce
startle, distress, or fear.

Thus, affective and cognitive processes

are intertwined from the very beginning of life.

As man interacts

further with his environment, an elaborate set of cognitive functions
emerge which enable him to achieve greater control over his feelings,
actions, and environments.

Man1s ability to appraise, to interpret,

and to ascribe evaluative labels to his behavior and/or his feelings
gives, in large measure, meaning to his affective-behavioral states.
Rensberger (1977), reporting for the New York Times, summarizes
the cognitive position as follows:
"Freud got it the wrong way around, some psychiatrists
are now asserting. Emotional disorders do not cause
people to think in bizarre, illogical patterns
typical of mental illness. Rather, it is illogical
or otherwise defective thinking patterns that cause
emotional or behavioral problems."
(p. A21)
Just as Freud's momentous discovery consisted of revealing the
unconscious processes in a person's affective life, the affectiveunconscious, so now we must go below the surface and reveal the
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unconscious processes in a person's cognitive life, what we may call
the cognitive-unconscious (Weiner, 1975).

Fairly conclusive

evidence is now available that a person's attitude toward any
object can be seen as a function of his beliefs about the object
and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs (Fishbein, 1967)Several contemporary theories treat emotion in essentially this
same way; i.e., as response or as a complex of responses determined
by cognitive processes.

These recent theories seem to have stemmed

from pervasive ideas about human nature which can be traced through
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Diderot, Kant, and other philosophers
such as Epictetus, who in the first century A.D. wrote in The
Enchiridion, "Men are disturbed not by things, but by the view
which they take of them."
approaches are:

The major ideas inherent in these

(1) Man is first and foremost a rational being;

(2) Rationality is basically good, emotionality basically bad;
(3) Reason (cognitive processes) should be used as a control and
as a substitute for emotion (Izard, 1577).
The classic theory in the field of emotions is the formulation
of William James (1884), that " ... bodily changes follow directly
the perception of the exciting fact, and our feelings of the same
changes as they occur i£ the emotion."

In this assertion James

(1884) avoids assuming that cognition intervenes between the object
stimulus and the bodily response.

But this stimulus-response

theory is expressed in terms of the following sequence:

object to
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perception of object to bodily state to feeling of bodily state,
•h'th the perception of the object and the awareness of the
feeling involve cognitive states and assessments.

Perception is

never direct but always interpreted in terms of one's prior
learning, beliefs, language, and assessments.
be modified by cognitions.

Even sensation may

The theory, therefore, presents more

than a behavioral stimulus and a behavioral response and is really
a "covert cognitive" theory of emotions (Shibles, 1974).
George A. Kelly (1955) thought of emotion as behavior that is
either loosely defined or not a word-bound construction.

His

theory postulates that each individual has available a number of
personal constructs for cognizing and perceiving events.

The

foundations of Kelly's theory are summarized by the statement
that "A person's processes are psychologically channelized by
the ways in which he anticipates events" (Kelly, 1955).

This

personal construct psychology emphasizes the individuality of
a person's system of construing events.
COxiSuTUCt

The salience of a

dimension in a person's system is determined by its

utility in anticipating behavior or events and thus it has a
direct association with behavioral prediction.

How we "feel"

may be the other side of how we "know."
Ellis (1962) theorizes that emotions and self-evaluative
thoughts are virtually one and the same thing.
the opposite of thinking.

Emotion is not

Rather it is partially comprised of
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thinking or reason.
mainly:

What we call "emotion" seems to include

(1) A certain kind of forceful thinking —

a kind

strongly slanted or biased by previous perceptions or experiences;
(2) Intense bodily responses, such as feelings of pleasure or
nausea;

(3) Tendencies toward positive or negative action in

regard to the events that seem to cause the strong thinking and
its emotional concomitants (Ellis & Harper, 1975).
differ from feelings in involving more cognition.

Emotions
For Ellis,

without cognition or self-talk there would be few emotions,
since emotion implies reason.
Arnold (1960, 1968), in support of Ellis, characterizes
an emotion as a felt tendency toward an object (behavioralmotoric component) judged suitable or unsuitable (cognitive
component), and reinforced by specific bodily changes
according to the type of affect (physiological-bodily component).
The emotion proper is the nonrational attraction or repulsion
that follows upon the appraisal of something as good or bad
for the perceiver.

Ellis and Arnold's views are consistent

with social-psychological definitions of attitude.

Attitude

also is considered a tendency to evaluate an object or symbol
in a certain way (Katz & Stotland, 1959), with an affective as
well as a predispositional response or behavioral component
(Lott, 1973).

Specifically, Ellis maintains that certain

individuals tend to think irrationally and that these
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irrational beliefs produce various forms of emotional upset-

As

seen from a social-leaming viewpoint, these irrational views
take on the status of a persistent and well-learned set with
which certain individuals approach life situations.

As suggested

by Dollard and Miller (1950), our early social learning experiences
teach us to label situations in varying ways.

Emotional re

activity may result at times from the label attached to certain
events, not the situation that is labeled.
The patient's private world has not been regarded as a useful
area of inquiry to the behaviorists (Watson, 1914; Skinner, 1971).
This is because thoughts, feelings, and ideas that are accessible
only to the person experiencing them are not valid data for these
theorists; only behavior that can be directly observed by an
independent outsider is used in explanation.

However, research

in behavior therapy techniques has highlighted the fact that
environmental events per se, although important, are not of
primary importance; rather what the client says to himself
about those events influences his behavior (e.g.. Mahoney,
1974; Meichenbaum, 1974; Steiner, 19/0).

Recently, it. has

been hypothesized that, in humans, conditioning does not occur
automatically and is in fact cognitively mediated (Bandura,
1974; Brewer, 1974) .

To account for behavior solely in terms

of external rewards and punishments overlooks the fact that
human beings can be rewarded and punished by their own thinking,
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"even when this thinking is largely divorced from outside rein
forcements and penalties” (Ellis, 1962).

Lazarus, Averill, and

Opton (1970) expanded this view by stating, "The individual —
cognitively filters stimulus information, and the resulting
appraisal determines whether the situation is evaluated as
relevant, threatening, frustrating, etc."

They add that

cognitive processes "create the emotional response" and shape
it into recognizable affect.

This recent development of

cognitive theories within the ranks of behavior therapy has
to be classified as one of the more intriguing developments
in contemporary clinical psychology.

Adler (1964) summarizes

this cognitive approach to emotions when he said:
"In a word, I am convinced that a person1s
behavior springs from his ideas ... It is
very obvious that we are influenced not by
'facts' but by our interpretation of facts
... Everyone possesses an 'idea' about him
self and the problems of life - a lifepattern, a law or movement - that keeps fast
held of him without his understanding it.
without his being able to give any account
of it."
(pp. 19, 26-27)
The Evaluation of the Concept of Depression
As a distinct and distressing state in man, depression was
known at least as early as 1500 years before Christ.

In the

Old Testament's Book of Job we have what is essentially a selfreporting inventory of a classical clinical depression.

Conse

quently, we have a condition that has prevailed at least since
Biblical times.

Yet, in spite of all of our scientific efforts,
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to this day no agreement exists as to diagnosis, epidemiology,
classification, causes or effectix

3

therapies for this "illness"

(Fieve, 1971).
The condition that today we label "depression" has been
described by a number of ancient writers under the classification
of "melancholia."

In 400 B.C. Hippocrates rendered the first

clinical description of melancholia when he observed depression
in women and labeled it hysteria because he felt its source was
the uterus ("hyster" in Greek).

Later this bleak mood became

known as melancholia after the black bile secreted by the gall
bladder, thought to be the provoker of sadness.

Opposed to

melancholia were excitements, designated by the term "mania,"
and explained by the influence of yellow bile.

Two centuries

later, the Greek writer Aretaeus ascribed melancholia to
flatulence or anger, grief and dejection.

He linked some

depression to manic states and noted that logical thought
processes were not impaired in depression (Becker, 1574).
Furthermore, the cardinal signs and symptoms used today in
diagnosing depression were found in most of these ancient
descriptions:

disturbed mood, self-castigations, self-

debasing behavior, wish to die, physical and vegetative
symptoms, and delusions of having committed unpardonable
sins (Beck, 1967).

The field did not advance beyond this

19th century phenomenology until Kraepelin (1913) presented
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the first schematic classification of all psychiatric illnesses.
Despite his narrow focus on prognosis as the essential criterion
for categorization, Kraepelin's (1913) attempt proved to be most
successful.
In the early part of this century, Freud and his co-workers
emphasized the significance of psychodynamics in personality de
velopment and in the expression of psychopathologicai symptoms.
Enlarging on an insight of his disciple, Karl Abraham, Freud
(1917) in his classic paper, Mourning and Melancholia, played
an extraordinary significant role in contributing to the psycho
dynamic understanding of depression.

He considered depressive

illness not only from the point of view of a reaction to life
situations but also from the standpoint of the intrapersonal
or intrapsychic events that constituted this reaction.

Freud

assumed that a particular behavior has its roots in the uncon
scious and that any irrationalities observed on the conscious
level are only manifestations of the underlying unconscious
drives.

In general, according to this psychoanalytical

orientation, depression represented the introjection of hostility
resulting from the loss of an ambivalently loved object (Abraham,
1911; Freud, 1917) or a reaction to separation from a significant
object of attachment (Spitz, 1942; Klein, 1945; Robertson &
Bowlbv, 1952; Bowlby, 1960).
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More recent reformulations of the original psychoanalytical
model have concentrated on object loss and its consequence on the
ego.

Bibring (1953) emphasized a loss of self-esteem as the

crucial element in depression.

His views contrasted with those

of the earlier psychoanalytic theorists in that he placed more
emphasis on ego psychology (conscious response to events) than
on unconscious conflicts between ego and superego (Mendels, 1970).
According to Bibring (1953), the basic mechanism of depression is
" __

the ego's shocking awareness of its helplessness in regard

to its aspirations"

(p. 39).

Depression supervenes when the ego

is cognizant of its goal and simultaneously aware of its helpless
ness to attain it.

The ego suffers a narcissistic injury and

collapse in self-esteem.

Depression then appears when one cannot

live up to one's ego ideals.
The ego-psychological approach is carried to its fullest
implications

in Beck's (1967) cognitive model of depression, which

emphasizes another intrapersonal component of depression.

The

vicissitudes of self-esteem in depressive illness are considered
from a perspective that conceptualizes depression in a new and
provocative way (Mendelson, 1975).

Generally, the thought dis

order that depressed patients manifest has been considered to
be a consequence of a basic disturbance in mood.

However, Beck

(1967) has suggested that it is a primary disturbance in thinking
that causes the development of the disturbed mood state.

He
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proposed "that the typical depressive affects are evoked by the
erroneous conceptualizations."

An altered style of cognition,

characterized by negative expectations, is said to be the basis
of depressive mood states.

Beck thus sees these intrapersonal

distorted cognitions as playing an etiological role in what has
been generally thought of as an affective disorder.
"This notion of the primacy of affect over cognition
in psychopathology presents an interesting paradox:
for normal subjects, the conceptualization of
a situation determines the affective state, but
in psychopathology, the affective state determines
the cognition.
On the basis of clinical observations and
subsequent research, this author has postulated
that in abnormal condirions such as depression
and anxiety the direction of the reaction is
from cognition to affect, just as it is in
normal responses (Beck, 1963). The difference
between normal and abnormal reactions lies in
the degree of correspondence between the con
ceptualization and the veridical stimulus
configuration.
In psychopathological states
perseverative faulty conceptualization leads
to excessive or inappropriate affective
disturbance."
(Beck, 1971)
Leaming-theory approaches to the analysis of depression were
hinted at by Skinner (1953) when he described depression as a
general weakening of the response repertoire of an organism, a
weakening presumably brought about by extinctions.

In general,

the behaviorist views depression as a set of maladaptive
behavioral responses which are elicited by uncontrollable
aversive stimuli or by loss of reinforcement, and additionally
maintained by the rewards of the "sick role" (Lewinsohn, 1974;
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Seligman, 1974; Ferster, 1965; Lazarus, 1968).

However, it was

not until Seligman and his associates (Seligman & Maier, 1967;
Seligman, Maier & Geer, 1968) began their experimental work,
connecting the powerless aspects of dependency and depression,
that the leaming-theory approach gained impetus.

They showed

that dogs receiving a large number of inescapable electric
shocks ultimately learned to become passive and accept the
electric shock in apparent helplessness.

These animals, once

having learned that their behavior was useless in one experimental
situation, gave up without exploring alternatives in a new
experimental situation where their behavior could have had an
effect.

Seligman's model may be useful in conceptualizing the

type of affect-cognition-action sequence that leads to what a
numbe.r of other theorists (e.g., Bibring, 1968; Beck, 1967)
have recognized as symptoms of depression, i.e., feelings of
hopelessness or helplessness.

Learned helplessness is net only

a stimulus-specific behavioral state; it may well represent an
induced trait, the expectation that one's efforts are generally
futile.

After drawing a number of parallels between the charac

teristics of "learned helplessness" and depression, Seligman (1968)
suggested that successful therapy occurs when the patient believes
that his responses produce gratification, that he is an effective
human being.
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Attempts at reconciling these diverse theoretical positions
have been sporadic and incomplete.

Psychodynamic explanations

of psychopathology weight early experience factors more heavily,
whereas behavioral explanations stress current situational
determinants more heavily.

Cognitive approaches to psycho

pathology, however, may prove to be useful integrators of these
disparities.

A greater emphasis on the individual's descriptions

of internal events can lead to a more complete view of human
psychopathology and the mechanisms of behavioral change.

By

using introspective data, the cognitive theorist has access to
the patient's thoughts, ideas, attitudes, dreams, and daydreams.
These ideational productions provide the cognitive theorist with
the raw materials with which he can form concepts and models
(Beck, 1970).

It is important, however, for the therapist to

distinguish among symptom, technique, and underlying attitudes.
For example, the symptom may be affective, such as crying spells,
sadness, loss of gratification, loss of sense of humor, apathy.
The therapeutic approach may be behavioral, for example, mobilizing
the patient into more activity and positively reinforcing certain
types of activity.

The underlying attitude, however, is the

component that needs to be changed ultimately if the totality
of the depression, for example, is to be influenced.

Thus, the

goal is cognitive modification (Beck, 1976).
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Definition of Depression
Despite the fact that research dealing with depression has
increased quantitatively, investigations into the causes of this
condition continue to remain unsolved.

A major reason for this

slow progress stems from the fact that the term "depression" is
used in many ways:

To describe a normal mood state (e.g.,

grief); a symptom (e.g., sadness that is seen in many psychiatric
disorders); a syndrome (characterized by dejection, hopelessness,
psychomotor retardation, etc.); a disease; an illness; or any
combination of these.

Furthermore, different schools of thought

use dissimilar dialects, thereby hindering communication to an
even greater extent.

Friedman (1974) , in an attempt to present

a schematic way of viewing "depression" has proposed that the
term be employed in three ways:
state, and as a character style.

As an affect, as a clinical
Within this framework, the

concentration of this paper is on depression as defined by the
first two classifications of this tripartite division:
1.

To refer to a basic feeling of sadness which is a part of

the fabric of life and which is noted in states of grief and periods
of disappointment (i.e., the affect of depression), and,
2.

To refer to a complex of symptoms, including the affect

of depression, but also other affects such as anxiety or guilt,
and motivational, vegetative, and cognitive disturbances (i.e.,
the clinical depressive state).
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In previous studies by Beck (1961, 1963, 1964, 1967), depression
has been defined in this way, as a psychopathological dimension
rather than as a discrete nosological entity.

This concept of

depression should be distinguished from the use of the term to
designate specific diagnostic categories, such as "neurotic
depressive reaction" or "manic depressive reaction," which are
frequently considered to have a specific onset, course, prognosis,
and etiology.

As a psychopathological dimension, depression may

be observed in association with other psychopathological states
such as "schizophrenic reaction" or "anxiety reaction," as well
as in cases receiving a primary diagnosis of depression (Loeb,
Beck, & Diggory, 1971).

Viewed in this way, depression is

identifiable in many diverse types of patients.
Beck's Cognitive Theory of Depression
A promising strategy in the exploration of both psychopathology
and normal functioning is the study of an individual's cognitions —
the person's manner of perceiving, construing, anticipating and
evaluating events, behaviors and their consequences (Kelly, 1955;
Mischel, 1973; Mahoney, 1974).

While cognitive theories have been

postulated (Ellis, 1962; Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970;
Meichenbaum, 1976), these theorists attempt to account for the
development of emotional responses and affective disturbance in
general.

The most precise delineation of a theory focusing upon

the relationship between cognition and depressive affect occurs

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

in the writing of Beck (1963, 1964, 1967, 1974, 1976).

In contrast

to many historical and popular views, Beck's (1967) thesis is that,
"The affective response is determined by the way an individual
structures his experience."

Rejecting the notion that man is

governed by powerful unconscious forces over which he frequently
has little control. Beck locates the basic problem of emotional
disturbances in man's misconceptions about himself, his irrational
beliefs and faulty assumptions about reality.

Depressive affect

and behaviors are considered secondary manifestations of depressed
cognitions; depression is seen as a thought disorder.
Although Arnold (1960), experimental psychologists such as
Richard Lazarus (1966), and clinicians such as Albert Ellis (1962),
have clearly marked the association between thinking and emotion,
they have not delineated the particular kinds of appraisals that
lead to specific emotions.

In fact, the vast literature in

personality and social psychology hardly touches on the question
of what ideational content in response to a noxious stimulus or
a threat produces sadness, anxiety, or anger.

Granting that the

initial appraisal may be a global "bad for me," Beck (1976)
claims that the individual's unique interpretation of the noxious
stimulus determines his emotional response.

Beck's theory

delineates the idiosyncratic content of cognitions relevant to
specific clinical syndromes, whereas Ellis offers a more general
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hypothesis about the predominance of irrational self-talk as a
reflection of neurotic behavior and thinking.
By analyzing recorded interview materials of depressed and
nondepressed patients in psychotherapy. Beck (1963, 1964) found
that depressed patients tended to distort their experiences in
an idiosyncratic way; that is, they misinterpreted specific
irrelevant events in terms of personal failure, deprivation,
or rejection, or they tended to greatly exaggerate or over
generalize events that bore any semblance of negative infor
mation about themselves.

From this, Beck theorized that

"certain cognitive schemas become prepotent during depression,
dominate the thought processes and lead to cognitive distortions"
(Beck, 1964).

Furthermore, Beck believes these cognitions (i.e.,

any mental activity that has verbal content) to be automatic
and involuntary and to seem plausible to the patient.

The

meaning that an individual attaches to an object or a
situation affects how he feels.

In other words, the depressed

person feels sad and lonely, for example, because he erroneously
thinks he is inadequate and deserted.

His thinking may appear

as highly irrational, but it makes sense within the patient's
conceptual framework.

The relationship between cognition and

affect or emotion is based largely on prior learning and
association.
problems.

One's irrationality leads to one's emotional

This is demonstrated by the philosophy espoused by
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the character, Don Juan:
"The world is such and such or so-and-so only
because we tell ourselves that that is the way
it is ... You talk to yourself. You're not
unique at that. Everyone of us does that.
We carry on internal talk —
In fact we
maintain our world with our internal
talk."
(Casteneda, 1972)
Beck (1967) assigns primary etiological importance to an
altered style of cognition characterized by three negative
views:

of the self, of the environment, and of the future.

This negative "cognitive triad" presumably results in and
accounts for other manifestations of depression —

such as

a lack of motivation, low activity level, dysphoria, etc.
In this view, depressives' cognitions lead to the misinter
pretation of experiences and subsequently to other responses
that are logical consequences of such misinterpretations.
Maladaptive behaviors are emitted which are consistent with
the cognitions of the depressives who are thus locked into
an internally consistent, self-fulfilling cycle.
The three cognitive constructions referred to as the
"cognitive triad" are:
1.

The view of self.

The depressed patient's cognitive

schemas that relate to self-assessment consist of seeing himself
as deficient, inadequate, or unworthy.

He will often attribute

his unpleasant feelings and experiences to some kind of physical,
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mental, or moral defect within himself.

He will then consider

himself worthless because of his presumed defects and will
"reject" himself.
2.

The view of the world.

The depressed person tends to

see his world as making exorbitant demands on him and as
presenting obstacles that cannot be surmounted.

He interprets

his interactions with his environment in terms of defeat and
failure, deprivation, or disparagement.
3.

The view of the future.

The depressed person's negative

cognitive patterns relating to the future become evident in his
view that his current difficulties or suffering will continue
indefinitely.

Thus, he anticipates unremitting hardship,

continued frustration, and never-ending deprivation.

Such

schemas essentially amount to a pervasive, hopeless attitude.
The hallmark of the cognitive triad is that the negative
evaluations comprise unrealistic, distorted, and illogical ways
of thinking, which do not correspond to reality.

It is as though

the depressed individual has been b o m with eyes that see only
with great distortions but give the illusion of seeing sharply
and clearly.

These distorted and illogical ways of thinking are

manifested in the depressed person's tendencies to make extrava
gant use of the following proccoooo:

Itiaggeration or misinter

pretation of events; the making of extreme, absolute judgments
when certain situations occur; overgeneralizations from a single
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incident; focusing on one particular detail out of context and
ignoring the more salient features of a situation; drawing
inferences in the absence of, or even contrary to evidence;
and extracting personally relevant meanings from unpleasant
situations.
This view represents a radical departure from psychodynamic
theories of affective disorders in that it emphasizes the role
that disturbances in thinking play in determining emotional
states (Beck, 1971).

The cognitive approach to depression and

psychopathology does not assume that a well-adjusted individual
necessarily thinks logically and solves problems correctly
(Beck, 1967).

What is assumed is that, to understand and

correct maladaptive behavior, the idiosyncratic meaning that
people ascribe to their experiences must be uncovered (Kovacs
& Beck, 1978).

These cognitions are termed "idiosyncratic" because

they reflect a faulty appraisal, ranging from a mild distortion
to a complete misinterpretation, and because they fall into a
pattern that is peculiar to a particular psychopathological
state.

The focus of therapy is on altering or removing those

idiosyncratic evaluations that are dysfunctional or maladaptive,
with the expectation that the remaining symptoms and behaviors
characteristic of depression will be alleviated.

An important

factor in treatment when trying to change misconceptions is the
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emphasis on insight, a cognitive process consisting of identifying
thoughts, feelings, and wishes and making psychological connections
among them (Beck, 1976).
The Concept of Schemas
How does an individual form the concepts that predispose him to
depression?

Early in life, a child develops many attitudes about

himself and his surroundings-

Some of these concepts are realistic

and facilitate healthy adjustments, while others deviate from
reality and make the individual vulnerable to possible psycho
logical disorders.

These relatively abstract and generalizable

rules regarding certain regularities in the relationships among
events are called "schemas."

According to Beck (1964) schemas

are conceived as relatively stable cognitive structures (in
contrast to a cognitive process, which is transient), which
channel thought processes, irrespective of whether or not these
are stimulated by the immediate environmental situation.

When

a particular set of stimuli impinge on the individual, a schema
relevant to these stimuli is activated.

The schema abstracts

and molds the raw data into thoughts or cognitions.

Once

established, the schemas serve as a guide to behavior and as
a framework that influences the way in which relevant new
information will be assimilated.

Beck (1967, p. 288) said, "It

is postulated that the schema determines the specific type of
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affective response.

If the schema is concerned with self

depreciation, a feeling of sadness will be associated with
i t

An analogous relationship between the content of the

schema and the corresponding feeling holds for the other
affects."

Eventually, a single association may call up an

entirely negative (or positive) experience response.

Beck

(1971) has described this process as follows:
"These schemas may remain latent for many
years but, activated under certain stress
ful conditions, supersede more realistic
concepts. The indiscriminate and repetitive
application of these idiosyncratic schemas
leads to a continual affective arousal.
The 'snowballing' phenomena observed in
these conditions can be understood in
terms of a feedback model. The affective
responses to the cognitive distortions are
in turn processed by the idiosyncratic
cognitive systems and lead to further
idiosyncratic cognitions. Thus, a
continuous cycling of cognition - affect cognition is established."
When viewed in this sense, "schema" certainly constitute a Kantian
notion:

We sense the world in terms of our categories.

There is

no sensation without cognition and no cognition without sensation.
One might also say there is no emotion without cognition and
sensation because, in the assessment view, emotion comprises
both.
The process of "constructing" involves:

first, hypothesis

generation; second, testing of these hypotheses; third, feedback
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from these tests; and finally, reformulation or adjustment of the
original hypotheses.

The individual must conceptualize the

world in a structural framework, however primitive it may be,
before he can react to it and within it.

This acceptance of

an internal unit (a cognition, a plan, a mediator, a schema)
as what is learned provides a different orientation to the
field.
In depression, specific idiosyncratic schemas assume a
dominant role in directing the thought processes.

Though the

schemas may be latent during the nondepressed period, they
are activated by particular kinds of circumstances and become
progressively more potent as the depression develops.

Circum

stances are not expected to produce a depression unless the
person in question is particularly sensitive to the situation
because of his specific predepressive constellation.

Whereas

the average person might experience such a trauma and still be
able to maintain interest in other aspects of his life, the
depression-prone person experiences such a constriction of
his cognitive field that he experiences negative ideas about
every aspect of his life.

The phenomenology of normal and

pathological moods may overlap considerably.

Most moods

entail poorer discrimination between subjective and objective
reality.

But in normal moods the individual has greater

awareness of what events have induced the mood and better
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recognition that changed perceptions are temporary effects of the
mood.

Moreover, qualitative and quantitative aspects of the mood

are more appropriate to the mood-eliciting events.

Events that

are incompatible with the mood are perceived and responded to more
realistically, which may lead to a shift or termination of the mood.
By contrast, pathological moods are less appropriate to reality in
relation to

all of the factors (Becker,1974).

conditions,

the reaction to the stimulus

In psychopathological

situation is determined to

a much greater extent by internal processes which distort the stimulus
situation.

The

increased frequency anddegree of cognitive dis

tortions as

the depression develops may be attributed to the

progressive dominance of the idiosyncratic schemas.

Normally,

the cognition resulting from the interaction of the schema with
the stimuli is expected to be a reasonably accurate (veridical)
representation of reality (Piaget, 1947).

However, as these

idiosyncratic schemas become more active, they are capable of
being evoked by stimuli that are less congruent with them.

Now,

instead of a schema's being selected to "fit” the external details,
the details are selectively extracted and molded to "fit" the
schema.

The result is inevitably a distortion of reality.

When the idiosyncratic schemas are especially active as in
severe depressions, particular items congruent with the depressive
schemas are selected from the stored material.

These items then

form part of the typical depressive sequences of associations and
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ruminations.

According to Beck (1971) :

"The model for affect instigation is based on
certain assumptions. First, irrespective of
the veridical properties of a stimulus
situation, an individual's reaction to the
situation depends upon his appraisal (or
conceptualization) of the situation.
Crucial properties of the stimulus are its
connotations, meanings, and significance
for the perceiver.
Second, the cognitive content or
meaning is chained to a particular affect.
As the cognitive content changes, the affect
changes in consonance with it. Affect-pro
ducing ideation may occur in response to a
specific external stimulus or may occur in
a sequence of associations in the ‘stream
of consciousness.' The affect is congruent
with the cognitions.
During the course of a person's
development, a particular cognitive content
may establish a pathway to a specific affect.
Some of these cognition-affect chains appear
to be universal. Others are idiosyncratic
for a particular society or a specific
individual."
A cycle is formed wherein each negative judgment reinforces the
negative self-concept, which in turn facilitates a negative
interpretation of subsequent experiences.

In the terminology

of formal logic, the schema equals the major premise; the
external event equals the minor premise; the cognition equals
the conclusion, the affect follows from the conclusion.

If

this major premise is invalid, then the conclusion will be
invalid, even though the logical operations may be flawless.
By observing a recurrent erroneous conclusion, then, one can
infer the content of the idiosyncratic schema.

Thus, schemas

may be thought of largely as statements that we make to ourselves

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28

and to others-

To understand a depressed individual then, we need

to get inside his conceptual system and see the world through his
eyes.

Beck (1976) gives the following example:
"An instructor, in a casual way, told two students
(Miss A and Miss B ) , who were carrying on a side
conversation in his seminar, 'If you have anything
to say, share it with the rest of us or else be
quiet.' Miss A responded angrily that she had
simply been trying to clarify a point."
(p. 43)

In this example, the major premise (schema or attitude) when stated
as a rule is:
criticisms."

"All corrections by a person in authority are
The minor premise (external event) is:

is correcting me."
criticizing me."

"The teacher

Miss A concludes, "Therefore, the teacher is
Eer emotional response was anger.

Miss A

doesn't actually state the initial premise to herself; however, it
is already a part of her cognitive organization.

Whether or not

she has a concrete thought about the situation, she is aware of
the conclusion.
The depressed patient also shows certain patterns of illogical
thought.

These systematic "errors" of thinking, which lead to

distortions of reality, can be categorized according to the ways
in which they deviate from logical or realistic thinking.

These

illogical processes, typical of depressed individuals within
Beck's (1967) approach, include:
1.

Arbitrary inference:

The process of drawing a conclusion

when there is no evidence to support the conclusion or when the
evidence is contrary to the conclusion.
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2. Selective abstraction;

The process of focusing on a detail

taken out of context, ignoring other more salient features of the
situation, and conceptualizing the whole experience on the basis
of this element.
3. Overgeneralization: The pattern of drawing a general
conclusion on the basis of a single incident.
4. Magnification or minimization; Errors in evaluation that
are so gross as to constitute distortion.
5. Personalization: The patient's proclivity to relate external
events to himself when there is no basis for making such a connection.
6 . Dichotomous Reasoning: overly rigid and simplified perception
of events as good or bad, right or wrong, etc.
Empirical Findings
Unfortunately, evidence- in support of Beck5s formulations
has been largely anecdotal or indirect (Beck, 1967; 1970; 1971).
However, some studies have explored the experimental manipulation
of other variables relevant to depression. Loeb, Feshbach, Beck,
& Wolf (1964) randomly assigned a group of depressed and non
depressed patients (determined by scores on the Beck Depression
Inventory) to an experimentally-induced superior and inferior
performance condition.

Prior to and immediately following the

experimental task, the patients rated their own moods.

Results

showed that the psychiatric patients in the superior performance
group were more self-confident, rated themselves happier, and
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perceived others as happier than did patients in the inferior
performance group.

Depressed patients were more sensitive to

task performance than nondepressed patients in estimating how
they would do in a future task.

The depressed patients also

showed greater changes in self-ratings of their mood with task
performance.
In a subsequent study by Loeb, Beck, £ Diggory (1S71), depressed
patients (determined by a dual criterion, score on the Beck
Depression Inventory and an independent psychiatric rating) were
found to be significantly more pessimistic about their performance
than were a matched control group of nondepressed patients.

However,

the depressed patients performed as well as the control group. On a
second task in this manipulation, the previous experience of
"success"

(defined by sorting 20 cards in any of seven trials)

or "failure" had different effects on the actual performance of
the two groups:

Success improved the performance of the depressed

group, whereas failure improved the performance of the nondepressed
group.

Friedman (1964) also demonstrated that, when given cognitive

tasks to perform, even the most regressed depressed patients do as
well as nondepressed controls, despite their severe feelings of
incapacity.

He interprets this finding as being in accord with

Bibring's (1953) theoretical conception of depression as an ego
phenomenon, involving lowered self-esteem and subjective feelings
of helplessness and hopelessness.
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Hammen and Krantz (1976) reported the results of a study
comparing the changes in self-ratings of depressed and non
depressed females as a function of feedback on a performance
task.

The depressed subjects (determined by scores on two

measures of depressed mood) were found to evaluate their
personal qualities significantly more negatively than the
nondepressed subjects.

In response to an experimental

manipulation (i.e., positive feedback about their performance,
negative feedback, or no feedback), the depressed subjects
typically demonstrated strongly negative reactions to failure
as compared with the neutral condition.

The depressed subjects

became more pessimistic in the prediction of their future
performance following the negative feedback.
Hammen and Glass (1975) found that inducing depressed
college students to increased participation in enjoying
(reinforcing) activities did not necessarily reduce their
depression.

Rather, the relation between mood and reinforce

ment may depend to an important extent on cognitive factors,
because the data suggested that depressed subjects who
increased their activities tended to evaluate them more
negatively than other subjects.

This finding seems contrary

to that of Lewinsohn and his colleagues (Lewinsohn, 1974;
Lewinsohn

& Graf, 1973; Lewinsohn

& Libet, 1972), who

postulated that depression results from a reduction in
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positive reinforcement.

It is, however, in agreement with Beck

(1963), who believes that depressed mood and its attendant
cognitions result in reductions in reinforcing activities rather
than the reverse association.
Velten (1968) used a group of statements designed to be
"depressing" and controlled for the subjects' pretreatment mood
level and suggestibility.

He found that depressed mood in female

college students was induced by the depressing statements.
Weintraub, Segal, & Beck (1974) also found a time-specific
relationship between cognition and mood, i.e., male under
graduates who thought more negatively felt more "depressed."
They further stated that "the negative attitudinal set, rather
than depressed affect, may be the primary factor in depression."
This result is also in agreement with Hammen and Krantz's (1976)
finding that depressed persons tend to systematically select
dysfunctional cognitions that maintain if not enhance depression
and hopelessnessThese research findings suggest new approaches for treating
depression and new ways in which the depressed person can learn
to help himself.

As a result of these studies, some psycho

therapists are now concerned with the kinds of statements that
people make to themselves or with which they "think."

One such

new approach, based on Beck's assumptions, is called "cognitivebehavioral therapy;" it suggests that the individual's problems
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are derived largely from certain distortions of reality based on
erroneous premises and assumptions.

These incorrect conceptions

have originated in defective learning during the individual's
cognitive development.

Man can learn erroneous, self-defeating

notions, and he is capable of unlearning or correcting them as
well.

Regardless of the origin of these notions, the formula

for treating them is simple:

The therapist helps the patient

to unravel his distortions in thinking and to learn alternative,
more realistic ways to formulate his experiences.
Of particular significance to this basic question of how
undesirable affect can be served from cognition is the widelyknown work of Schachter and his colleagues.

Schachter's (1964,

1966) research supports the contention that the emotional content
of a reaction can be modified or eliminated if the cognitions
related to the emotional reaction are changed.

Such a contention

presupposes that emotional experiences always include cognitive
aspects.

Three propositions constitute the essence of Schachter's

(1971) approach:
1.

Given a state of physiological arousal for which an

individual has no immediate explanation, he will "label" this
state and describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions
available to him ...
2.

Given a state of physiological arousal for which an

individual has a completely appropriate explanation ..., no
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evaluative needs will arise and the individual is unlikely to
label his feelings in terms of [any] alternative cognitions
available ...
3.

Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual

will react emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only
to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological
arousal.
In other words, both physiological arousal and cognitive
evaluation are necessary, but neither is a sufficient condition
for the production of emotional states (Mandler, 1975).

This

two-factor theory of emotions, although not fully explaining
the link between negative cognitions and depressive affect,
suggests that affective experience is a joint product of
cognitive labeling and physiological arousal.
In an early experiment, Schachter and Singer (1962) injected
students with adrenaline and asked them to report their experiences.
Seventy-one percent reported having certain physical sensations,
the rest described "as-if" emotions; e.g., "I feel as if I were
afraid."

The researchers found that the cognition that one has

and the kind of linguistic labeling that one does determines
which emotion is experienced.

Subjects who were aware that the

cause of their arousal was adrenaline reported no emotions.

The

same physiological arousal may be experienced as joy or as anger
(or as any other emotion), depending on the cognitions available
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in the situation.

The data suggest that if a state of physiological

arousal is induced, and if the individual has no immediate expla
nation for it, he will then label his state in terms of the environ
mental-cognitive information available at the time.

Conversely,

if the state of physiological arousal is completely explained in
terms of antecedents, such as an injection, then the individual
will not use other environmental-cognitive information to label
his internal state (rdandler, 1975).

The conclusion is that an

emotion is neither a physiological event determined by factors
under the skin nor is it determined by environmental events
impinging upon the person.

Rather, it is the result of a

complex evaluation of internal and external pieces of information
and is particularly affected by a person's attributions of the
causality, intent, and extent of these factors.
The relative independence of physiological and cognitive factors
demonstrated by these experiments is somewhat overshadowed by the
necessary artificiality of the experimental situation, as physio
logical arousal is rarely artificially induced, but, instead,
caused by environmental events.

Schachter's thesis can be

applied to a depressed state as follows:

If a person suffers

a loss, he will become emotionally aroused and will scan his
environment for cues.

Then, when he notices that he has suffered

this loss, he will interpret the loss as the cause of the dysphoria.
This circular approach reflects the limitations of this particular
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experimental design when it is applied to a natural state.
However, Schachter and his colleagues' interests lay in the
relation between certe"^ artificially induced states of
physical arousal and cognition.
This approach assumes that there exists a close relation
ship between the affective and cognitive organizations in the
person.

The obvious implication for the psychotherapist is

that, if his clients can be induced to perceive differently
situations that produce disruptive feelings or emotions, he
can alter their affect in a therapeutic fashion.

In other

words, the bonds between cognition and a given maladaptive
emotion or feeling can be severed if the cognition is changed
(Arnold, 1968).

If the meaning of what is perceived determines

the emotion experienced, and if the therapist can help the
client to change his perception or understanding of the
significant events in an emotion-provoking situation, then the
affective response will also be changed.

Likewise, Beck has

suggested that one can get to the emotional disorder through
the person's thinking.

The individual's reports of his ideas,

feelings, and wishes provide the raw materials for the cognitive
model.

It is a descriptive, empirical, observational method to

deal with what people actually say and do.

A depressed person,

then, may be helped by changing his errors in thinking (i.e.,
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his dysfunctional attitudes) rather than by concentrating on
his depressed mood.
In general, cognitive psychotherapies (e.g., RationalEmotive Therapy, Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, etc.) have been
developed for treating a wide variety of disorders.

These

treatments are alleged to change faulty conceptions and self
signals; yet, for Beck’s approach to depression, no satisfactory
measure of these alleged cognitive changes is available.

An

instrument to measure the basic premise or rule underlying
the cognition would assess whether cognitive changes occur
and may predict which patients would respond to such treatments.
Review of Existing Measures
Several attempts have been made to develop instruments to
assess change in the thinking patterns of clients, particularly
with regard to changes in irrational thinking patterns.

However,

a review of these existing measures indicates that a satisfactory
instrument is not yet available (Lane, Bessai, & Bard, 1975;
Mahoney, 1977).

Bessai (1976) reviewed nine instruments that

have been developed to assess irrational thinking.

However,

she (p. 13) concluded that "the properties of these scales
reveal numerous inadequacies, including:

Items that deal with

feelings and symptoms rather than beliefs, insufficient number
of items, inadequate subject and item ratios, and failure to
investigate potential factorial complexity."
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Argabrite and Nidorf (1968) devised a 15-item, five-point
rating scale to investigate the possibility of the irrational
beliefs being used as a measure of neurosis.

Each item on the

scale was anchored at one end by a description of a rational
belief and at the other end by its corresponding irrational
belief.

They administered the scale to 204 college students,

but only reported the means, standard deviations, and ranges of
their scores.

No other information about test development was

given.
Jones (1968) designed a 100-item, five-point, factor-analyzed
instrument (The Irrational Belief Test) to quantify the relative
presence or absence of irrational beliefs in individuals.

Originally,

Jones wrote 40 items for each of 10 major irrational beliefs within
the Ellis framework.

Then, based on judges' decisions, he reduced

this to 20 items per scale.

These 200 items initially were

administered to 131 college students, and the data were factor
analyzed, resulting in 100-item, ten-point scale instrument.

In

addition, a cross validation was performed on a sample of 178
college students, 72 state mental hospital patients, and 177
volunteers from the general adult population.

These data

demonstrated high factorial validity; a strong negative relationship
between scores on the scale and education level; and no discrimi
nation with regard to age, sex, or intelligence.
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A few issues emerge from a detailed analysis of the procedures
employed by Jones in validating the Irrational Belief Test.

Ap

parently, the subject sample for the final factor analysis was
too heterogeneous; i.e., it is difficult to draw valid conclusions
from a sample comprising junior college students, seniors in
college, mental hospital patients, and adults from the general
population.

Furthermore, results from the factor analysis

produced 15 factors, yet only 10 were used (Factors 1-8, 12,
and 14); and 41 of the 100 items were not included in the scale
on which they had their highest loading.

In fact, nine of the

41 items were placed on the scale on which they had one of the
five lowest loadings.

Of these 41 items, 14 had loadings of

less than .10, and 13 had loadings of less than .20 on the
factors on which they were placed.

Such evidence leads the

reader to question whether such a study involved abuse of the
subjectivity inherent in factor analysis.

Trexler and Karst

(1972) claim that this Irrational Belief Test could be con
sidered a measure of vocabulary acquisition (i.e., whether the
subject merely has learned the language associated with
Rational-Emotive Therapy) rather than a measure of the
construct of irrationality.
Hartman (1968) developed the Personal Belief Inventory, a
60-item, self-administered, six-point (totally agree to totally
disagree) rating scale, derived from Ellisonian theory, for
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assessing specific levels of irrational thinking.

Final item

selection (from a pool of 135 items) was based on correlations
between the mean score for each item and total test scores in
a sample of 500 college students.

Reliability (internal

consistency and stability) was investigated first in a sample
ox 30 college students in a test-retest situation, five days
between testings (test-retest = .89, split half = .95) and
then in another sample of 85 college students with one week
between testings (test-retest = .91; split half = .90).
Hartman (1968, p. 7) claimed that these results " ... have
empirically shown the Personal Beliefs Inventory to possess
a high level of validity and reliability and to be extremely
sensitive to irrational thinking."
because of the following flaws:

This claim is suspect

(1) The sample sizes for

the reliability studies seem rather small;

(2) If one is

truly assessing irrational thinking, one would expect
stability to be tested over a longer period of time; five
to seven days for a test-retest investigation seems too
short; and (3) N d validation, cross-validation, or tests of
significance were reported.
Bard (1973a) developed the Self-Rating Scale for Ration
ality, a measure consisting of 20 statements of rational and
irrational values set in a Likert-scale format.

These items

were said to have been derived from the writings of Ellis; yet
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specific item selection procedures were not explained.

No data

were presented on reliability or validity of the scale, other
than a statement that each of the items was reviewed by Albert
Ellis (face validity).

In a discussion of this scale. Lane,

Eessai, & Bard (1975) questioned the stability of these scores.
Furthermore, the low correlations of the Self-Rating Scale of
Rationality with other rationality scales, together with the
inconsistency of the relationships with other measures, call
into question the construct validity of the instrument.

Bard

(1973b) also admitted to not knowing what a high rationality
score actually means; in fact, it may be "a greater familiarity
with the text, A Guide to Rational Living," which the subjects
were required to read.
MacDonald and Games (1972) developed the Ellis Scale, a
nine-point, nine-item irrational beliefs rating scale.

Items

included 9 of the 11 major irrational beliefs according to
Ellis' theory, with total scores ranging from 9 to 81.

This

instrument, however, appears to constitute merely an indication
of one's endorsement of each of Ellis' 11 irrational beliefs.
In addition, because of the way in which this scale is
structured, there is no way either to examine the factorial
composition or to investigate empiricallv the assumed unidi
mensionality of the construct "irrationality," as is implied
within this scale.
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The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Hathaway, &
McKinley, 1942) is the most widely used test in the self-rating
category.
or "false."

It consists of 568 items that are scored as "true"
A number of scales designed to measure the degree

of psychopathology and to differentiate broad categories of
psychopathology have been derived, for example, depression,
hypochondriasis, conversion hysteria, masculinity-femininity,
and several validity scales (Mendels, 197 0).

The depression

scale in particular, consisting of 60 items, includes 49 items
that discriminated hospitalized manic depressive patients from
normals and 11 items that discriminated the former from other
psychiatric patients.

However, Dahlstrom and Welsh (1962)

pointed out that a high score on the D Scale (Scale 2) does
not necessarily indicate a primary diagnosis of depression, in
that patients with other conditions (such as schizophrenia) may
be depressed and have a high D score.

In addition, the scale

has been criticized for its factor complexity (O'Connor, Stefic,
& Gresock, 1957) and lack of dimensionality (Dempsey, 1963; 1964).
Hut even more important to this study, the scale does not purport
to be a trait measure of one's beliefs, which would be the appropriate
type of instrument needed for an empirical validation of Beck's
theory.
The review of these existing measures indicated that "no one
scale seems to be sufficiently comprehensive and well-developed
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psychometrically and theoretically to warrant using it as a starting
point"

(Lane et al., 1S75). According to Baisden (1975), " —

it

appears that further research is indicated in developing an instrument
to assess the degree to which an individual holds the irrational
beliefs or engages in the irrational thinking."

Mahoney (1977) agrees

with these two viewpoints and delineates some major tasks facing a
cognitive-learning perspective, including both the development of
more reliable methods for assessing cognitive phenomena and the
refinement and extension of knowledge regarding the causal impact
of cognitive phenomena on other categories of experience (behavior,
feelings, etc.).
There seems to be consensus that, at the present time, not
only is there insufficient research on the hypothesis that the
changing of faulty beliefs or misconceptions will alter affect,
but also there are no adequate instruments for detecting the
crucial clusters of misconception.

The existing measures (of

cognitions or beliefs reviewed) appear to reflect general
feelings not beliefs (i.e., schemas or unspoken general rules
that form the logical underpinnings of cognitions); and a number
of methodological criticisms of each of the tests have been
raised.

The need for additional instruments may be caused by

differences in theoretical viewpoint and definitions among the
theorists.

Since Beck's (1967) theory revolves around the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44

notion of traits, or formulas by which an individual interacts
with his environment, a written instrument reflecting this
stability in thinking is needed.
Personality theory and research increasingly distinguish
between affective states and traits (Cattell
Spielberger, 1966).

& Scheier, 1961;

The terms "state" and "trait" are dis

tinguished primarily in terms of the duration of an emotional
experience.

An affective state refers to the momentary, here-

and-now feeling status of the individual, as exemplified by
the statement that "Mr. Jones is depressed now."

States may

last from seconds to hours, and they vary widely in intensity
as a function of the "traumas" that impinge on the organism.
The level of a depressive state (illness) may be measured by
self-report scales such as the Beck Depression Inventory
(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961).

By contrast,

a depressive trait refers to relatively stable individual
differences in depression proneness, i.e., to differences
among people in the disposition or tendency to perceive a
wide range of situations as "depressing" and to respond to
these situations with differential elevations in state
depression.

These traits usually are reactive and remain

latent until activated by the dysphoria associated with a
specific traumatic situation, a concept very similar to
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Beck's "schema.”

If a self-report instrument were available to

measure the level of a depressive trait, a first step in testing
Beck's cognitive model would be achieved.
Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this research was in part methodological and
in part substantive.

Methodologically, I hoped to validate as

measureable constructs the ideas that Beck has proposed as
"cognitive distortions" and to develop a written instrument
that is sufficiently reliable and valid for research purposes
to measure the extent to which persons hold these maladapative
beliefs.

The term "maladaptive" is applied to ideation that

interferes with the ability to cope with life experiences,
unnecessarily disrupts internal harmony, and produces inap
propriate or excessive emotional reactions that are painful
(Beck, 1976).

In other words, I attempted to design a scale

aimed at identifying the common assumptions underlying a series
of cognitions.

These assumptions or beliefs act as schemas by

which the individual's world is construed, a conceptualization
very similar to that i-y- the pioneering research by Jean Piaget
on the development of thinking patterns in children.

These

beliefs are unspoken, abstract regulations by which the individual
has judged his own worth and direction and which he may apply to
others.

Often these assumptions can be inferred by looking for

common themes in a series of cognitions.

For example, recurrent
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cognitions of being a failure when examined sight reveal desands
for perfection on each occasion.

When this ideal is not met, the

individual decides that he has failed and that he is, therefore,
"a failure."

The underlying assumption might be stated as

"Unless I am doing a perfect job all the time to the best of
my ability, I am a failure."

Once this particular attitude or

concept has been formed, it can influence subsequent judgments
and become more firmly set.

As the concept is structuralized,

it remains permanently with the individual, even though it may
be dormant.

In these cases, it is reactivated when the individual

is confronted with certain internal or external stimuli related to
this belief.

Once reactivated, the "depressogenic" schemas

generally replace more appropriate ways of organizing and
evaluating information.

If this concept of the schema is to

serve adequately as an experimental variable, techniques must
exist for its identification and measurement.
p r imary

Therefore, the

goal of this research was to design an objective

method for quantifying the relative presence or absence of
these maladaptive beliefs.

The substantive aspect of this

research, in the event the primary goal had been attained,
was to determine the relationship between these attitudes and
depressive tendency, as a preliminary investigatior. of Beck's
position.
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Research Hypotheses
As a means of structuring both the accumulation of data and
its statistical analysis, I formulated three broad research
hypotheses and their rationales:
1.

There will be a significant positive correlation between

scores on a measure of depressive affect and scores on the proposed
scale designed to measure dysfunctional attitudes.

It is hypothesized

that the greater the degree of endorsement of the dysfunctional
attitudes, the more frequent and/or the more severe the psychopathological symptomatology to be expected.

This is based on Beck's (1976)

finding that the force and prominence of maladaptive thoughts appear
to increase in measure with the severity of the patient's disturbance.
2.

Test-retest correlations for scores on the cognitive measure

will be significantly higher than those for the affective measures;
that is, negative beliefs are more persistent over time than
depressed feelings.

The depressive-prone individual will endorse

the same maladaptive attitudes, even when he's not feeling depressed
as these beliefs have became a part of his organizing and evaluating
information.
3.

Dysfunctional attitudes in normal subjects will be antecedent

to psychopathological symptomatology.

This is the basis of the

cognitive approach to affective disorders; i.e., the typical feeling
or emotional state of the individual appears to be a consequence of
the way he structures reality.
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CHAPTER II
Construction of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale
Many instruments have been proposed for measuring psycho
pathology, including inventories, interviewing methods, and
physiological indications.

In this study, I present data on

the validation of a new instrument, the Dysfunctional Attitude
Scale (hereafter abbreviated "DAS"), designed to assess the
beliefs by which a person perceives, evaluates, judges, and
gives meaning to a variety of situations.

According to Beck:

"—
people apply rules (formulas, equations,
premises) in regulating their own lives and
in trying to modify the behavior of other
people. Moreover, they label, interpret,
and evaluate according to sets of rules.
When these rules are framed in absolute
terms, are unrealistic, or are used
inappropriately or excessively, they
frequently produce maladjustment. The
ultimate result is often some kind of
disturbance: anxiety, depression, phobia,
mania, paranoid state, obsession. When the
rules lead to difficulties, they are by
definition maladaptive."
(1976, p . 246)
The DAS was developed to identify these maladaptive or dysfunctional
rules.
Test Format
One of the major assumptions involved in the construction of
attitude scales is that there will be differences in the belief
and disbelief systems of those with "favorable" attitude towards
some psychological object and those with "unfavorable" attitudes
(Edwards, 1957).

In an attempt to reflect this, the test format
48

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49

of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale is that of the typical selfreport attitude or value scale-

For each belief or attitude (the

items), seven response categories are presented:

totally agree,

agree very much, agree slightly, neutral, disagree slightly,
disagree very much, totally disagree.

On an a priori basis, the

author determined whether a disagreement or an agreement response
indicates an adaptive or maladaptive reaction to the belief in
question, i.e., whether or not the belief produces unnecessary
discomfort or suffering or leads to self-defeating behavior.
Scaling is on a modified Likert (1932) model, with the adaptive
end of the scale being assigned an arbitrary value of one, the
next category two, etc., and with zero being used for omits on
each item as a code for missing data.

Thus, a "disagree-type"

response to an adaptive item was made equivalent to an "agreetype" response to a maladaptive item.

This Likert response

format allows finer distinction by subjects than the traditional
two-choice format (for example, agree-disagree). Velicer and
Stevenson (1978) found that use of this finer-grained response
format in the development of personality scales leads to a more
•precise definition of scales and a greater explained portion of
the total variance.

They say, "Research employing scales con

structed in this way would be more likely to obtain meaningful
relationships to other variables, and the items involved in
these relationships would be more accurately identified" (p. 295).
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Each individual earns a score (1-7) for every item, and his
total Dysfunctional Attitude score is simply the sum of his item
scores.

For each item, a score of 1 corresponds to the most

adaptive way of responding to that item and a score of 7, the
most maladaptive.

The individual's total score, therefore,

represents a combination of the number of depressogenic beliefs
he endorses and the strength with which he believes each of them.
The higher the total score, the more distorted is the individual's
way of thinking.

The fundamental assumption involved in scaling

by the method of equal-appearing intervals is that the intervals
into which the statements are rated are, in fact, equal.

There

is nothing contained within the procedure of equal-interval scaling
to provide a check on Lhis assumption.

An empirical study by

Hevner (1930) did indicate, however, that when the same stimuli
were scaled both by the method of paired comparisons and the
method of equal-appearina intervals, the relationship between
the two sets of scale values was approximately linear, except
at the two extremes of the equal-appearing interval continuum
(Edwards, 1957).
Initial Item Selection
I wrote an initial pool of items, with the goal that they
should reflect the maladaptive statements found to be character
istic of depressed patients in therapy.
clinically derived.

The items were primarily

A number of clinicians sent me lists of those
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verbalizations and thinking patterns most characteristic of their
depressed patients.

These patterns had been based on data obtained

from observations made during psychotherapeutic interviews.
patients had been adjudged depressed by two criteria:

The

score on

the Hamilton Rating Scale of Depression (Hamilton, 1S60), a
clinical measure, and score on the Beck Depression Inventory
(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), a self-report
measure.

Since Beck (1967) has noted that "each nosological

group showed an idiosyncratic ideational content that distinguished
it from each of the others," I tried to target in on those verbal
izations which occurred most frequently in this patient population.
The content represented in these depressive cognitions was pre
dominantly negative in tone and self-referential in direction,
reflecting the preoccupation of the depressed individual with
self-derogatory and self-blaming thoughts; e.g., "Either I am
one hundred percent successful in everything or I am a failure."
Moreover, because the depressed patient projects into the future
his notions of real or imagined loss, the items selected deal
with his pessimistic and hopeless attitude, as well as his
belief that his current discomfort is unending and unalterable.
The ideational content leading to anxiety, sadness, euphoria,
or anger is similar to the ideational content responsible for
anxiety reactions, depression, mania, and paranoid states,
respectively.

The difference is that in psychopathology the
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ideational content represents a distortion of a.realistic situation,
whereas the normal cognitive responses encompass a reasonable
approximation of the reality situation (Beck, 1976)Depressogenic schemas have a number of additional character
istics which may explain that, while everyone has schemas that
relate to self-assessment and interpersonal relationships, not
everyone gets depressed.

One defining characteristic is in

flexible or absolute rules of conduct and evaluation, which
becomes manifest in the patient's language in the form of
rigid quantifiers (i.e., "all," "always," "never"), categorical
imperatives ("must," "ought," "have to"), and preemptive class
assignments ("nothing-but").

These rules were demonstrated by

such items as "I should be happy all the time," "I cannot be
happy unless most people I know admire me," "I am nothing if a
person X love doesn't love me."

In addition, the depressed

patient's characteristic, stereotypic conclusions and assess
ments contain certain systematic "errors" of thinking (Beck,
1967).

Therefore, in the final wording of the statements, I

attempted to simulate thinking errors that typically lead to
and/or aggravate depression.

These typical depressive cognitions

can be categorized according to the ways in which they deviate
from logical or realistic thinking.

The patient's appraisal of

reality may not be distorted, but his system of making inferences
or drawing conclusions from his observations is at fault.
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Illogical processes, typical of depressed patients witnxn Beck's
(1967) approach, and described by the DAS items include:
1.

Arbitrary Inference:

Drawing a conclusion when evidence

is lacking or supports a contrary conclusion, i.e., "If I perform
a selfish act, this means I am a selfish person."

This is one's

tendency to conclude something (usually of a personally denigratory
nature) from a situation that is essentially neutral or impersonal.
One fails to realize that there are more probable explanations for
particular situations.
2.

Magnification of Minimization:

Exaggeration or under

estimation of the meaning of an event, i.e., "I should set higher
standards for myself than other people."

Here a person exaggerates

difficulties and limitations and minimizes achievements and
capabilities.
3-

Selective Abstraction:

Abstracting a detail out of

context, and thus missing the significance of the total situation;
i.e., "If a person is indifferent to me, it means he does not like
me."

This occurs when an individual, corrected for one minor

aspect of his work, immediately jumps to the conclusion that
everything he does is inadequate; he cannot be easily dissuaded
from this idea.
4.

Dichotomous Reasoning:

Overly rigid and simplified

perception of events as good or bad, right or wrong, etc.; i.e.,
"I must be a useful, productive, creative person or life has no
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purpose."

Here, the individual sees life as black or white, with

no other alternatives in between.
5.

Overgeneralizations;

Unjustified generalizations on the

basis of a single incident; i.e., "People will probably think less
of me if I make a mistake."

This usually involves an overall

conclusion based on a single, often minor, experience or incident.
The ultimate goal was to obtain an approximately equal
representation of adaptive and maladaptive beliefs as a means
of controlling for acquiescent response set.

However, valid

adaptive statements proved to be more difficult to write than
maladaptive ones.

I constructed a preliminary version of the

DAS, consisting of 85 items, and administered it to a group of
residents in psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, who
were apprised of the purpose of the test and who provided their
opinions regarding the face validity and comprehensibility of
the items.

Each resident was instructed to pick the items that

he felt most accurately described and measured the attitudes
inherent in the espousal of Beck's approach.

I also asked them

to evaluate the logic of each item; i.e., to separate out those
items which were truisms (i.e., "If I go up to a stranger on the
street and punch him in the mouth, he will get angry";, as
opposed to the required beliefs (i.e., "I may be able to
influence other people's behavior, but I can't control it").
In addition, 50 individuals (33 females and 17 males) enrolled
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in a graduate course in adolescence at the University of Pennsylvania
were asked by their professor to complete the scale, commenting on
any ambiguities or technical problems.

Product-moment correlations

were obtained from these data (item-item and item-total correlations).
Then, I eliminated those items that did not seem to be tapping the
same faulty thinking processes.

This revised draft was given to

Aaron T. Beck, whose writings stimulated the creation of these
items, for review.

Further modifications in wording were made,

and additional items were constructed, resulting in a total of
100 items.
A crucial decision to be made involved the dimensionality
of the instrument.

I chose to treat the DAS as a "single scale

psychological instrument"

(Horst, 1968 ), that is, to have a

single total score for each person and to "ignore" the fact
that this score may be based on a number of different malad
aptive beliefs.

Based on Beck's (1967) postulate of a

"cognitive distortion," I constructed a number of items which,
when taken as a set, should indicate depressogenic attitudes.
Even though each specific item may cover a different belief
or maladaptive way of viewing various situations, it becomes
a necessary component in reflecting one's tendency to employ,
in general, adaptive or maladaptive attitudes.

In addition,

in considering the temporal stability of responses, I was not
so much concerned with the stability of a person's response to
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a single item.

With enough items, the stability of a total score

may be adequate, even though responses to individual items may
fluctuate over a period of time.
Refinement of the Scale
A sample of 275 undergraduates (100 males and 175 females)
at the Pennsylvania State University were administered the 100item version of the DAS by a member of the Department of Psychology.
The major criticism voiced by these volunteers was the amount of
time needed to complete this number of items.

Therefore, in an

attempt to balance brevity and reliability, I factor-analyzed
the data obtained from this population and employed an adaptation
of a method described by Gulliksen (1950, pp. 207-210) to construct
two parallel forms.
Initially, data from the 100-item DAS were intercorrelated.
Factor-analytic procedures were then applied in an attempt to
determine the minimum number of factors that could adequately
account for the resultant correlation matrix.

This is in

agreement with Xerlinger and Pedhazur (1973) who say:
"Factor analysis is a method for reducing a
large number of variables (tests, scales,
items, persons, and so on) to a smaller
number of presumed underlying unities
called factors. Factors are usually
derived from the intercorrelations among
variables __
factors are constructs,
hypothesized variables that reflect the
variance shared by tests, items, and
scales and responses to them, and, in
fact almost any sort of stimuli and
responses to stimuli."
(pp. 360-361)
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Results indicated that ten factors (or, latent variables) were
extracted (see Tables 1 and 2) from the 100 items of the DAS.
However, as already stated, I had decided to treat the construct
of cognitive distortions in a unidimensional way at this time,
and therefore

I concentrated on the first factor extracted,

which identifies the most general dimension and accounts for
the maximal common variance among all the items.

An in-depth

factor analytic study will be carried out at a later date to
determine the more minor dimensions accounting for subsets of
the items.
The factor analytic results were used to construct two
parallel forms of the DAS.

According to the procedure I

employed (Gulliksen, 1950), each item was represented by a
point on a scatter diagram, the abscissa of which represents
the mean score on the item (or its "popularity" in the sample),
and the ordinate represent is factor loading on Factor I, the
general factor (before rotation) of the analysis.

This

procedure is congruent with that used in item analysis of
cognitive tests (Henrysson, 1971); the popularity index corresponds
to the "difficulty index" and the factor loading corresponds to the
"discrimination index."

Each item having a factor loading of less

than .15 (19 items in total) was ignored.

Then, the remaining

items plotted in the same approximate region were paired, (see
Figure 1).

Two additional items which could not be paired off
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0 .1 3 © - 0 . 0 5 1 - 0 . 0 7 5
—O .C o l
0.016
0 .0 8 6
- 0 .2 9 0 -0 .3 5 1
0 .0 9 6
-0 .1 4 2 -0 .0 3 4
0 -3 7 4
0 .3 5 8 - 0 . 0 7 7 - 0 . 0 8 2
0 .2 7 3
0 .0 8 9 - 0. t G £
0 .0 9 7 - 0 . 1 0 6 - 0 . 1 2 5
0 .1 5 8
0. 0 9 3 - 0 . 1 0 5
0 .0 6 3 - 0 . 2 1 7 - 0 . 1 4 7
—0 *2 4 3 - 0.019
0 .1 2 8
- 0 . 2 8 0 - 0.000 - 0 . 3 5 1
0 .1 2 7 - 0 . 2 2 5 - 0 . 2 6 2
0 .0 3 1
0 .1 3 2
0 .0 2 9
0.120 0 . 2 9 6 - 0 . 1 6 7
-0 .0 6 0
0.212 0 . 0 5 5
-0 .1 7 1
0 . 083
0 .1 4 5
0 .0 6 4 - 0.222
0 .2 2 9
0.201 - C . 0 0 4
0.011
0 .0 6 0 - 0 . 2 1 4
0 .0 6 5
_ 0 .!7 6 -0 .3 2 4
0 .0 2 2
0 .1 0 3
0 .0 7 1 - 0 . 2 2 4
0 ,2 1 6 - 0 .1 06 - 0 . 0 8 9
0 .2 8 5
0.000
9 .1 3 9
- 0 . 3 0 2 - 0 .002 - 0 . 0 9 3
-0 .0 0 9
0 .2 7 4 - 0 .1 5 1
-0 .0 7 1
C .2 5 0
0 .0 5 5
0 .0 0 4
0 .1 S S - 0 . 0 6 2
0 .0 1 6
0 .1 8 9 - 0 .0 7 1
- 0 * 2 8 5 L 0 *0 1 ,7 . - 0 * 3 0 3

6

7

0

9

0 * 1 7 0 -0 .0 5 7

10

0.010
0 .0 8 0 - 0 . 1 5 6
-0 .0 8 7 - 0 * 0 * 7
0 .0 4 3
- 0 . 1 3 2 - 0 . 1 3 9 - 0 . 1 5 7 - 0.01 i
0.122
0 .0 1 2 -0 .0 6 4
0 .2 4 0 - 0 . 2 8 2
0 .3 6 3
-0 .0 2 8
0 .0 2 4 - 0 . 2 5 7
0.012 - 0 . 0 0 8
0 .3 2 7
0 .1 4 0
0 .1 1 9
0 .2 0 9 - 0 .1 IL .
0 .1 2 7 -0 .1 7 4 - 0 .3 3 9
0 .0 3 3
0 .0 0 7
0 .1 0 3 - 0 - 0 7 1 - 0 f 179 - 0 * 0 7 3 r 0 . 0 4 i
0 .1 2 4
0 .1 5 0
0 .6 6 3 - 6 . 0 4 6
0 .1 1 6
0 .0 1 C
0 .1 5 1 —0 .0 5 6 - 0 . 0 0 6
0 .2 9 3
-0 .2 9 1
0 .1 9 6
0 .0 4 5 - 0 . 0 1 7
C . 165
0 *1 5 4
0 .0 5 4 _ - 0 « 0 3 S
0 ,0 3 7
0 *2 7 0
0 .0 6 5
0 .1 V 6 - 0 . 0 9 3 - 0 . 1 2 7 - 0 . 2 7 7
0 .0 9 0
0 « 2 4 2 - 0.010 “ P .* !? *
0. 140
0 .1 4 2
-0 .0 4 5
0 .2 4 7 - 0.022
0 .1 0 9
- 0 .2 0 9 -0 .0 5 4 -0 .2 7 7
0 .0 1 3
0.102
0 .0 8 5
0 .2 6 5
0 .1 3 6
0.101
O.OS3
- 0 .1 9 3 -0 .0 8 2
0 .0 9 5
0 *0 5 3
0 .0 7 1
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 6 1
0 .0 9 6
0 .2 6 9
0 .0 9 2
0 .1 0 0
0 .0 3 9 - 0 . 0 5 6
0 .C 3 6
-0 .0 0 3
0 .1 1 ? - 0 . 0 5 1
0 .0 6 6
0. 2C8
0 .1 7 0
0 .2 5 6
0 .1 2 7 - 0 . 3 3 7 - 0 . 0 8 1
-0 .0 6 0
0 .1 0 6 - 0 . 0 6 4
0 .0 9 1
0 .3 0 2
0 .2 5 1
0 .0 9 4 - 0 . 1 3 7
0 .0 6 4
0 . 156
0 .1 7 0 -0 .1 6 2
0 .1 78
3 .2 1 5 - 0 .1 2 C
0 .1 7 9 - 0 . I l l
0.212
0 .1 6 0 - 0 . 1 3 ?
0 .2 1 4
O.OoO
0 .0 3 0 - 0 , 0 0 6 - 0 . 0 6 2
- 0 .0 1 0 -O .tlO
0 .1 5 3 - 0 . 0 7 0
0 .0 9 2
-0 .0 0 3
0 .0 0 0 - 0 . 1 3 8 - 0 . 3 5 7
0 .1 4 9
0 .2 7 4 -0 .1 8 0
0.202 - 0 . 0 5 9
0 .1 7 4
0 .3 5 9
0 .0 2 9 - 0 . 0 2 6 - 0 . 0 6 6
0 .0 4 3
- 0 .1 9 5
0 .0 2 3 - 0 . 0 5 3
0 .1 5 0 - 0 . 0 4 2
I
- w . 1 57 - 0 .0 6 2
0 .0 5 0 - C . 150
0 .2 2 9
0 .0 9 3
0 .0 3 4
0.166
0 .2 8 8
0 .0 9 8
0 .1 0 6 - O . lO i
0 .0 6 3 - 0 . 0 1 4 - 0 . 1 0 6
-0 .0 8 1 -0 .1 2 7 -0 .0 6 5
0 .0 7 5 - 0 . 0 6 6
0 .3 5 0
0 .1 2 2
0 .0 8 $ “
!" - o ; 2 i i '
0 . 2 6 1 - 0.100
0.222
0 .0 6 1
O .O t l -0 .3 4 6
0 .1 1 6
0 .0 0 7
0 .0 6 9
-o ,0 7 0
C .0 7 9
C.JOO - 0 . 0 1 6
0.001
0 .0 0 5 -0 .1 0 0
0 .1 8 3 - 0 . 3 6 7
0. 200
- 0 .0 2 7 -0 .2 0 1
0 .1 5 7
0 .0 6 *
0 . 143
0 .1 7 2 - 0 . 11© 0 .2 1 9
0 .0 9 5
0 .1 2 5
0 .1 2 7
0 .0 6 5 - 0 . 1 5 0 - 0 . 0 6 3
0 .1 9 5
0 . 0 2 5 - 0 .1
- o . K i * - n . i c . f i _r0* 000_
- 0 .0 0 1 - 0 .2 2 2 " u . 130
C .1 4 2
C .0 1 2
O.tiAfe - 0 . 2 4 4 - 0 . 0 4 6 - f t . .111
.s fla u ..
0 .0 6 6
0 .1 3 2 - 0 . 1 6 3
0 .0 6 5
0 .0 0 9
-U .2 Q 4 — C .0 8 B - 0 . 0 0 4
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Table 1 (cont.)
Facto\s
Itema

1

50
51
52
5J
55

__

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0 .6 8 7
0 .4 9 4 - 0 . 0 5 7 - 0 . 0 1 6
0 .0 7 5 - 0 . 3 6 0
0 .0 0 9 - 0 . 1 1 5 - 0 - 0 5 8 - 0 . 0 d 6
------ U .2 9 0 _ 0 .0 2 8 - 0 . 1 3 3 - 0 . 2 4 6
0 .1 9 3
0 .0 2 9 - 0 . 0 1 2
0 .1 9 9 - 0 . 1 7 6
0 .0 3 6
0 .3 7 9 - 0 . 3 6 5 - 0 . 2 2 6
0 .0 3 6 - 0 . 0 7 9
0 .1 6 9
0 .1 6 8
0 .0 4 8
0 .0 6 4
0 .C 2 7
0 .4 1 8
0 .1 3 3
0 .5 3 7
0 .2 1 5
0 .2 6 9
0 .5 0 9
0 .1 1 1
0 .1 6 9
- 0 .2 6 0
0 .1 6 7
0 « lt B - 0 - 0 1 4
0 .0 7 6 - 0 . 3 9 0

66
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
76
75
76
77
?S
70
BO
81
82
83
0*
85
86
87
08
89
90
51
92
93
55

-0 .2 8 9
-0 .1 1 7
0 .0 3 9
-0 .3 9 7
0 .1 3 9
0«252
-0 .3 4 6

0 .2 1 1
0 .1 1 2
-0 .1 0 9
-0 .1 2 9
-0 .0 5 2
-O -0 2 7
-0 .0 3 5

-0 .0 0 8 -0 .0 8 6
0 .1 4 2
0 . 1 1 7 - 0 . 0 5 0 * - 0 . I 18
- O .O C f - 0 * 7 0 9
0 .0 7 7 * 0 . 0 4 7 - 0 . 0 4 0 * 0 . 0 1 8
0 .0 6 7 - O . O l f
0 .1 5 2 - 0 . 1 1 9 - 0 . 1 3 5
0 .2 0 0
-0 .2 1 6
0 .0 4 0
0 .0 6 5
0 .0 9 7
0 .1 9 7 - 0 . 0 2 3
0 .4 2 0
0 .3 6 0 -0 .2 6 8 - 0 .3 0 8
0 .0 7 6
0 .0 5 0
-O -O O f
0 *2 7 1
n . |? o . n a.iQn
- o lAr.
-0 .0 6 7
0 .2 5 3
0 .0 5 4 " 0 .0 5 1
0 . 1 0 3 ' 0 .0 7 1

0 .3 4 2 - 0 . 3 1 9
0 .0 9 2 - 0 . 1 0 4 - 0 . 1 1 9
0 .0 0 3 - 0 . 0 6 7
0 .0 Z 4 - 0 . 1 6 9 - 0 . 0 0 8
0 .2 7 9
0 .5 1 3
0 .1 2 0
0 .1 2 9 - 0 .0 7 8 -0 .1 4 1
0 .1 2 2 - 0 . I H 2 - n . n i n .n .n T 4
- 0 .1 4 8
0 .3 0 1 - 0 . 3 0 6 - 0 . 1 3 5 - 0 . 1 1 4 - 0 . 0 2 6 - 0 .2 4 5
0 .1 7 2 - 0 . 1 7 3 - 0 . 1 5 6
- 0 .0 6 1

0 .0 7 1 - 0 . 1 6 7

0. HZ

- 0 .4 0 6 -0 .1 8 6 -0 .0 7 4

0 .3 1 6
0 .3 0 5 - 0 . 3 0 2 * 0 . 1 0 4
0 .0 2 9
------ 0 *4 0 2 - 0 . 1 1 5
0 .2 7 7
0 .0 4 7 * 0 . 0 9 3
-0 .0 3 2
0 .4 1 5 - 0 . 2 ) 3 - 0 . 0 9 1 - 0 . 1 3 6
0 .4 6 4 - 0 . 1 2 9

0 .i7 2
0 .0 3 6
0 .2 0 9
0 .0 4 1 * 0 . 0 4 3 * 0 . 1 7 7
0 .0 6 5 - 0 .1 5 2
0 .1 6 7

0 .4 * 5
0 .0 9 2 - 0 . 1 2 1
0 .1 3 4
----- 0 .3 9 5 — 0 . 0 4 1 , 0 . 1 3 3 - 0 . 1 1 3
0 .2 3 6 - 0 . C 8 3
0 .0 5 2 - C .2 2 S

0 .0 6 6 - 0 . 0 2 9
0 . 2 6 4 0 .2 7 2
0 .1 2 9 - 0 ,1 4 5

' 0 . 1 3 8 " 0 .3 0 7
0 . l i i t ' - 0 . 052
0 .1 7 6
0 .0 9 7 -0 .7 7 4 -0 .7 7 5
0 .2 5 5
0 .2 0 6
0 .1 6 6 - 0 . 0 2 5

0 .5 2 8

% of var.
*

0 *1 2 ? - 0 .0 2 3
0 .0 7 1 - O . m 7
0 .0 8 7 - 0 . 2 0 8

- 0 .2 9 9 - 0 . 1 0 5 ” 0 . 0 2 / " - 0 . 0 2 »

0 .4 1 4 - 0 . 0 1 1 - 0 . 1 9 1

- 0 .2 4 0 -0 .0 2 1 -0 .1 8 1

0 . 1 7 5 - 0 .0 6 5 - 0 . 0 1 2

0 .1 8 0 - 0 . 2 4 7
0 .1 9 5 -0 .0 6 1
0 .3 6 2
0 .4 1 3
0 .2 1 5
0 .0 4 8
0 .3 6 5
0 .4 6 7
0 .4 0 5 - 0 . 1 1 8
0 .1 9 4
0 .2 4 5
------0 . 3 0 1 _ - 0 . 3 U
0 .5 1 0 - 0 . 1 8 4
0 .3 2 8 - 0 . 2 9 5
0 .2 6 0
0 .0 8 1

100

0 .3 6 3

0 .0 1 4 - 0 . 1 0 1

0 .0 8 9
0 .2 5 6
0 .2 5 9 - 0 .0 0 5 - 0 .0 8 2
0 .1 5 8
-----D .3 4 5 - 0 . 1 9 1
0 ,3 4 1 - 0 . 0 7 8 - 0 .0 U 2
0 .0 7 0
0 .5 4 6
0 . 0 8 9 - O .S 7 ? 0 . 1 5 ! - O . S i ; - 0 . 1 0 5

96
?7
58
99

0 .2 0 7 - 0 . 1 6 8

0 .1 7 7 - C . 1 4 2

-0 .1 2 0

95
...

3

0 .4 1 4
0 .4 2 9
0 .1 9 7 0 .0 6 5 - 0 . 1 5 0 - 0 . 1 3 5
O.'lSO - 0 . 2 8 0 - 0 . 0 1 5 - 0 . 0 6 3
----- 9 . 5 2 3 - = 0 . 2 6 5 — U « lS 5 _ = H » 1 6 5 _ r J .llS _ = 0 .f l6 0 .- : O .B lS t O .U O l J l . 2 0 l _ t 8 . 0 6 8
0 .5 2 6
0 .1 0 5
0 .1 2 2
0 . I l l -0 .0 3 1 -0 .2 6 0
0 .0 8 6 - 0 . 0 8 9
0 .0 3 2 -0 .1 7 3

56
57
58
59
60
61
62

...

2

2 0 .0

S e e T a b le

1 1 .2
3 fo r

-0 .2 7 5
0 .1 5 2
- 0 .0 7 2
0 .1 1 4
0 .0 2 3
0 .1 6 0
-0 .3 5 5
0 .1 2 6
-0 .1 0 5
-0 .2 3 3
-0 .4 7 8
5 .0

0 .0 8 0
-0 .1 4 5
- 0 .2 2 6
-0 .0 2 4
0 .2 7 8
-0 .2 1 3
0 .0 4 3
-0 .1 4 8
0 .2 7 5
0 .0 8 3
- 0 .3 9 0

0 .1 2 1

0 .1 1 1

0 .2 8 3
0 .0 0 5
-0 .1 4 3
0 .2 7 7
0 .0 7 6
0 .0 1 0
-0 .2 0 0
0 -2 1 6
-0 .0 1 8
0 .0 8 8
-0 .0 1 4
0 .0 0 9
0 .0 3 1
0 .2 2 0
-0 .0 0 5 -0 .2 5 8
-0 .0 2 2
0 .0 5 7
0 .2 8 9 - 0 . 0 9 2
- 0 .1 0 6
0 .1 1 0

4 .0

t h e w o r d in g o f

376

3 .3

each

ite m .

0 .1 1 7

0 .0 2 0 -0 .2 3 0

0 .1 8 9
0 .0 9 9
0 .1 9 7
0 .1 4 1
0 .1 1 3 - 0 . 0 6 5
0 .0 3 5 - 0 . 0 8 8
0 .2 5 4
0 .0 4 9 - 3 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 2 0 7
- 0 . 0 8 3 - 0 .0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 .2 1 5

-0 .1 8 0

0 .1 6 1
-0 .0 1 8
0 .0 3 3
0 .1 6 1
0 .1 2 1
-0 .1 7 6
-0 .1 8 0
0 .0 4 7
-0 .0 3 7
0 .0 9 7
0 .0 4 6

0 .0 2 7
0 .7 4 4
-0 .0 9 4
-0 .0 3 1
0 .0 9 8 '
- 0 T 117
0 .0 5 7
0 .0 9 9
-0 .0 7 6
- C .0 7 7
-0 .0 2 6

3 .2

- 0 .0 7 3 -0 .0 6 3
-0 .1 2 6 -0 .1 8 4
- 0 .0 9 1 - 0 . 1 1 4
-0 .1 6 3 -0 .1 3 2
-0 .1 2 0
0 .0 3 8
-0 .0 6 7
0 .p )8
0 .2 2 8
0 .0 8 0
0 .2 0 2
0 .0 1 1
-O .O o d
0 .0 0 9
0 .0 5 5
0 .1 d 9
-0 .0 4 0
0 .1 5 4
2 .9

2 .7
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2 .6

T a b le 2
R o ta te d O rth o g o n a l F a c to r M a t r ix
1 00 Ite m
<n -

DAS

275)

F a c to rs

Itests8
02
_B3L

04

_05_
06

_az_
os
-0 9 .

10

11

12
13

14
_12_
16

JL
18

_J2_
20

_21_

22

_2i_
24
_ZS_
26

_2I_
28
29
30
31

32

_aa_

34
_15

36
38
_22_
40
_S1_
42
43
44

45
46

_4I_
48
_4£_

9

10

— Q .3 0 7 - 0 . 0 1 4
0 .0 9 1 -0 .0 7 a
o . o ? 7 g -t'9 7
0 .1 2 2 .rO »08i_rO.P41__
0 .4 3 5
0 .2 3 4
0. 187 - 0 - 1 1 5 - 0 . 0 0 7 - 0 . 0 3 0 - 0 . 1 0 4 0 .0 4 1 - 0 . 0 2 4 0 .0 9 4
0.448 0 .7 0 9 • 0 .1 2 3 - 0 . 2 4 3 0 .0 3 5 0 .0 9 5 - O . l B t - 0 . 0 9 1 - 0 . 0 06 0 .0 1 3
0 .0 6 9
0 .1 0 6 - 0 .0 7 2
0 .0 7 4 0 . 0 69 - 0 .0 9 0
0 .1 2 6 - 0 . 0 5 7 - 0 . 0 0 7
0 .5 7 4
J .2 1 2 _ 0 . 153_S .419_z5. 273 _r0. 9 8 2 .. 0 .0 4 7 . r 0 . 0&2 .. 0 .0 6 5 = 0 .0 9 3 = 0 .1 3 4 _
0 .0 9 3
0 .0 1 S - 0 . 1 6 6 - 0 . 2 1 2
O.i0 4 5
0 .2 1 0
0 .4 2 3 - 0 . 0 4 1 - 0 . 1 6 2
0 .0 7 1
_<1,124__0.169_^.M3 _ a.0 ?*_ril..4.46_ 0 . l l t _ r i ) « 2 0 2 . 0 .9 2 6 _ 0 . 100 _ = Q .0 6 J __
0 .0 8 3
0 .1 *1 8
0 .4 8 4
0 .0 5 1 - 0 . 0 78
0 .0 8 (1
0 .0 3 9
0 .1 1 4 - 0 . 1 0 6
0 .0 4 9
0 .0 5 7
0 .0 1 3
0 .0 6 4
0 .0 6 1 o 1 0 4
0 .0 2 2 __ 0 . 6 0 4 - 0 . 0 1 3
0 . 041 - 3 . 1 4 3
0 .0 2 2
0 .0 2 8
0 . 0 3 2 - 0 . 6 4 2 - 0 189 0 .0 1 9 - 0 .1 7 5
0 .0 4 0
0 .0 0 2 - 0 .0 1 1
- 0 . 3 ? L _ = 8 .9 M _ J U 1 S 2 _ = 9 , 3 0 4 0 . 0fi4_=J!,34«_5,t>il-^a,2*5
e,9lS_O.04L_
0 .X 6 3
0 . 3 9 9 - 0 . 1 7 3 - 0 . 1 0 5 - 0 . '0 61
0 .0 4 3
0 .2 1 4
0 .0 6 7
0 .1 1 0
C .2 2 7
M 2 _ = 4 s _ H l . = o , o i o -o ., 2 1 1 - Q .|9 2 _ = 0 ,0 9 9 = 0 .1 2 9
0 . 3 6 6 - 0 .2 0 2
0 .0 0 8
0 . 3 0 2 - 0 . 4 1 2 - 0 . 0 3 7 0.<0 5 4
0 .0 1 4
0 .0 8 6 - 0 . 2 8 4
0 .2 2 8
0 .1 8 5
0 .0 3 3
0 .2 3 2 - 0 .1 5 4 - 0 .4 7 0 -0 046 -0 .0 4 1
0 .0 2 0 - 0 . 0 2 8
0 003 - 0 . 0 8 6
0 .0 8 2
0 .6 6 0
0 .0 5 4 - 0 . 0 4 3
0 .0 3 3
0 .0 4 2 - 0 . 122
0 .0 4 5
0 .1 3 6
0 .0 4 6
r s k 1 *5 __ a , 9 9 L _ e , 9 3 1 _ 0 . |Q 4 - O , p * l_ = 0 .1 3 2 _ 0 .3 9 5 - 0 . 0 9 6 , - 9 . 0 0 4
0 .0 6 4
0 .3 5 9
0 .2 0 6 0 .2 1 2 - 0 . 2 4 5
0 .1 6 8
- 0 . 1 0 5 0 .0 7 3
0 .1 3 3 0 . 0 4 7 ' o . i i z '
-S , Z_J>, _= .. # _=S-i fe_ 0 , P 7 9 _ 0 . 0 6 3 0 .1 5 5 0 . 1 ) 5 - 0 . 0 6 8 -Pf?44
0 .0 6 7
0 . 1 6 2 - 0 . 0 3 6 - 0 . 3 0 5 - •0 .0 5 2
- 0 . 0 5 4 6 .0 1 1
0 .0 6 3 - 0 . 2 2 J
0 006
^ 1 .1 0 4 - 0 .3 9 9
0 .1 5 2 - 0 . 1 3 8
0 .0 2 4
= 0 .0 1 1 0 .2 3 9 - 0 . 0 1 7 - 0 . 0 0 3
P»16B
0 .0 6 4
0 .0 7 6 - 0 .0 9 5
0.100 0 .0 7 9 - 0 . 1 6 2 - 0 . 0 6 5 -0.000 0 . 492 0 .1 1 7
- 2.220___
0 . 0 9 6 - 0 . 0 1 9 __ g . 9 0 9 . -fiiOJO 0 .0 4 5 _ 0 .p 2 8 _
-0 .0 2 5 - 0 .1 3 7
0 .0 9 4
0 .5 3 9 - 0 . 0 2 2
0 .1 1 4 - 0 . 1 1 4
0 .0 4 8
0 .0 4 3
.2 .1 3 1
0 - 1 S I__ 0 . 1 0 6
0 . 4 36
0 . 2 44
0 .0 5 4 _ 0 .0 6 0 _
0 .3 7 0 - 0 . 0 2 2 - 0 . 1 6 6
0.172 0 . 0 4 2 - 0 . 0 5 3
0 .3 0 6
0 .1 0 5
0 . 1 4 0 ’ 6 10 4 5
0 .0 5 9
0 .2 5 0
0 .1 7 1
0 .2 4 4
0.012 0 .0 4 7 0 .0 1 1
0 .1 7 4 O . 216_ 0 .1 0 2
— * £ 2 - 0 . 0 9 2 - 0 . 1 70 0.021 - 0 .0 9 1 - 0 . 1 6 9 0 .0 4 3 - 0 .1 1 7
0.212
0 l0 5 2
= 0 .0 1 4 __ 0 . 1 8 ) __ 0 . 3 8 6 • 0 .0 2 5
0 .0 0 2 - 0 . 0 2 0 - 0 . 0 9 1 J J .0 8 5
0 .1 6 2
0 .2 8 5
0 .1 6 1
0 . 0 4 3 - 0 . 1 3 6 - 0 . 2 9 1 -0 .1 4 1
0 .1 2 1 - 0 . 0 2 4
0 i3 5 2
O J l2 3 * 0 . 2 4 1 '
= 0 .0 5 8 - 0 . 1 1 7 0 . 0 4 0 - 0 . 0 0 4 ■ 0 .5 6 2 - 0 . 0 3 7 __ 0 .0 1 7 , 0.112 0 .1 O 4
0 .0 9 2 _
-0 .0 6 6
0 .1 4 4
0 .3 9 2
0 .1 4 1
0 .1 1 7 - 0 .1 0 7
O .id O
0 .0 4 5 0 .1 9 5 - 0 .0 5 9
_ 0 .4 ? 8
0 .0 0 6 - 0 .2 7 5 - 0 .0 4 4
0 .0 1 1 - 0 . 2 9 9 - O . 0 04 0
0.0 5 5 - 00..0 7 2 - 0 .0 6 4
-0 .0 0 3 - 0 .0 0 8 - 0 .2 8 4
0 . 1 27 - 0 .1 3 5 - 0 . 0 5 5
0 .3 2 4 • 0 .0 3 8
0 . 185 0.040
0 . 0 6 7 - 0 . 33 1 • 0 .0 1 9 - 0 .1 9 5 - 0 . 0 9 4 - 0 . 0 6 9
O.OUl - 0 .2 3 3 :C .0 6 3
0 .1 3 7
0 . 5 3 9 - 0 . 0 4 4 - 0 .0 7 2
0 .0 4 7
0 .0 2 8 - 0 .0 7 3
0 . 3 1 4 ' 0 .0 2 3 " •U.U31'
iil 0.024 0.Q71 - 0 .1 6 1
0 . 0 4 2 __0 .0 6 3 - 0 . 007
O.J3S •Q ,6 o 2 _ 0 .0 5 5 _
0 .0 7 1
0 .1 0 8
0 .0 2 0
0 .0 7 7
0 .1 0 8
0 -9 6 2
O .o S j
0 .1 7 8 - 0 .3 5 9
0 .* 3 l
0 . 8 53 - 0 . 0 1 0
0 . 0 4 4 - 0 . 1 7 2 • 0 .0 6 6 0 .0 4 5
0 .0 3 5
0 .1 8 U ■0.012 0 .1 3 0
0 .3 0 5 - 0 . 0 8 7
0 .2 2 1 - 0 . 1 5 8
0 .0 /9 -0 .0 8 8
0 .0 8 8 • 0 .1 3 0
0 . 1 5 5 • 0 .0 2 6
_ P - 294
0 . 2 1 5 0 . 0 4 3__ 0 .0 6 4 ■ 0.044 = 0 .1 6 4 - 0 . 0 6 2
0.120 •0.121
0.5*7
0 .5 8 0
0 .0 1 1
0 .0 0 9 - 0 . 0 8 3 - 0 . 0 1 0 * 0 . 0 8 5
0 .1 6 2
O.Olo O.OiS" 0.21T
O . 168
0 . 1 19 - O . C t O - 0 . 0 1 8 0 .2 2 3
0 . 1 7 * __ 0 . 3 1 1 <M6*_ • 0 . 0 69 0.236
0 .1 7 3 - 0 .0 1 2 - 0 . 0 * 2
0 . 2 * 9 - 0 . 4 5 3 - 0 . 0 2 5 - 0 . 1 5 * “ - 0 .0 7 8 • 0 .0 3 6
0 .0 5 3
0 .5 3 5
0 .1 2 3 - 0 .2 5 3
0 . 0 4 6 - 0 . 3 6 8 - 0 . 1 3 6 - 0 . 1 8 6 ■ 0 .1 2 2 • 0 .1 3 9
0 .1 1 7
0 .2 1 3
0 .3 9 7 - 0 .2 2 0
0 .0 1 6
0 .0 3 6
0 .0 2 3
0 .0 5 4 0 .3 3 0
0 .0 8 1 0 . 0 9 *
-2.*12- Q.135
- 0 . 2 9 0 —0. 0 3 5
- O f 0 *1 _0 .0 7 5 - 0 . 1 * 1 0 .0 2 1
-0 .1 2 0
0 .6 5 2
0 .0 3 1
0 .0 3 9 -0 .0 1 3
0 .0 5 *
3 .1 6 8 0 . 1 1 5 - 0 . 0 5 5
0 .0 * 1
£,2 *2 _ 0 . 1 1 3 - 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0 6 6 - 0 . 5 7 * - 0 . 0 9 2 - 0 . 0 7 1_0 .0 2 9 0 .0 1 6 -O .O bS

21

975 0 1 2

4
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.

T a b le

2

(c o n t.)

Factors
2

1

3

4

5

6

|
7

8

9

10

. 50

51

0 .5 8 7

52
53
5'.
55
56
5?
53
59
60
61
62
63
*4
65
66
67
6#
67
70
71
7?
73
76
75
76

0 .0 3 6

0 .IS 8 - 0 .0 1 3
0 .2 0 5
0 .6 3 1
0 .1 7 6 - 0 . 0 3 0
0 *0 2 2
0 .2 3 4
- 0 .0 6 7
-0 .0 9 5
0 .0 9 3
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were eliminated.

One member of each pair was then randomly assigned

to a given subtest, with the constraint that the "reversed items"
were approximately balanced between the two scales.

One item

which had a high factor loading and popularity index but could
not be paired off was placed on both versions of the DAS.

Table

3 presents the item statistics for the 100 items of the DAS along
with the resultant shortened version of the scale that each item
was placed on.
To verify that the two statistically-derived forms of the
DAS were in fact parallel, another testing was arranged.

Seventy

undergraduates (20 males and 50 females) enrolled in a child
development course at Montgomery Community College volunteered
to participate.

They initially received Form A of the DAS; one

week later Form B was administered by the instructor of the course.
The correlation between the total scores on Form A and Form B was
.79.

The mean score for Form A was 113.01 and for Form B, 113.73.

Coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) reliabilities of the two forms
(DAS-A and DAS-B) were .86 and .87, respectively.
It is important to emphasize that I had decided a priori to
treat the construct of cognitive distortions in this general manner.
In writing the items I set down the essential rubies of the domain
of Beck's theory to enable me to distribute equitably emphasis to
the various classificatory subdivisions and to identify important
attributes.

However, the question was not so much whether by such
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Figure 1
The 100 DAS Items Plotted as a Function of Their
Factor I Loading and Mean Score
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a priori efforts the best set of attributes in some absolute sense
has been formulated as whether a set has been found which would
enable me to cover most of the essential dimensions of depressogenic
cognitions, even if these were confounded, overlapping, or otherwise
not as clear-cut as later research might help to make them.

I feel

that the two 40-item forms of the DAS met this criterion and
therefore, constituted the final versions selected for the in-depth
validation study.

A reproduction of the two forms of the DAS as

finally administered may be seen in the Appendices E and F.
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Table 3
100-Item form of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scaloi
Keys, DAS Assignments, Means, S.D.'a, and Loadings3

Key for
adaptive
response

DAS
form
assignment

Item

Mean

S.D.

Factor I
loading

Agree

1.

I can find happiness without being loved by another
person.

5.19

1.74

.16

Disagree

2.

People will probably think leas of mo if I make a
mistake.

2.99

1.41

.47

Disagree

3. People who have the marks of success (good looks,
fame, wealth) are bound to be happier than people
who do not.

2.70

1.55

.46

Agree

4. There is no value in getting upset about making
mistakes.

4.00

1.54

.13

Disagree

5. It is best to give up your own interests in order
to please other people.

2.64

1.43

.30

Agree

6. Criticism need not upset the person who receives
the criticism.

2.85

1.33

.17

Disagree

7. I must be a useful, productive, creative person
or life has no purpose.

5.26

1.53

.17

Agree

0.

I can find greater enjoyment if I do things
because I want to, rather than in orde.r to please
other people.

2.53

1.52

.14

Agree

9.

Dy controlling the way I interpret situations, I
can control my emotions.

2.94

1.39

.02

01

Disagree

10.

I should be happy all the time.

3.24

1.62

.23

Disagree

11.

Turning to someone else for advice or help is an
admission of weakness.

1.83

1.24

.34

a n » 275

in
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Table 3 (continued)
!

Key for
adaptive
response

DAS
form
assignment

Item

Mean

S.O.

Factor I
loading

Disagree

A

12.

If people consider me unattractive it need not
upset me.

4.10

1.58

.36

Disagree

A

13.

If you cannot do something well, there is little
point in doing it at all.

2.35

1.36

.34

Agree

A

14.

I can be happy eVen if I miss out on many of the
good things in life.

3.33

1.60

.23

Disagree

B

15.

If someone performs a selfish act, tills means he
is a selfish person.

2.73

1.22

.29

Disagree

A

16.

What other people think about me is vory Important.

4.03

1.45

.35

Agree

-

17.

An unpleasant event does not make me sad.
myself sad by what I tell myself.

4.03

1.69

-.06

Disagree

A

IB.

If I ask a question, it makes mo look inferior.

2.05

1.35

.43

Disagree

B

19.

If a person is indifferent to me, it meaiiB he
does not like me.

3.22

1.36

.48

Disagree

B

20.

People should prepare for the worst or they will
be disappointed.

3.07

1.61

.31

Agree

A

21.

Happiness is more a matter of my attitude towards
myself than the way other people feel about me.

2.54

1.39

.33

Disagree

A

22.

People should have a reasonable likelihood of
success before undertaking anything.

3.30

1.52

.33

Disagree

B

23.

I should be able to please everybody.

2.00

1.34

.39

Agree

-

24.

If I demand perfection in myself, I will make
myself very unhappy.

3.06

1.93

-.01

T make
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Table 3 (continued)
Kay for
adaptive
response

DAS
form
assignment

Item

Moan

S.D.

Factor I
loading

Agree

25.

Even though a person may not be able to control
what happens to him, ho can control how lie thinks.

3.14

1.71

.12

Agree

26.

It is possible to gain another person’s respect
without being especially talented at anything.

1.75

1.17

.30

Agree

27.

You can be a happy person without going out of
your way in order to please other peoplo.

2.90

1.70

.26

Disagree

20. It is shameful for a person to display his
weaknesses.

2.00

1.12

.35

Agree

29.

3.03

1.45

.08

It is not necessary to stop myself from doing
something for my own welfare simply because it
might displease another person.

CD
2.53

1.45

.32

A person should try to be best at everything he
undertakes.

4.70

1.91

.05

32.

I can take responsibility only for what I do, not
what other people do.

3.55

1.70

-.08

Disagree

33.

People who have good ideaB are more worthy than
those who do not.

2.60

1.34

.44

Agree

34.

Just because I believe I deserve something, I have
no reason to expect that I will get it.

3.37

1.70

-.03

Disagree

35.

If a parson is not a success, then his life is
meaningless.

2.07

1.30

.51

Disagree

36.

Hi others dislike you, you cannot be happy.

3.44

1.78

.41

Disagree

37.

Taking even a small risk is foolish because the
loss is likely to bo a disaster.

2.07

1.02

.34

Disagree

30. If a person lias to be alone for a long period
time, it follows that he lias to feel lonely.

Disagree

31.

Agree

of
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Table 3 (continued)
Key for
adaptive
response

DAS
form
assignment

Item

Mean

S.D.

Factor I
loading

Agree

-

3B.

It is not necessary to become frustrated if one
finds obstacles to getting what he wants.

3.26

1.43

.21

Disagree

A

39.

If I do not do as well as other people, it means
I am an inferior human being.

1.90

1.15

.54

Agree

B

40.

I may be able to influence other people's behavior
but 1 cannot control it.

1.96

1.06

.24

Disagree

A

41.

I should be upset if I make a mistake.

3.62

1.49

.39

Disagree

0

42.

If I make a foolish statement, it means 1 am a
foolish person.

1.73

0.00

.49

Disagree

I)

43.

A person cannot change his emotrional reactions
even if he knows they are harmful to him.

3.42

1.63

.19

Disagree

B

44.

I should always have complete control over my
fuelings.

3.55

1.62

.20

Disagree

11

45.

My life is wasted unless I am a success.

2.30

1.56

.56

Disagree

B

46.

If puople whom I care about do not care for me,
it is awful.

5.07

1.55

.30

Disagree

A

47.

If I fall at my work, then I am a failure as a
poison.

2.21

1.31

.60

Agree

B

4U.

I can enjoy myself even when others do not like me.

3.97

1.64

.26

Disagrue

A

49.

If I don't set the highest standards for myself, I
am likely to end up a second-rate purson.

3.04

1.74

.30

Agree

B

50.

I do not need other people's approval for me to bo
happy.

3.64

1.71

.41
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Table 3 (continued)
Key for
adaptive
response

DAS
form
assignment

Item

Mean

S.D.

Factor I
loading

Disagree

A

51.

If I do not do well all the time, people will not
respect me.

2.16

1.13

.52

Disagree

B

52.

A person should think less of himself If other
people do not accept him.

2.10

1.05

.52

Agree

B

53.

One should look for a practical solution to
problems rather than a perfect solution.

2.44

1.28

.17

D19ugree

A/B

54.

My value as a purson depends greatly on what
others think of me.

3.72

1.74

.49

Disagree

B

55.

If I do well, it probably is duo to chaugei if I
do badly, it is probably my own fault.

2.20

1.32

.29

Disagree

B

56.

A person should do well at everything he undertakes.

2.03

1.53

.38

Disagree

A

57.

If someone disagrees with me, it probably
indicates ho does not like me.

1.64

0.81

.42

Disagree

B

50.

The way to got to like you la to impress them with
your personality.

3.70

1.76

.42

Disagree

A

59.

I cannot bo liappy unless most people I know admire
me.

2.95

1.41

.56

Agree

A

60.

My own opinions of myself are more important than
other's opinions of mo. .

2.70

1.50

.27

Disagree

-

61.

If I do not treat people kindly, fairly and con
siderately, I am a rotten person.

4.66

1.69

.11

Disagree

-

62.

People should be criticized for making mistakes.

4.93

1.47

-.24

Agree

A

63.

It is possible for a person to be scolded and not
yet upset.

2.89

1.42

.17

Table 3 (continued)
Key to
adaptive
response

DAS
form
assignment

Item

Mean

S.D.

Factor I
loading

Disagree

-

64.

If I try liard enough I should he a'olo to excel
at anything I attempt.

4.69

1.71

.00

Disagree

A

65.

It is difficult to be happy unless one Is good
looking, intelligent, rich and creative.

1.0B

1.19

.51

Disagree

A

6b.

I cannot trust other people because thoy might be
cruel to me.

2,17

1.30

.39

Agree

A

67.

I do ’.ot need the approval of other people in
order to be happy.

3.71

1.01

.20

Disagree

-

6B.

It is necessary to have the help in order to cope
with life’s problems.

5.20

1.45

-.15

Agree

-

69.

It is not possible for a person to accomplish
everything he wants.

3.33

1.76

-.07

Agree

-

70.

There’s no value in criticizing myself for my
mistakes.

5.52

1.10

-.06

Disagree

A

71.

It is awful to be disapproved of by people
Important to you.

5.03

1.34

.20

Disagree

A

72.

If you don’t have other people to lean on, you
are bound to be sad.

3.01

1.55

.32

Agree

B

73.

People will like me even if I am not successful.

2.25

0.94

.40

Disagree

-

74.

A person cannot survive without the help of
other people.

5.10

1.57

-.03

Dlsagiee

-

7b.

I should get higher standards for myself than
other people.

4.09

1.41

.21

Disagree

A

76.

If other peoplu know what you are really like,

2.00

1.11

.46

• 1__ ..111 L1.1..I. 1___

___
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Table 3 (continued)
Key for
adaptive
response

I

DAS
form
assignment

Item

Moan

S.D.

Fautor I
loading

Agree

A

77.

Making mistakes is fine because I can learn
from them.

2.16

1.20

.30

Disagree

B

70.

If I put other people's needs before my own, they
should help me when I want them to do something
for me.

3.62

1.59

.42

Disagree

B

70.

Whenever I take a chance or risk I am only looking
for trouble.

2.20

0.90

.40

Disagree

A

00.

If a person avoids problems, the problems tend to
go away.

1.56

0.04

.24

Disagree

B

01.

I have to impress new acquaintances with my charm,
intelligence, or wit or they won't like mu.

2.39

1.26

.64

Agree

-

02.

People can learn to be completely independent.

4.03

1.01

-.12

Disagree

B

03.

People should be criticized for their mlstakos.

3,50

1,55

.23

Agree

-

04.

No onu can hurt me with words. I hurt myself by
the way I choose to react to their \/ords.

3.46

1.03

.09

Agree

B

0B.

Others can care for me even if they know all my
weaknesses.

1.61

0.90

.35

Disagree

B

06.

I should try to impress other people if I want
them to like me.

2.75

1.39

.55

Disagree

A

07.

if I fail partly, it is as had as being a complete
failure.

2.06

1.16

.40

Disagree

A

00.

I am nothing if a person I1 love doesn't love me.

2.59

1.51

.53

Disagree

B

09.

Puople will reject you if they know your weaknesses.

1.91

0.97

.47
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Table 3 (continued)
Key to
adaptive
response

DAS
form
assignment

Item

Mean

S.D.

Factor I
loading

Disagree

90.

A porson should be able to control what
happens to him.

3.80

1.50

.10

Agree

91.

I can reacli important goals without slave
driving myself.

3.30

1.50

.20

Disagree

92.

My happiness depends more on other people than
it does on me.

3.20

1.50

.36

Agree

93.

One can got pleasure from an activity regardless
of the end result.

2.40

1.30

.22

Agree

94.

A person doesn't need to be well liked in order
to be happy.

3.23

1,47

.37

Disagree

95.

If a person I love does not love me, it means
I am unlovable.

1.64

0.93

.41

Disagree

96.

Being isolated from othors is bound to lead to
unhappiness.

4.11

1,78

.19

Disagree

97.

If a person asks for help, it Is a sign of
weakness.

1.69

0.96

.36

Disagree

90.

If I am to be a worthwhile porson, I must be
truly outstanding in at least ono major respect.

3.17

1.67

.51

Disagree

99.

I ought to be able to solve my problems quickly
and without a great doal of offort.

3.00

1.40

.33

Disagree

100.

To be a good, moral, worthwhile person, I must
help everyone who needs it.

3.77

1.51

.26

vl
to

CHAPTER III
The Validation of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale
The purpose of the present study was to further assess the
appropriateness of the DAS-A and DAS-B for quantifying the extent
to which individuals hold beliefs that predispose them to
depression.

Specifically, this study examined the reliability

and validity of both forms of the DAS, primarily in terms of
the instrument's internal consistency, stability, and degree
to which it correlates with scores on several other brief
psychological tests designed to measure personality factors
that theoretically appeared closely related to the construct
of dysfunctional thinking.
Methodology
Instruments
Three additional instruments were used in this validation
study.

They included the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck,

Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), the Profile of Mood
States (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971), and the Story
Completion Test (Hammen

& Krantz, 1976).

These instruments

were chosen because they purported to measure cognitions
related to the maladaptive beliefs of deprsssives, or because
they were measures to which the DAS could be compared when
testing the validating hypotheses.

More specifically, the

Beck Depression Inventory was chosen to test the hypothesis
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of a positive correlation between depressive affect and endorsement
of dysfunctional attitudes.

The Profile of Mood States was added

in an attempt to determine whether the depressogenic beliefs
assessed by the DAS are in fact unique to depression rather
than characteristic of emotional upset in general.

Since this

scale gives data on moods other than just depression, it became
important to investigate the relationship between these distorted
attitudes and anxiety, fatigue, etc.

Finally, the Story Completion

Test was included as a means of testing the congruent validity of
the DAS, since this scale purports to measure depressive-distorted
responses by employing a different type of format.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI).

This scale (Appendix B)

consists of 21 items, each referring to a symptom or attitude
that reflects an overt behavioral manifestation of depression.
The BDI was designed to include all symptoms integral to the
depressive constellation, and at the same time, to provide for
grading the intensity of each.

It was not designed to distinguish

between diagnostic categories.

Every item or symptom category of

the BDI presents, for choice of response, four self-evaluative
statements reflecting the intensity or severity of the symptom
or attitude.

For example, the individual chooses one of the

following four sentences:
0.

I do not feel sad.

1.

I feel sad.
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2.

I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it.

3.

I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.

Depending upon severity, each statement is assigned a value from 0
to 3.

By assigning this numerical score for each symptom, the

scoring system takes into account the number of symptoms reported
by the individual.

In addition, the intensity of each symptom

is registered by assigning graduated numerical values to each
statement within a category.

The individual's total score, which

can range from 0 to 63, represents a combination of the number
of symptom categories he has endorsed and the severity of the
particular symptoms.
Each of the items was chosen on the basis of its relationship
to the overt behavioral manifestations of depression; they do not
reflect any theory regarding the etiology or the underlying psycho
logical processes in depression (Beck, 1967).

The 21 symptom-

tude categories are:
1. Mood
2 . Pessimism
3. Sense of Failure
4. Lack of Satisfaction
5. Guilty Feeling
6 . Sense of Punishment
7. Self-Dislike
8 . Self-Accusations
9. Suicidal Wishes
10. Crying Spells
11. Irritability

12. Social Withdrawal
13. Indecisiveness
14. Distortion of Body Image
15. Work Inhibitions
16. Sleep Disturbance
17. Fatigability
18. Loss of Appetite
19. Weight Loss
20. Somatic Preoccupation
21. Loss of Libido

Rehm (1976) , in reviewing available instruments for the
assessment of depression notes about the BDI:
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"In general its psychometric properties are very
good, with its discriminant validity especially
notable. It is probably most suited to clinical
populations but also seems to be useful with
subclinical populations —
The nature of the
questions on the BDI probably make this instru
ment most useful as a selection criterion for
behavioral research or as a pre- and post
assessment measure."
(p.140)
In a sample of 606 cases, an estimate of the reliability of the
BDI was calculated by

means of the split-halves method, with a

resultant coefficient of .93 (Beck

& Beamesderfer, 1974). The

concurrent validity of the BDI was supported by a number of
studies comparing the test scores with clinicians' global ratings
of depth of depression.

In Beck's (1961) validation study, the

inventory was found to correlate .65 with the clinicians' ratings;
in a drug study by Nussbaum, Wittig, Hamlon, & Kurland (1963) the
correlation was .66; in a British study by Metcalfe

& Goldman

(1965) the correlation was .62.
The BDI has been well validated on both psychiatric and general
medical patients (Metcalfe

& Goldman, 1965; Schwab, Bialow, &

Holzer, 1967b) and is easily administered in about 10 minutes.
Its scores correlate well (.75) with those from the Hamilton
Rating Scale for Depression (Schwab, et al., 1967b) and with
pretreatment (.75) and posttreatment (.69) scores on the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, D-Scale (Nussbaum
et al., 1963).

In addition, there is strong support for the

construct validity of the BDI (see Beck

& Beamesderfer, 1974

for a summary).
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Attempts have been made to classify depressive phenomena by
the use of factor analysis.

In his own studies, Beck (1961)

obtained three factors from the BDI which he labelled:

(1)

"Negative view of self and future," which was heavily loaded
on sense of failure, expectation of punishment, self-dislike,
self-accusation, and suicidal ideas;

(2) "Physiological,"

which was heavily loaded on insomnia, anorexia, weight loss,
and loss of libido; and (3) "Physical withdrawal," which was
heavily loaded on work inhibitions, fatigability, and somatic
preoccupation.

Other researchers have found anywhere from

one general factor (Delay, Pichot, Lemperier, & Mirouze, 1963)
to 10 factors (Pichot, Piret, & Ayde, 1966).
As a screening device to detect depression among psychiatric
patients, Beck (1961) found a cut-off point of 13 to be appropriate.
For screening among medical patients, Schwab, Bialow, Brown, &
Holzer (1967a) found that a cutting score of 10 was appropriate.
Profile of Mood States (POMS).

This scale (Appendix C) is

a 65-item, five-point adjective rating scale designed to measure
subjective aspects of affect both economically and rapidly.
The present form is a refinement of a total of 100 different
adjective scales by means of repeated factor analyses.

The

authors claim that "persons with at least a 7th grade education
have little or no difficulty in understanding the POMS" (McNair,
Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971).
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Instructions to the POMS read:

"below is a list of words that

describe feelings people have;" for each word the respondent selects
one of five responses that best indicates how he has been feeling
"during the past week including today."

The five possible responses

are not at all, a little, moderately, quite a bit, and extremely.
These intensity modifiers are rated on a four-point scale, with
weights ranging from zero (not at all) to four (extremely).

In

the development of the POMS, six factors were extracted and
replicated in a series of studies on a total of approximately
2,000 male and female subjects, mainly psychiatric outpatients,
but including some nonpatients (McNair, et al., 1971).

The six

factor-analytically derived mood states are Tension-Anxiety,
Depression-Dejection, Anger-Hostility, Vigor-Activity, FatigueInert ia, and Confusion-Bewilderment.

To obtain a score for each

mood factor, the sum of the responses is obtained for the
adjectives defining the factor.

All items defined in each

factor are keyed in the same direction, except for "Relaxed"
in the Tension-Anxiety Scale and "Efficient" in the ConfusionBewilderment Scale.

These items receive negative weights in

calculating the factor scores.

The possible score ranges for

the six factors are:
Factor T, 0 - 3 6
Factor A, 0 - 4 8
Factor F, 0 - 2 8

(9 items); Factor D, 0 - 60 (15 items);
(12 items); Factor V, 0 - 3 2 (8 items);
(7 items); Factor C, 0 - 2 8 (7 items).
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Both internal consistency and test-retest reliabilities have
been estimated for the six factors (McNair

& Lorr, 1964).

Internal consistency reliabilities (KR-20) range from .74 to
.92, and test-retest correlations range from .61 to .69, the
latter based on scores before and after four weeks of treat
ment.

Further support for the reliability of the POMS comes

from the similarities of factor structure and loadings found
in a number of studies (Lorr, Bastcn, & Smith, 1967; Lorr,
McNair, & Weinstein, 1963; McNair

& Lorr, 1964).

The POMS has been used in short-term psychotherapy studies,
both as a predictor and criterion (Haskell, Pugatch, & McNair,
1969; Lorr, McNair, & Weinstein, 1963; Lorr

& McNair, 1965).

In one study (Lorr, McNair, Weinstein, Michaux, & Raskin, 1961),
a control group of 45 normals showed no significant changes on
any of the mood measures after an eight-week interval, indi
cating that the POMS may be unaffected by a "repeated measure"
response set.
The manual also provides data on selected samples of normal
college students who contributed normative data of nonpatients.
Because so little variance was found to be associated with sex
in factors measured with the POMS among normal subjects (340
men and 516 women college students), tentative norms are
presented for males and females combined (McNair, Lorr, &
Droppieman, 1971).

However, in both males and females, Vigor,
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Depression, and Tension discriminated most clearly between students
and patients.

In general, the score distributions for college

samples are considerably more symmetric than those found in the
patient samples (McNair et al., 1971).
Story Completion Test (SCT).

To measure depressive cognitive

processes, Hammen and Krantz (1975) constructed the SCT (Appendix
D) , six hypothetical story introductions of potentially problematic
situations common to college students.

Following each story are

presented multiple-choice questions (a total of 23 for the six
stories) pertaining to the central character's feelings, thoughts,
and expectations.

The reader is forced to select from among four

various response alternatives the one that most approximates his
assessment of the character's likely response to the given
situation.

The rationale behind this technique is similar to that

for certain other projective tests, such as the TAT and Beck's
Focussed Fantasy Test (Beck, 1961).

The way in which the reader

structures an ambiguous stimulus is assumed to reflect his own
perceptions of himself and of external reality.
The four response options to each question were carefully
tailored to include one of each of the following:

Depressive-

distortion, depressive-nondistorted, nondepressive-distorted,
and nondepressive-nondistorted.

"Distortion" is defined here as

logically unjustified conclusions which are drawn from available
information.

Three of the six stories in the questionnaire have
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mainly social-interpersonal thanes, and the other three have
predominantly achievement-competence themes.

As an example,

in one story Peggy is depicted as a member of an organization
who has been encouraged by friends to run for presidency.
eventually loses the election.

She

The reader is instructed to

"put yourself in Peggy's place, and try to imagine as vividly
as you can what she thought and felt."

The first item is:

"When you first heard you'd lost, you immediately:"
a.

Feel bad and imagined I've lost by a landslide,
(depressive in tone - distorted in terms of
logical inference based on information provided
in the story.)

b.

Shrug it off as unimportant.

c.

Feel sad and wonder what the total counts were,
(depressive-nondistorted)

d.

Shrug it off, feeling I tried as hard as I could,
(nondepressive-nondistorted)

(nondepressive-distorted)

Analyses revealed that neither sex of the subject nor story theme
appears to be a determinant of distortion level.
Each story was developed to contain specific examples of
Beck's (1967, 1970) categorizations that exemplify depressed
individuals.

"An effort to construct the depressed-distorted

response options to depict equal numbers of categories of such
distortions as arbitrary inferer^e, selective abstraction,
overgeneralization, maximization of negative or minimization
of positive, proved unsuccessful"

(Krantz

& Hammen, in press).
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However, the distortion responses are all examples of some type
of distortion described by Beck.
Coefficients of internal consistency are only moderately
high (.61 to .79) but according to Krantz and Hammen (in press),
they may reflect the lack of homogeneity of the items and the
short length of the questionnaire (only 23 items).

Content

validity has been shown by interjudge agreement of at least
80% on the four scoring categories for each item.

Moderate

congruent validity (r = .31) with Byrne's Repression-Sensitization Scale (Byrne, 1964), which also measures distortions
in a somewhat different sense, has been established (Krantz
& Hammen, in press).
Data from a number of samples strongly support the hypothesized
tendency of more depressed persons to give a greater number of
replies.

Hammen and Krantz (1976) found that depressed women

had significantly greater depressed-distortion scores than did
nondepressed women (F^ (1,61) = 8.24, p < .01).
study (Hammen

In another

& Peters, 1978) students were given instructions

to role-play a depressed or a nondepressed person and then to
complete the questionnaire as they imagined a depressed student
would answer.

Depressed-role-players gave a significantly

higher proportion of depressed-distorted responses than did
students asked to respond in a nondepressive fashion (F (1,49) =
5.46, p. < .05), it should be noted that the students were not
given information about depressive cognitions.
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Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS).

As discussed in Chapter II,

the test format employed in the DAS was that of the typical selfreport attitude scale.

A modified Likert (1932) method of scaling

was used, with summative scoring over a seven-position response
scale for each item.

The DAS (Appendices E and F ) , comprising

two statistically-derived parallel forms of 40 items each (DAS-A
and DAS-B), measures specific distortions in thinking as
discussed by Beck (1967).

Even though individual item scores

are available, I decided that the DAS is to be primarily a single
scale instrument, i.e., one that yields a single total score.
For both Forms A and B, the possible range of scores is from
0 to 280.
For utility in administration, scoring and processing
of data, the DAS may eventually be presented to subjects in the
form of a reusable test folder with a separate answer sheet
capable of being processed by the IBM Optional Scanner.

In

addition, either of the 40 item forms of the DAS should involve
a testing time of less than 15 minutes.
Subj ects
From September to December, 1977, after two years of item
writing and pilot testing, I attempted a rigorous validity
study on the DAS-A and DAS-B.

Originally 356 subjects volunteered,

but one individual was excluded from the analyses as he was involved
in therapy at the initial testing.

This sample was composed of
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undergraduates enrolled in an introduction to psychology course
at the University of California in Los Angeles (71%) and
graduate students enrolled in an educational psychology course
at either Beaver College or the University of Pennsylvania (29%).
Demographic characteristics are presented in Table 4.
There was a predominance of females (73%), and most of the
respondents were Caucasian (70%).

Ages ranged from 16 to 55,

with the majority falling between 16 and 21 (Median age was 21).
Seventy-nine percent of the sample were single.

In addition,

seven percent of the undergraduate students had part-time jobs,
while all of the graduate students were employed.

Application

of Hollingshead's Two-Factor Index of Social Position (1965)
to the 101 graduate students revealed a high concentration
(89%) of respondents from the higher socioeconomic groups
(I and II on this five-point scale).

The mean reported

grade-point average was 3.41.
At the time of initial testing, 14% reported having had
contact with a professional (physician, social worker) within
the month prior to completing the test battery, four people
had had previous inpatient psychiatric treatment approximately
40 months ago, and 9% more reported some form of outpatient
treatment around 17 months earlier.

Of the individuals who

revealed a history of former therapeutic treatment, 79%
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rated their experience as being a success.

Table 5 presents

the clinically relevant background characteristics.
Procedures
Admi nistration of Instruments
All of the testing was carried out by group administration
under the supervision of the course's professor.

Each subject

was given a packet of instruments containing a questionnaire
requesting demographic information and data pertaining to
prior and present psychiatric treatment and the four test
instruments, i.e., the POMS, the DAS-A or DAS-B (pretests
will hereafter be referred to as DAS-A^ or DAS—B ^), the BDI,
and the SCT.

The examiner instructed the participants in

the proper procedure to be followed in taking each instrument.
Eight weeks later a very similar packet of information was
administered to the subjects:

demographic and clinical data,

the BDI, the POMS, and the DAS-A or DAS-B (posttests will be
referred to as DAS-A2 or DAS-B2 hereafter).

Since the SCT

was used primarily for the investigation of congruent
validity of the DAS, it was not readministered in the
post-testing.
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Table 4
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
(n = 355)

Variable

Frequency

Percent

Sex
Male
Female

97
258

27.3
72.7

31
249
10
65

8.7
70.2
2.8
18.3

Race
Black
White
Latin American
Other
Age (years)
16-21
22-27
28-33
34-39
40-45
46+

241
52
31
14
11
6

68.0
14.6
8.7
3.9
3.1
1.7

279
64
3
9

78.6
18.0
0.9
2.5

14
28
89
80
85
59

3.9
7.9
25.1
22.5
24.0
16.6

Marital Status
Single
Married
Cohabitation
Divorced
Religious Background
Atheist
Agnostic
Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Other
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Table 4 (continued)
Variable

Frequency

Percent

Last Grade Completed
Partial High School
High School Graduate
Partial College
College Graduate
Graduate Professional
Training

4
163
82
55
51

1.1
45.9
23.1
15.5
14.4

254
3
7

71.5
0.8
2.0

81
10

22.8
2.9

84
45
226

23.6
12.7
63.7

2
20
138
26
169

0.6
5.6
38.9
7.3
47.6

Occupation
Student
Unskilled Blue Collar
Clerk, Secretary, Office
Worker
Teacher
Professional
Employment
Employed full-time
Employed part-time
Not applicable (students)
Grade-Point Average
1.0 - 1.9
2.0 - 2.9
3.0 - 3.9
4.0
Not applicable
(1st semester Freshman)
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Table 5
Clinically Relevant Background Characteristics of the Sample
(n = 355)
Variable

Frequency

Percent

Contact with a professional
within the last month
No
Yes

305
50

85.9
14.1

351
1
3

98.9
0.3
0.8

4
0
351

1.1
0.0
98.0

322
4
6
23

90.7
1.2
1.6
6.5

26
7
322

7.3
2.0
90.7

355
la

100.0
NA

Prior inpatient psychiatric
treatment (4-36 mos. prior)
None
One experience
More than one
Success of prior inpatient
treatment
Successful
Unsuccessful
Not applicable
Prior outpatient therapy
(4-96 mos. prior)
None
Single evaluation
One therapy session
More than one
Success of outpatient therapy
Successful
Unsuccessful
Not applicable
Presently involved in therapy
No
Yes

a Dropped from all analyses.

88

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89

In an attempt to get data on both forms of the DAS used as
a pre- and posttest, a counterbalanced design (see Figure 2) was
set up.

The entire group of 355 subjects was divided into

approximately two random halves, one half taking DAS-A^
followed by DAS-B 2 (n = 185), the other half taking DAS-E^
followed by DAS-A2 (n = 170).

Formulae for linear equating

(Thorndike, 1971, p. 573) cf the two forms were applied to
the obtained data.
Processing of the Data
As the test booklets were received, the author handscored
the data and copied them on to IBM Coding Sheets, from which
they were then keypunched on to cards by operators at Uni-Coil,
the main computer center at the University of Pennsylvania.
Every subject was given a unique identification number, and
cards were sequence-punched to allow ready identification
and prevent possible mishandling errors.

The on-line storage

system at Uni-Coil was employed to set up a disk as a means
of storing the data.
Each individual had four cards of data, two for the initial
testing data and two for the posttest eight weeks later.
from the scoring program provided:

Output

(1) 40 item scores and one

total score for the DAS, with a code indicating whether it was
DAS-A or DAS-B;
BDI;

(2) 21 item scores and one total score for the

(3) six subscale scores for the POMS;

(4) 23 item scores
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and one total score for the SCT; and (5) 15 (see Tables 4 and 5)
demographic variables for each testing.

The only exception to

this rule ncis that the SCT was administered solely during the
pretest and was therefore not represented in the posttest data
output.
The Statistical Programs for the Social Sciences (SPSS), a
"canned" program which is a part of the Uni-Coll Statistical
Library, was employed for most of the data analyses.

Product-

moment correlations and descriptive statistics were secured by
specific programming or as part of the computer output from
some of the other analyses.

An additional program was written

by Andrew Baggaley, Professor of Education, University of
Pennsylvania, to compute the standard error of the difference
between two coefficients of correlation, which was needed as
part of the cross-lagged panel design, a statistical procedure
inherent in the design of the experiment.
Demographic Variable Relationships
Age, sex, and level of education were correlated with DAS,
BDI, POMS, and SCT scores, and the values were investigated for
significant relationships.

In addition, t tests were performed

to investigate the significance of differences between mean
scores on the instruments by gender and education level (based
on median split).
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Figure 2
Design of the Research

Group

Group A
(ri = 185)

Group B
(n = 170)

Pretest Measures

Posttest Measures

BDI
POMS: T-Scale
D-Scale
V-Scale
A-Scale
F-Scale
C-Scale
DAS-ASCT
Demographic Questions
Clinical Questions

BDI
POMS: T-Scale
D-Scale

BDI
POMS: T-Scale
D-Scale
V-Scale
A.-Scale
F-Scale
C—Scale
DAS-B^
SCT
Demographic Questions
Clinical Questions

BDI
POMS: T-Scale
D-Scale
V-Scale
A-Scale
F-Scale
C-Scale
DAS-A2
Demographic Questions
Clinical Questions

A-Scale
F-Scale
C-Scale
d a s -b 2
Demographic Questions
Clinical Questions

a Posttest measures were administered 8 weeks after the initial
testing.
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Psychometric Properties of DAS-A and DAS-B
Reliability
One of the most important qualities that a measurement
device should possess is reliability, which can encompass the
extent to which the test is consistent in measuring whatever
it does measure, dependability, stability, and relative freedom
from errors or measurement (Thorndike, 1971).

Frequently the

reliability of a test refers to the degree to which the items
measure the same underlying characteristic (homogeneity or
internal consistency), although quite often the term is also
applied to calculations of temporal stability and equivalence
between forms.

Both internal consistency and temporal

stability coefficients were calculated for DAS-A and DAS-B.
Two methods of evaluating the internal consistency of
both forms of the scale were used.

First, the data of 355

subjects were analyzed, and the scores for each of the 40
items were compared with the total scores on the DAS.

This

analysis was performed for DAS-A and DAS-B when used as both
a pre- and a posttest.

The second method employed was

coefficient alpha, a generalization of the KR-20 formula,
developed by Cronbach (1951) for use when the items are not
scored dichotomously.
92

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

Inherent in the counterbalanced design was the fact that
parallel forms of the DAS (DAS-A and DAS-B) were administered
to the subjects at two different testings.

These two forms

were empirically derived to measure the same characteristics,
but they comprised different questions.

To test whether

these two forms sampled the same domain, correlations were
calculated between the scores on the two administrations of
the DAS, eight weeks apart (i.e., DAS-A^ was correlated with
DAS-B2 and DAS-B^ was correlated with DAS-A 2 )-

This procedure

reflects both changes in scores due to trait instability and
changes in scores due to item specificity.

However, because

the DAS-A and DAS-B consisted of different items, a linear
scaling approach (Thorndike, 1971) was employed to equate
the scores from the two forms.

A test-retest correlation

was then performed to test the difference in magnitude
between the coefficient obtained by correlating these
equated scores (pre-post) and the one obtained prior to
converting the scores.
Validity
I regarded the degree of validity to be the most important
aspect to be tested.

Validity can be defined as the degree to

which a test is capable of achieving certain aims (Mehrens
Lehmann, 1973).

&

Predictive use is dependent upon criterion-

related validity, and descriptive use is dependent upon content
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and construct validities.

For the sake of simplicity, validity

of the DAS will be discussed under two main categories,
corresponding to the categories used in the APA's Standards for
Educational and Psychological Tests (1966).

These categories,

however, are far from independent.
1.

Content Validity was emphasized as an important (though

not sufficient) characteristic of the items, since there is now
substantial empirical evidence for the importance of the content
validity of inventory items (i.e., Duff, 1965; Goldberg
1967; Norman, 1963; Wiggins, 1966).

& Slovic,

Since content validity is

related to how adequately the content of the test samples the
domain about which inferences are to be made, there is no
commonly used numerical expression for it.

Instead, it is

determined by a thorough inspection of the items.

The content

validity of the DAS has been described in depth in Chapter II.
2.

Construct Validity refers to the degree to which scores

on a measure permit inferences about underlying traits.

When

measurement is attempted in a new domain where no external
criterion for validation exists, it is necessary to establish
validity in terms of the relationships of scores on the new
measure with theoretical constructs.

As Cronbach

and Maehl

(1955) and Cronbach (1971) pointed out, the most relevant
information dealing with personality variables is obtained
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from an assessment of construct validity, which involves the
testing of various hypotheses in an experiment that uses the
test as a criterion measure.
One of the most appropriate methods of establishing construct
validity is through factor analysis.
DAS were intercorrelated.

Therefore, items on the

The data were then subjected to a

principal-components factor analysis, with varimax rotation
to simple structure.

A general factor of "distorted

thinking" was hypothesized; i.e., one that involves primarily
negative self-evaluative cognitions and related behavioral
manifestations.

In addition, it was assumed that the other

resulting factors could be interpreted within Beck's theory
(see Chapter II).
In addition, the construct validity of a measure is
determined by setting up a number of hypotheses regarding the
personality variable (dysfunctional thinking in this case).

If

the hypothesis is confirmed in an experiment using the test as
a criterion measure, the validity of the instrument is supported.
Four research hypotheses were tested in this investigation
of dysfunctional thought processes:

(1) There is a positive

relationship between depressive affect and endorsement of
dysfunctional attitudes, i.e., individuals who have a tendency
to think more negatively (endorse more dysfunctional attitudes)
are likely to feel more depressed than persons whose thinking
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reflects the absence of these negative cognitive processes.
(2) Test-retest (stability) correlations for scores on the
cognitive measure are significantly higher than those for the
affective measures; i.e., cognitive patterns are more persistent
over time than depressed mood.

(3) The presence of depressogenic

schemas is more associated with depressed mood than with other
mood disturbances (i.e., anxiety, as measured by the POMS).
(4) There is a directional relationship leading from changes
in thinking to changes in affect, i.e., the greater capacity
for dysfunctional attitudes (depressogenic distortions in
thinking)
affect.

is causally prior to a greater level of depressive
However, because the population being studied is

primarily a non-therapeutic "normal” college sample, displaying
various other life-stress situations which are not controlled
for, the results may indicate a bidirectional relationship
instead of one pattern of directionality dominating.

Within

Beck's framework, though, the common-sense expectation is
that the causal hypothesis of changes in cognition leading
to changes in affect is more plausible than the reverse
sequence of changes in affect leading to changes in cognition.
Much of this analysis is based on the application of a
relatively novel and powerful quasi-expsrimental method of
causal inference, the "cross-lagged panel correlational
technique"

(Campbell, 1963; Campbell

& Stanley, 1963; Crano,
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Kenny, & Campbell, 1972; Kenny, 1975; Pelz
Rozelle

& Andrews, 1964;

& Campbell, 1969), which allows the inference of

causal relations from correlational data.

According to this

technique, panel data can be analyzed to indicate which of
two variables A and B, each measured at Time I and Time 2,
is more likely to have causal priority over the other.

If

A determines B, rather than the reverse, then the cross
lagged correlation A^B2 should exceed B^A2 (see Figure 3).
In employing this method, I decided to let variable A
represent the DAS score and variable B either the BDI or
the POMS.

The remeasurement interval was set at eight

weeks.
It was expected that the correlations between variables
A and B at pre- and posttesting (the simultaneous correlations)
would both be positive and of about the same magnitude (the
magnitude depending on errors in measurement and the extent
to which other factors affect B) .

The test-retest correlations

for variables A and B (lagged correlations) similarly should be
high if the tests employed are reliable and the time lag between
testing sessions is not extreme, as this will reflect the
consistency in each variable over time.
Hypothesis #1 was tested by examining the resultant
simultaneous correlations; hypothesis #2 by examining the testretest correlations; and, hypothesis #4 by examining the
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cross-lagged correlations; i.e., the diagonals. The PearsonFilon test, a statistical procedure described by Peters and
Van Voorhis (1940), was used in each of these analyses to
test the difference between the two coefficients of correlation
that have no array in common.
In addition, because the value of the DAS for psycho
therapists and for diagnostic personnel may lie in its
capability for identifying specific features of distorted
thinking, tests of the DAS' discriminative power were also
performed. DAS total scores (DAS-A and DAS-B) were compared
among subjects grouped according to levels of:

(1) depression,

as measured by the BDI; and (2) mood state or affect as
measured by the POMS. I hypothesized that both forms of the DAS
are sensitive enough to discriminate among the groups when
blocked on the aforementioned variables.

Statistical significance

of these results was tested by one-way analyses of variance.
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A, A.

Figure 3.

Cross-lagged panel correlation paradigm (A and B are
variables and 1 and 2 are times.)
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CHAPTER IV
Results and Discussion
This chapter presents a discussion of the psychometric
properties of the DAS-A and DAS-B.

Included in this presentation

are (1) data on the linear equating of the DAS-A and DAS-B; (2) the
reliability findings; and, (3) the results of the validation study.
Equating of DAS-A and DAS-B Scores
During the last 15 or 20 years, with the appearance of new
testing programs and the further development of old ones, all
requiring the administration of interchangeable test forms, many
new designs and methods have been developed and refined for the
equating of test scores (Angoff, 1971).

If equating is properly

executed, it becomes possible to merge data even when the separate
sets of data derive from different forms of a test (i.e., DAS-A and
DAS-B) with somewhat different item characteristics.

It becomes

possible also to compare directly the performance of two individuals
who have taken different forms of a test.

What is being sought is

a conversion from the units on one form of a test to the units on
another form of the same test.
In the method used to equate scores on DAS-A with scores on
DAS-B, it is assumed that the practice effect on DAS-B (as a
result of having taken DAS-A first) and the practice effect of
form DAS-B on DAS-A (as a result of having taken DAS-B first)
are proportional to the standard deviations of the two tests

100
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(Lord, 1950) .

Substituting the data from DAS-A and DAS-B into

the respective equations (Thorndike, 1971, p. 574) resulted in
the following linear equation for making the scores on the DAS-A
equivalent to scores on DAS-B:
Y = .978 X + 3.43, where
X = score on DAS-A
Y = score on DAS-B
By applying this conversion, one can express all pre- and posttest
scores in equivalent units, regardless of which form of the DAS
was administered.

This statistical equating of the two forms

made it possible to perform some of the following analyses.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 6 gives descriptive statistics for the total group on
each variable examined in the study.

On all scales, pre- and

post, it is possible for a subject to deviate as much as twoand-a-half standard deviations above the mean and from one to
one-and-a-half standard deviations below the mean.

The

variances are sufficiently large for adequate discrimination;
and only seven of the nineteen possible extreme scores were
attained by anyone in the sample of 355 subjects.
6).

(See Table

Since users of the tests would be primarily concerned with

discrimination between high scorers rather than low scorers, the
positive skew of the score distribution on all the scales is
desirable.

(Notice that the skewness of the Vigor scale of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Descriptive Statistics for the Assessment Instruments
(n - 355)

Pretest

Poattest

Mean

S.D.

Std.
Error

Max.
Value

Min.
Value

Mean

S.D.

Std.
Error

Max.
Value

Min.
Value

.Skew
ness

T-Scale

13.02

6.99

0.37

35.00

0.00

0.64

12.57

7.37

0.39

36.00

0.00

0.77

D-Scale

11.47

10.43

0.55

50.00

0.00

1.42

11.36

11.12

0.59

50.00

0.00

1.73

A-Scale

8.34

7. 17

0.30

34.00

0.00

1.16

9.19

0.70

0.47

40.00

0.00

1.67

V-Scale

17.14

6.09

0.32

32.00

2.00

-0.19

16.06

6.32

0.34

32.00

1.00

0.00

F-Scale

10.77

6, 52

0.35

20.00

0.00

0.43

10.10

6.60

0.35

20.00

0.00

0.64

C-Scale

9.12

4.03

0.26

23.00

0.00

0.62

0.94

5.56

0.30

20.00

0.00

0.01

DDI

5.91

5.29

0.20

33.00

0.00

1.54

5.74

5.09

0.31

36.00

0.00

1.05

SCT

1.35

2.08

0.11

14.00

0.00

0.59

DAS

117.75

26.03

1.42

216.00

52.00

0.44

Instrument

Skownoos

POMSi

119.36

-

-

27.17

1.44

215.00

-

-

40.00

0.51

102
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POMS is slightly negative, however; the pathological end of this
scale is reversed in that low scores reflect mood disturbance.)
In general, the descriptive statistics for all the assessment
variables show acceptable values.
Relationship to Demographic Information
Although no specific hypotheses were made with regard to
demographic variables, I thought it necessary to examine the
relationships among the assessment variables, sex, race, age,
and educational level.

When the data of the 355 individuals

included in the research were correlated with these background
variables, the following findings resulted:
1.
by sex.

Sex.

Table 7 presents data on the assessment instruments

There was a significantly negative correlation (point

biserial r_ = -.12) with the scores on the T scale of the POMS
at pretesting; i.e., males had significantly higher levels of
anxiety than the females (t^ (354) = 2.19, ji <-05).
is contrary to that of other researchers (Burnett

This finding
& Thompson,

1963; Taylor, 1966; Wheeler, 1965) and to typical clinical
experience, wherein substantially more females than males appear
at outpatient facilities for treatment (Jones, 1968).

Scores

on the posttest revealed the same trend, but this was not
significant.
Males also tended to score significantly higher than females
on the converted scores of the DAS at both pretesting (a: = -.09,
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p. <£. 05) and posttesting (r = -.13, £<f .01).

Additional analyses of

these data revealed statistically significant differences in mean
performance on the posttest only (£ (354) = 2.46, £ C .01).

There

is no theoretical basis for predicting differences in frequency
of depressogenic attitudes, and the obtained male-female differences
are not directly relevant to the theoretical notions of idio
syncratic beliefs in depressed persons.
Lastly, gender correlated with the BDI score (r = .11, £<T.05) ,
with females having a higher level of depression at pretesting than
males (t (266) = -2.54, £<.01).
at posttesting.

This difference was not present

Similar findings, i.e., women having higher levels

of depression than men, were found by Beck (1967) and appear to be
quite prevalent in the literature.
2.

Race.

The correlations between race and each of the

assessment variables, both at pre- and posttesting, were nonsig
nificant and close to zero.
3.

Age.

Older subjects tended to obtain somewhat lower

scores on the Confusion Scale of the POMS at both pre- and post
testing (r = -.09 and -.16, respectively).

This finding is con

sistent with those of McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman (1971) in their
validation of the POMS.

All other correlations with age were

negligible.
4.

Educational level■

Using educational level as an index

of social class, I found a significant negative correlation between
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educational level and SCT score (r_ — -.19), as well as converted
pre- and posttest DAS scores (r = -.14 and -.20, respectively).
Thus, subjects with lower educational attainment tended to score
higher on the SCT and DAS than did those with a higher level of
education.

While the reason for this discrepancy is not

immediately apparent, it may be due to a response set in lesseducated subjects.
In general, even these significant correlations were small,
accounting for at most four percent of the variance; thus,
suggesting that scores on the assessment variables were almost
independent of background measures.

Reliability of the DAS-A and DAS-B
Internal Consistency
Two methods of evaluating the internal consistency of the DAS-A
and DAS-B were used, item-total correlations and coefficient alpha
(Cronbach, 1951), a generalization of the KR-20 formula.

Because of

the nature of the counterbalanced design that was employed, both of
these methods had to be calculated four separate times:

For Form A

of the DAS when used as a pretest (DAS—A^) and as a posttest (DAS-A2) ,
and then, for Form B of the DAS as a pretest (DAS-B^) and a posttest
(DAS-B2)Initially, item statistics were obtained from the 355 subjects
(Table 8), and the score for each item was then compared with the
total score on the scale of which it was a part (i.e., DAS—A ^ ,
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DAS-A2 , DAS-B^, DAS-B 2 ) for each subject.

The resultant correlation

coefficients ranged from .25 to .76 (all significant at the .001
level).

Therefore, each item has a significant positive correlation

with the total DAS score under each of the four conditions.

In

addition, the differences in means on the same items, when used
as a pre- and posttest, were negligible, in fact, they were no
more than one-fifth of a standard deviation.
The second method of evaluating internal consistency was the
determination of coefficient alpha for each form of the DAS.

Each

of the resultant coefficients was judged to be quite acceptable
(Mehrens, & Lehmann, 1973) :

DAS-Aj,

= .89; DAS-B^, r = .89;

DAS-A2 , r = .92; DAS-B2 , r = .90.
Tesb-Retest Reliability
Traditional methods of assessing the stability of depressogenic
distortions were employed, correlating the initial with the eightweek scores on the DAS for the entire group.

Because of the nature

of the counterbalanced design, i.e., the fact that parallel forms
of the DAS (DAS-A and DAS-B) were administered to the subjects at
different testings, two analyses were conducted.

The first

investigated whether both forms of the DAS sampled the same domain
of distortions, as well as their stability, and a second tested the
overall temporal stability of the converted pre and post DAS scores.
Initially, total scores on the two adminstrations of the DAS
given eight weeks apart were correlated:

DAS-A-^ scores were
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Itea Slalletlcs for Bach fora of U m DAS Under Varying Condition*
UAS-Aj

(ii -185)

Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
U
9
1.7
11
12
1J
14
IS
16
17
!U
19
20
21
it
21
24
25
.’6
2/
211
20

10
11
12
11
14
IS
10
17
In
10
40

DAS

(n - 185)

Itea*
HoAll

!>.».

2.40
2.51
3.15
2.50
2.19
2.14
1.05
1.55
1.96
2.06
2.23
2.16
1.06
2.02
2.25
2.22
2.63
3.72
1.49
4.15
1.67
2.97
3.68
2.01
4.24
2.04
5.10
4.09
2.91
1.25
2.26
2.91
2.24
2.76
3. 14
1.07
1.69
4. SO
4 .O H
5. IO

1.59
1.36
1.55
1.63
1.52
1.50
1.65
0.99
1.13
1.50
1.40
1.23
1.04
1.35
1.49
1.63
1.61
1.67
1.76
1.94
1.7/
1.54
1.65
1.57
1.61
1.35
1.50
1. /(I
1.50
1.60
1.26
1.71
1.26
1.57
1.711
1.26
1.79
1.76
1 .61)
1.711

Hoan
.57
.32
.52
.64
.37
.31
.60
.45
.62
.53
.45
.27
.46
.47
.49
.55
.25
.27
.64
.45
.65
.49
.411
. 19
.33
.47
.16
.41
.211
.15
.46
.43
.40
.54
.46
.26
.19
.55
.35
.25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
13
14
35
36
37
HI
J9
40

2.96
2.99
3.82
2.40
2.90
3.19
3.30
1.00
3.62
3.16
2.30
2.06
4.S4
2.96
3.22
3.18
4.36
2.31
3.57
3.60
3.81
1.92
2.52
4.71
2.51
3.29
3.01
3.79
3.27
3.60
2.59
3.24
2.30
2.10
3.20
2.6)
2.27
3.02
1.75
3.17

3.0.
1.43
1.55
1.64
1.41
1.43
1.66
1.69
1.17
1.69
1.40
1.31
1.23
1.71
1.52
1.01
1.73
1.76
1.38
1.81
1.74
1.65
1.12
1.53
1.46
1.46
1.4b
1.45
1.65
1.67
1.64
1.35
1.61
1.13
1.02
1.51
1.25
1.43
1.58
1.09
1.73

'Tito wording of ««clt Ilea t v m UJVS-A a i m ! OAS-n Bay be found In Append1ceti E
»le* All ourrolatlons are algnlfleant at tins ,001 level,

thTMZWon
.20
.57
.J6
.44
.37
.50
.60
.54
.40
.46
.51
.46
.36
.16
.54
.49
.31
.:n
.42
.35
.51
.58
.47
.26
.54
.41
.41
.12
.44
.35
.40
.34
.30
.58
.26
.20
.47
.43
.14
.41
ami

f
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T f t b le 8 ( v u n t . )

t u is ~ 0

Mean s . U .
1

3 .2 6

i

3 .0 2
1 .7 1
2 .1 9
2 .7 4
2 .6 2
7 .7 6
1 .7 5
3 .6 0
3 .1 5
2 .0 9
1 .9 6
4 .5 6
2 .9 6
3 .1 9
2 .9 4
4 .6 0
2 .0 4
3 .1 8
3 .4 7
J . 40
1 .75
1 .9 6
4 . 38
2 .4 0
3 .2 9
2 .7 6
3 .4 0
2 .6 1
3 .4 0
2 .3 8
1 .2 9
2 .2 8
2 .1 3
3 .2 7
2 .2 5
2 .1 V
3 .5 5
1.112
2 .4 1

)
4
5
0
7
U
V
Ml
11
12
t)
14
IS
16
17

III
IV
20

21
22
21
24
2S
?<♦
27
211
2*1
in

II
12
II
14
35
36
37
III
IV
40

In •

17o>

IMS-A

(ti -

170)

Iteat*

Il« V
1 .6 6
1 .6 7
1 .8 5
1 .3 3
1 .3 6
1 .6 3
1 .7 0
1 .2 4
1 .5 7
’ 1 .4 7
1 .3 0
1 .2 6
1 .7 8
1 .6 6

1.00
1 .6 5
1 .9 6
1 .2 5
1 .8 3
1 .7 6
1 .6 3
1 .1 1
1 .2 6
1 .8 2
1 .5 9
1 .6 1
1 .4 8
1 .7 7
1 .6 1
1 .7 0
1 .2 6
1 .8 0
1 .2 4
1 .1 6
1 .6 7
1 .1 0
1 .3 9
1 .7 5
1 .2 3
1 .6 0

iorreTaH on
.2 9
.6 3
.5 1
.3 3
.4 4
.5 1
.6 7
.7 6
.2 7
.5 7
.7 1
.4 5
.3 2
.2 9
.4 7
.5 1
.3 9
.5 0
.41
.4 8
.5 3
.5 6
.4 7
.3 4
.6 2
.41
.4 2
.2 6
.3 7
.4 0
.6 0
.1 6
.2 7
.6 0
.3 4
.2 6
.5 3
.5 2
.3 3
.3 9

1
2
)
4
5
6
7
n
9
10
li
12
13
14
15
16
17
10
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
13
34
15
36
37
10
19
40

Mean

S.D.

2 .2 0
2 .3 2
2 .8 5
2 .6 6
2 .4 2
2 .4 2
3 .2 3
1 .6 6
2 .0 0
2 .1 8
2 .C 2
2 .3 0
1 .0 9
2 .0 9
1 .9 5
2 .6 2
2 .3 5
3 .0 3
3 .3 5
3 .4 8
3 .4 3
2 .0 6
3 .4 0
2 .6 9
3 .5 0
2 .0 5
4 .5 5
3 .2 6
2 .0 8
3 .0 0
2 .1 1
2 .7 0
2 .0 9
2 .7 2
3 .6 0
1 .9 1
3 .7 2
4 .5 4
4 . 10
4 .7 1

1 .2 0
1 .2 0
1 .5 2
1 .4 8
1 .6 4
1 .4 5
1 .7 4
1 .1 9
1 .4 0
1 .3 2
1 .5 3
1 .3 0
0 .9 5
1 .2 6
1 .2 7
1 .5 6

K SST3I
.3 7

.32
.6 9
.5 3
.3 2
.4 6
.5 6
.5 4
.5 7
.6 8
.6 2
.2 7
.6 1
.5 9
.5 7
.6 7
.3 7
.4 7
.7 1
.5 0
.6 0
.6 1
.5 4
.3 7
.4 6
.5 6
.5 1
.4 6
.5 7
.5 3
.5 0
.7 0
.3 9
.6 4
.3 0
.4 3
.2 9
.5 4
.41
.2 9

1 .4 6
1 .3 0
1 .5 9
1 .7 3
1 .7 9
1 .5 3
1 .6 6
1 .4 0
1 .6 9
J . 34
1 .7 0
1 .0 4
1 .4 6
1 .4 5
i .0 9
1 .6 1
1 .1 4
1 .6 0
1.110
1 .2 )
1 .6 9
1 .6 0
1 .6 7
1 .7 7

*TIh» MKtllnq of each ltc» frm* M S - A *wl DAS-B *«y be found lit A|>peti(11c«t* E
All rortnlallona ate significant a t t lie .° O I level,

aim )

r

M o lu i
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correlated with DAS-B2 for the 185 individuals who took the tests
in this sequence, and DAS-B^ scores were correlated with DAS-A2
for the remaining 170 subjects.

The resultant product-moment

correlations were .80 and .81, respectively.

Thus a substantial

degree of trait stability is reflected but these values may
involve a lower-bound estimate of reliability because of the
procedure employed, as well as the slight changes in scores due
to item specificity-

Therefore, for the 355 individuals in the

total sample, converted pretest scores (defined by the linearscaled scores of DAS-A^ and DAS-B^) were correlated with the
converted posttest scores (linear scaled scores of DAS-A2 and
DAS-B2) resulting in a stability coefficient of .84.

Although

this result is slightly higher than those obtained by the first
method, the difference in magnitude is very small.
The obtained stability coefficients are well within the .80
to .90 levels expected of measures of stable personality charac
teristics.

These results indicate that the rank-orderings of

scores is approximately the same on repeated occasions, in spite
of item specificity on each form of the DAS-

These indications

of good stability over an eight-week period could be useful in
determining experimental or therapeutic change.
In addition, I had decided to analyze the data from item #54
of the original 100-item DAS, which was included in both the DAS-A
and DAS-B.

Results indicated no significant differences among the
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mean scores for the various testings:
s.d. = 1.76; DAS-A^:

DAS-A^:

Mean = 3.49,

Mean = 3.35, s.d. = 1.59; DAS-B^:

s.d. = 1.63; and DAS-B 2 :

Mean = 3.81, s.d. = 1.65.

Mean = 3.48,

The content of

this item seemed to be more closely associated with the domain
being tested on Form A of the DAS, but the correlation coefficients
were not significantly different (DAS-A^:

x_ = .71, ©.<.001; DAS-B^:
£<• 001).

r^ = .64, £<-001: DAS-A2 :

r_ = .53, p ^ . O C l ; and DAS-B2 :

r_ = .51,

Lastly, correlations for this item over time were

investigated on the individual level.

Each subject's score on this

item at pretesting correlated with his score at posttesting (2: = .95,
£<.001) , indicating high temporal stability of this item.

Validity of the DAS
The American Psychological Association's manual, Technical
Recommendations for Psychological Tests and Diagnostic Techniques
(1954) recommends the use of congruent validity and construct
validity criteria in evaluating personality tests (Beck
Beamesderfer, 1974).

&

Therefore, the validity results will be

presented according to these categories.
Congruent Validity
Correlation coefficients were computed between the DAS and the
six subscales of the POMS, the BDI, and the SCT (see Table 9) to
evaluate the congruent validity.

(In these analyses, the all-

inclusive term "DAS" refers to the mathematically equated scores
for Forms A and B.

Therefore, every subject has one "pretest
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In k o rc o iro la L lo n u Among thu Auiiuautnont V a ria b lu a
(n “ 355)

Varlabluui

T

I)

Prokeuk Vai'labloB i
C
DD1
V
F

A

SCT

DAS

T

D

Pouktoet Variablesi
A
V
P
C

ODI

DAS

Prukuakt
POMS I
1.00
.70
.60
-.34
.49
.65

1.00
.65
-.4U
.46
.69

1.00
-.20
.4 J
.51

1.00
-.20
-.35

1.00
.51

1.00

UI3I

.59

.70

.51

-.40

.47

.50

1.00

SCT

.36

.42

.32

-.30

.25

.29

.44

1.00

DAS

.34

.40

.33

-.23

.31

.30

.36

.52

1.00

.63
.51
.45
-.26
.39
.40

.45
.62
.49
-.27
.35
.49

.36
.41
.57
-.15
.35
.30

-.24
-.29
-.20
.53
-.19
-.23

.30
.36
.33
-.21
.56
.36

.47
.40
.36
-.23
.33
.62

.46
.50
.40
- 30
32
45

.29
.39
.26
-.22
.19
.27

.33
.30
.32
-.22
.27
.35

UDI

.45

.51

.35

-.30

.37

.39

.66

.37

.37

.65

DAS

.32

.40

.27

-.22

.27

.34

37

.40

.04

.30

T-Scale
O-Soalu
A-Soale
V-Scale
F-Scalo
C-Scale

1
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T a h it i 9

Poukluaki
POMS i
T-Scale
D-Scale
A-Scalo
V-Scalo
F-Scalu
C-Scale

Nokui

ji (• OS) “ .111

(.01) “ .l!i

(i^ " 300)

1.00
.76 1.00
.75
.63
-.43- -.45
.57
.53
.70
.71

1.00
-.33
.52
.64

1.00
-.37
-.41

1.00
.56

.73

.57

-.44

.44

1.00
.64

.44

.30

-.25

.20

.39

1.00
.47

1.00
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score" and one "posttest score," regardless of which form of the
DAS was actually taken.)

Resultant values were examined for

significance in accordance with the sample size and the a priori
assumptions regarding the expected relationships.
It was anticipated that the DAS would have a moderate positive
correlation with scores on the SCT, a purported measure of
depressive-cognitions.

The correlation between the two scores

was .52 (p. <.001), indicating some similarity between the constructs
being tested by each of these measures.

The data in Table 9 also

support research hypothesis #1, i.e., that there will be a positive
correlation between depressive affect and endorsement of dys
functional attitudes.

For the pretest measures, the DAS correlated

.40 (p. ^.001) with the D-Scale of the POMS and .36 ( p < .001) with
the BDI.

These associations were slightly stronger for the posttest

measures, r = .44 (p<.001) for the D-Scale of the POMS and r = .47
.CGI) for the BDI.

Also supported is the assumption that

individuals who endorse a greater number of depressogenic attitudes
or schemas tend to feel more depressed than those individuals whose
thinking reflects the absence of these negative beliefs.
Scrutiny of the intercorrelations in Table 9 provides insight
into the dominant characteristics of individuals whose thinking
contains the idiosyncratic beliefs measured by the DAS.

According

to the correlational data from the DAS and the POMS, these
individuals tend to be more tense or anxious, to have feelings of
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depression accompanied by a sense of personal inadequacy, to have
a mood of anger and antipathy towards others, to display lack of
vigor and low energy, and to be characterized by bewilderment and
muddleheadedness.

However, since the DAS was constructed to assess

depressogenic beliefs, it seemed important to question whether the
items on both forms of the scale are unique to depression rather
than characteristic of emotional upset in general-

Although the

D-Scale of the POMS had the highest correlation with the DAS at
both pre- and posttesting (.40 and .44, respectively), all the r
values were significant at least at the .05 level.

However, this

result may be an artifact caused by the high intercorrelations
among the factor scores for this sample (i.e., depression with
confusion, r_ = .69 at pretesting; depression with tension-anxiety,
r_ = .76 at posttesting).

In an attempt to control statistically

for the effects of these other variables, partial correlations
were performed.

Table 10 presents the results (for pre- and post

testing) when each mood factor score was correlated with the DAS
and the effects of the other mood factors controlled.

The findings

suggest that, for the pretest sample, depressed mood and confusion
alone were associated with distortions in thinking when the effects
of the other mood states were controlled.

However, on the posttest

data, depressed mood supplied the only significant partial corre
lation.

Similar analyses conducted by Krantz and Hammen (personal

communication, 1978) on the SCT resulted in the finding that
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distortion, as measured by that scale, is associated -with depressed
mood and fatigue alone.
Construct Validity
The hypotheses that X tested in my investigation of distortions
in thinking are:

(1) Depressed subjects are more likely to have

dysfunctional attitudes thar nondepressed subjects;

(2) Depressogenic

schemas are more persistent over time than depressed feelings; and
(3) There is a time-related association between depressogenic
attitudes and depressed mood, possibly quasi-causal in nature.
Effects of level of depression.

Of critical interest are

issues pertaining to construct validity, and the central question
is the relationship between depressed mood and degree of distorted
responding.

As mentioned earlier (Table 9}, college students who

endorsed more depressogenic attitudes tended to feel more depressed.
However, in an attempt to answer this question more fully, the total
group was divided into "depressed" and "nondepressed" subgroups.
By applying the suggested cutoff score (Schwab et £.1., 1967a), 75
students who obtained a score of 10 or more on their initial BDI
were considered to be mildly to moderately depressed.

Based on

this split, scores on the DAS were analyzed (see Table 11).
As hypothesized, the more depressed persons endorsed more of
the depressogenic attitudes (see Table 11).

DAS scores of the

depressed group were significantly higher than those of the nonj*

depressed group at both pre- and posttesting (t (353) = 4.634,
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Table 10
Partial Correlations of DAS Responses with Mood
(Controlling for Remaining Moods)

Testing Time

Mood States a
Pretest
Tension-Anxiety

-.01

Posttest
.05

Depression-Dej ection

.10 *

.12 **

Anger-Hostility

.06

.07

-.05

-.06

Fatigue-Inertia

.07

-.00

Confusion-Bewilderment

.15 **

Vigor-Act ivity

.06

a Mood states were measured by the POMS subscales.
* fi<.05
** p C . O l
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£ < . 3 0 1 and t (353) = 5.419, £ < . 0 0 1 , respectively).

Values of

coefficient alpha for DAS-A^, DAS-A^, DAS-B^, and DAS-B 2 were
recomputed to see if the more depressed subjects would show
different internal consistency on the test.

In each case, the

reliability of the test increased in the depressed group, though
not significantly.
Stability and Change in Distortion and Mood.

The simple

test-retest correlations between DAS scores at pre- and post
testing reflect a substantial degree of stability.
earlier, in the total group of 355 individuals

As mentioned

the test-retest

coefficient was .84 (£< .001) over a period of eight weeks.

In

comparing this to the test-retest coefficents of the BDI (.6 6 )
and the D-Scale of the POMS (.62) , I found the DAS to be a much
more stable measure (Z^ = 5.50, p < . 0 0 1 and ]Z = 6.21, p.<-001,
respectively).

This finding can be taken as additional evidence

of construct validity, as one goal of the research was to design
a reliable and valid trait measure of depressogenic attitudes.
A closer look at Table 11 reveals that, although distortion
scores, as measured by the DAS, tend to be relatively stable, they
also seem to vary according to changes in mood level, as predicted
by Beck's theory.

To further investigate this, subjects whose

depression level had increased over time were compared with those
whose level of depression had decreased.

Because the BDI scores

were associated with gender, males and females were analyzed
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separately (see Table 12).
were nonsignificant.

Differences in DAS scores at retesting

Whether the male subject became more or less

depressed was not reflected in his DAS scores; i.e., his dysfunctional
attitudes remained constant.

For females, however, those who became

more depressed increased in their distortion score (t (78) = 2.78,
P. <.01).

This same analysis was then done in reverse, i.e., a

comparison was made by gender of BDI scores of subjects whose level
of distortion had increased over time versus those whose level of
distortion had decreased.

These data are presented in Table 13.

Although all of the fluctuations are in the predicted direction
(i.e., those who increased in level of distortion increased in
level of depression, and those who decreased in level of dis
tortion decreased in level of depression), none of these changes
were statistically significant.
At this point, one may legitimately raise the question of the
direction of the relationship between depressogenic schemas (attitudes)
and emotional affect.

Does the greater capacity for distorted think

ing result in a higher level of depression, or is the progression
more accurately described as one in which depression influences
distorted thinking?

Probably both of these causal progressions

operate to a certain degree (see Table 12 and 13); i.e., it's a
bidirectional relationship.

The activation of certain schemas

might well cause the increase of depressive affect, which in turn
activates additional schemas, etc.

But while some reciprocal
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Table 12
Distortion Scores for Males and Females
By Changes in Depression Level

Depression
Level3

Became less
depressed

Became more
depressed

Sex

DAS Score
Post
Mean
S.D.

Mean

Pre
S.D.

Male
(n=41)

121.05

21.32

124.34

21.17

1.17

Female
(n=127)

115.75

26.19

114.15

24.66

-0.83

Male
(n=34)

127.68

28.57

131.47

29.12

-0.90

Female
(n=79)

119.60

29.08

124.86

30.22

t-value

2.78 **

a Defined by the score on the BDI at posttesting minus the initial
BDI score. A negative difference score means the individual
became less depressed during the eight week testing period.
** p <.01

: 120

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 13
Depression Scores for Males and Females by Changes in
Dysfunctional Attitude Endorsement

Distortion
Level3,

Thinking
contains
more dys
functional
attitudes

Thinking
contains
less dys
functional
attitudes

Mean

S.D.

DAS Score
Post
Mean
S.D.

Male
(n=56)

4.64

4.03

5.36

5.25

1.11 (NS)

Female
(n=133)

6.34

5.26

6.79

6.29

0.37 (NS)

Male
(n=38)

5.40

3.34

5.34

4.35

0.11 (NS)

Female
(n=108)

6.14

6.30

5.21

6.15

1.93 (NS)

Sex

Pre

t-value

a Defined by the score on the DAS at posttesting minus the initial
DAS. A negative difference score means the individual endorsed
fewer dysfunctional attitudes during the eight week testing
period.
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feedback system of this type is conceivable, it is likely that a
preponderant causal pattern exists, and the resolution of this
issue motivated the following investigation.
Data were analyzed by means of the cross-lagged panel
correlational method, a quasi-experimental design (Campbell, &
Stanley, 1963; Kenny, 1975).

In this method, the inference of

causality is based primarily upon the rule of time precedence.
In all sciences, when an event consistently precedes the occurrence
of another, and the opposite does not hold, one of two possibilities
is entertained:

(a) Event 1 is seen as a cause (though possibly

only one of many) of Event 2, or (b) Events 1 and 2 are viewed
as the effects of some more general causes (Crano, 1973).

In the

experimental arena the controlled application of Event 1 effectively
precludes the possibility of the second alternative, and thus
changes in Event 2 (usually termed the dependent variable) are
attributed to the application of Event 1 (the dependent variable).
In spite of the fact that I was unable to control life stress
events in this study (i.e., schemas may or may not have been
activated), I decided to analyze my data by this method to see
how this trait measure (the DAS) would be affected by changes in
mood.
Intercorrelations among the pre- and posttest scores for the
total group on the BDI, POMS (D-Scale), and DAS were employed in
this analysis-

If, as espoused by the cognitive theorists, changes
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in one's cognitive organization precede changes in affect, the
following should be observed:
— 14 > ^— 13 = £2 4)> * 2 3 ' where
1
2
3
4

=
=
=
=

DAS
DAS
BDI
BDI

pretest score
posttest score
or POMS pretest score
or POMS posttest scores.

Inherent in this formula is the assumption that the two simultaneous
correlations

( £ 13

and £ 2 4 ) should be stable over time.

are shown in Table 14.

The results

The pairs of cross-lagged relationships

between depressogenic attitudes and depression

(£^4

and £ 2 3 ) were

not different when either the BDI or the POMS was used as the
measure of affect (Z = .07 and -.37, respectively).

In addition,

it was found that the cross-lagged correlations were slightly
lower than the simultaneous correlations for both analyses and,
the simultaneous correlations were not steady over time when
the analysis employed the BDI (Z = 2.57, p. < . 01).

This instability

itself might have upset rhe predicted inequalities in that oth^r
factors may be affecting one’s level of depression, i.e., lifestress situation, and these uncontrolled factors varied more at
one time than at another.

Perhaps, too, a period of eight weeks

was either too long or too short to match the causal interval (if
indeed a causal asymmetry existed).
It became apparent that this scheme was operating under an
additional constraint, the stability of the DAS over time.

One

of the assumptions inherent in the cross-lagged design is that if
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Table 14
Cross-Lagged and Other Correlations Between
Depressogenic Attitudes and Affect
(n = 355)

DAS

.84
.37
.36
.37
BDI. S-

.66

BDI

Using BDI as measure of affect

DAS

DAS

.84
.40

.44

.40

POMS.
(D-Scale)

(D-Scale)

Using POMS (D-Scale) as measure of affect
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one variable is highly consistent, then all cross-correlations
must take very similar values, and the predicted difference in the
two diagonal correlations has little opportunity to appear.

In

an attempt to free the relationship from this constraint, the
technique of partial correlations was applied in order to
investigate:

(1) the possible effect of an individual's pre-

DAS score on his post-BDI, over and above what could be predicted
simply from his pre-BDI, as well as (2) the effect of an individual's
pre-BDI score on his post-DAS performance, over and above what is
predictable from his pre-DAS.
Table 15 presents the data for the cross-lagged relationships
(for both the BDI and the POMS), using the first-order partial
correlations along the diagonals.

Whether the BDI of the POMS

(D-Scale) was used as the measure of affect, the results were
in the hypothesized direction according to cognitive theory,
i.e., schemas

affect, but nonsignificant (Z = 1.40 and 1.04,

respectively).
Based on these data, we truly cannot assert any priority;
perhaps both depressogenic attitudes and affect influence each
other, or both are influenced by a third factor.

With the

stability of attitudes or of affect over time (i.e., becoming
progressively more stable, or less stable), this method runs
into difficulty.

However, since the same analysis, using the

partials, approaches significance, it leads one to assume that
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Table 15
First-Order Partial Correlations Between
Attitudes and Affect for Cross-Lagged Relationships
(n = 355)

DAS

DAS

.84
.13

tv
.47

.20
BDI ^

Using BDI as the measure of affect

DAS
.13
.44

.40
.13
P0MS1
(D-Scale)

.62

pom s2

(D-Scale)

Using POMS (D-Scale) as the measure of affect
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affect is subject to the effect of other factors and the extent to
which they affect it may alter the results.

Within Beck's theory,

this other factor may be the "cognition," i.e., the conclusion one
draws from the depressogenic attitude and the only thing the
individual is aware of.

Data also tend to support the notion

that the interval of remeasurement may not match the true causal
interval since:

(1) the cross-lagged correlations (diagonals)

are not always greater than the simultaneous (or vertical)
correlations, and (2) these simultaneous correlations are not
statistically equal.

However, even if one has selected an

interval of remeasurement larger or smaller than the causal
interval, there is reason to believe the predicted inequalities
will appear, provided that variable A (depressogenic attitudes,
in this case) is reasonably consistent over time (Pelz

&

Andrews, 1964).
In a final attempt to explore further the theory of a
preponderant causal pattern existing, I repeated the foregoing
for the depressed (BDI score ^ 10) and nondepressed (BDI score
10) subgroups separately.

Analyses based on the zero-order

correlations, using both BDI and POMS scores, revealed that
for both groups the pairs of
not different.

wuob

-lagged relationships were

However, when the analyses were repeated using

the first-order partials, results showed a small but consistent
difference in the predicted direction in the four comparisons
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(see Table 16).

The average difference was .21, and all four of

them were statistically significant.

When the effect of the scores

on the initial DAS were partialled out, the correlations between
initial BDI score and final DAS score approached zero.

Therefore,

the expected differences do appear when the initial state of the
"resultant" variable is partialled out.

These findings are

interesting within the cognitive paradigm; however, the results
are purely suggestive.

Further controlled research is needed

before one can draw unambiguous conclusions about the maintaining
role of attitudes (or schemas) in depression.
Differences in DAS Scores by Levels of Depression.

Because

the DAS was designed as a screening instrument (i.e., to identify
those maladaptive beliefs which are typical of depression), the
cardinal test of its usefulness should involve a determination of
its ability to identify persons with certain characteristics.

To

determine the power of the DAS to discriminate among individuals
with varying levels of depression, the total group was divided
into 3 subgroups according to pre- or posttest scores on:
BDI and (2) the POMS (D-Scale).

(1) the

In a previous analysis, I had

examined the DAS scores by separating the group into depressed and
nondepressed subsamples according to the suggested cutoff scores
for a "normal" population.

In this analysis, I decided to apply

the clinically determined cutoff scores (Beck, 1967) on the BDI
for comparison when these analyses are repeated at a later date
in a psychiatric population.
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Table 16
First-order Partial Correlations for
Depressed and Nondepressed Groups

Using BDI as the Measure of Affect

Group

DAS, 3DI_ * BDI,
X
^
X

Nondepressed
(n=281)

.23*

Depressed
(n=74)

.17

BDI1 DAS2 * DAS-j^ Difference

.07

.16 *

-.08

.25 **

* p£.05
** p.
01

Using POMS (D-Scale) as the Measure of Affect

Group

DAS1 POMS2 • POMS-l

Nondepressed
(n=281)

.23 *

Depressed
(n=74)

.17

POMS1 DAS 2 * DASjl

Difference

-.06

.01

* ,p<.05
** p.^.01
129
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.29 **

.16 *
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When the BDI scores were used as the criterion measure, three
subgroups were obtained by applying the predetermined cutoff scores
(Beck, 1967):

normal range of depression (0-9); mildly depressed

(10-15); and, moderately to severely depressed (16+).

Mean DAS

scores were determined for each of these groups, and a one-way
analysis of variance (see Table 17) was performed (F (2,352) =
15.58,
p

51

001 for the pretest scores and F (2,352) = 38.22,

001 for posttest) .

data indicates that:

Newman-Keuls post hoc analysis of the
(1 ) the moderately to severely depressed

group has significantly higher DAS scores than both the normal
and mildly depressed groups at pre- and posttesting;

(2 ) the

difference in means between the mildly depressed and normal group
was just short of significance (p. ^.08) for the pretest scores;
and (3) the mildly depressed group had higher DAS scores than
the normal group at posttest (£<.05).
The total group was then divided into thirds based on the
percentile scores for Scale-D reported in the Instruction Manual
for the POMS (McNair, Lorr,£ Droppleman, 1971).

Mean DAS scores

were calculated for both pre- and posttests for each of these
subgroups and then subjected to another one-way analysis of
variance (F (2,352) = 31.55, £ < .001 at pretest; F_ (2,352) = 29.35,
fc.<\001 at posttest).

Similar results were obtained from the Newman-

Keuls post hoc analysis, i.e., the top third had significantly higher
DAS scores than the middle or bottom thirds of the group.

In
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Table 17
DAS Scores by Levels of Depression as
Measured by the BDI
it.
Pre BDI Score

Pre DAS Score
N

Mean

S.D.

281

114.43

25.14

(10-15)

54

124.72

25.55

Moderate to
Severe (16+)

20

145.20

34.97

Normal (0-9)
Mild

Test

F = 15.58

P

.001

r = .36

Post BDI Score

Post DAS Score
Mean

S.D.

282

114.05

23.55

(10—15)

AO
•aw

131.94

27.34

Moderate to
Severe (16+)

25

154.68

31.76

Normal (0-9)
Mild

Test

F = 38.22

£. »

.001

r = .47
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addition, the lower and middle thirds did not differ significantly
at either testing (see Table IS).
A closer look at the mean scores in Tables 17 and 18 seem to
suggest that there may be a curvilinear relationship between the
DAS and the two measures on affect.

This hypothesis will have to

be tested at a later date with a sample which is not as skewed
toward the normal end.

However, these results affirm the construct

validity of the DAS by the "known-groups method"
1973).

(Crano

& Brewer,

In this technique various groups of persons know to differ

on the attribute being tapped by the DAS were compared.

If the

DAS is really a measure of depressogenic attitudes, groups "known"
to be different should generate clearly discriminable scale scores.
The data clearly support this reasoning in a sample of nonpsychiatric
college students.
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Table 13
DAS Scores by Levels of Depression as
Measured by the POMS D-Scale

Pre POMS(D-Scale)
Scores

Pre DAS Scores
N

Mean

S.D.

0-33rd percentile
(bottom)

122

108.67

21.01

34th-66th percentile
(middle)

113

112.24

25.35

67th-100th percentile
(top)

120

132.23

27.65

Test

F = 31.55

£

.001

r = .40

Post POMS(D-Scale)
Scores

Post DAS Scores
N

Mean

S.D.

0-33rd percentile
(bottom)

122

109.85

22.21

34th-66th percentile
(middle)

113

114.76

22.53

67th-100th percentile
(top)

120

133.45

30.07

Test

F = 29.35

2.

.001

r = -44
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CHAPTER V
Final Comments
Evaluation of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale
The primary purpose of this research was to validate as
measurable constructs the ideas Beck has proposed as dys
functional attitudes and to design a written instrument
sufficiently reliable and valid for research purposes to
measure the extent to which persons hold these beliefs.

On

the basis of the data presented, it appears that this goal
has been met successfully.

Both forms of the DAS, consisting

of 40 items each, have been shown to exhibit homogeneity and
stability reliability, as well as content, congruent and
construct validity.
These findings show that the DAS can be used in further
research involving cognitive depressogenic attitudes, thereby
providing a research tool or aid not before available.

In

addition, this instrument could be of considerable value not
only as a screening device but perhaps also as a way into
treatment.

Many psychiatric populations are remarkably

disinclined to verbalize psychological discomfort although
they are more than ready to talk about somatic complaints.
An instrument such as the DAS should be of value in at least
orienting these individuals towards slightly more cognitive
appraisal of their current situation and problems.

The
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exploratory clinical use of the DAS (not incorporated as part of
this study) has shown many advantages offered by it.

Like other

clinical instruments, it provides an economical and simple short
cut to greater understanding of the nature of the patient's problem,
in this case, by providing the therapist with information about his
patient's dysfunctional thought pattern.

Most importantly, the DAS

affords a means of objectively measuring progress in therapy.
By going into the entire population, one can find individuals
who may exhibit amounts of depression equal to those exhibited by
individuals who come for treatment but who themselves never cross
the threshold of a clinic or a therapist.

This was true of

approximately one-third of the sample investigated in this study.
A knowledge of why they fail to do so may unearth some of the
hidden factors separating the "ill" from the "well" as well as
reveal individuals who need treatment but for some reason do not
get it.

Additional studies should be run to determine which items

on the DAS most clearly distinguish the severely depressed individual
from the depressed normal.

It is hypothesized from the data

presented that the thought processes will distinguish the two
groups, not the central mood factor.

They can be equally sad,

lonely, etc., that is, equally depressed in mood, however; it is
their dysfunctional attitudes which will be most revealing.

A

person experiencing a mild disturbance in his feelings or behavior
may not be aware of his depressogenic schemas or attitudes - even
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though they are accessible to consciousness-

In such cases, the

attitudes do not attract his attention, although they can exert
an influence on how he feels and acts.

By concentrating on these

thoughts, however, he can easily recognize them.

This phenomenon

can be observed in people who have recovered from the acute phase
of a psychological disturbance or who are only mildly disturbed
(Beck, 1976).
Despite the present usefulness of the instrument as developed,
a number of possible improvements could be made.

Additional items

should be gathered and analyzed to furnish a larger item pool.
Not only may weaker items be replaced, but both forms of the
scale may be lengthened slightly.

Work should also be done to

improve the instructions so as to eliminate confusion in responding.
Many individuals cannot separate how they "think"

(which is what

the directions to the DAS state) from how they "feel" and this
affects their results.

According to Beck (1976), it is important

for the individual to be able to make the distinction between "I
believe" (an opinion that is subject to validation) and "I know"
(an "irrefutable" fact).

The ability to make this distinction

is of critical importance in modifying the patient's reactions that
are subject to distortion.
In short, in spite of the psychometric properties of DAS-A and
DAS-B which were presented, like any development it should continue
to be improved for maximum utility.
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Questions Raised by the Data
Dysfunctional Attitudes and Gender
Both the pre-scores and post-scores on the DAS showed a mild
relationship with sex; i.e., males tended to get higher scores on
the tests than females, a finding which was not expected.

Although

these differences were quite small, one possible explanation could
be that the sample of males (only 27% of the total) was not equi
valent to the sample of females.

One other reason for this result

is possibly that DAS-A and DAS-B may be testing dysfunctional
attitudes which are sex related; i.e., success-oriented items
versus interpersonal ones.

Prior research (Beck, 1967; 1976)

has supported the notion that females are far more sensitive to
interpersonal situations, i.e., needing to be loved., while males
are more sensitive to failure, and items related to work situations.
A detailed content analysis should be performed and the mean scores
for males and females compared (according to content) to see if
this explanation is valid.

This analysis could be combined with

the detailed factor-analytic study proposed in Chapter 2.
Discriminative Validity
More detailed studies must be performed to determine the power
of the DAS to discriminate among various psychiatric groups.

It is

important to know that not only does the DAS discriminate among
normals at varying levels of depression (shown in this study) but
that the instrument is also sensitive enough to discriminate among
137
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depressed psychiatric outpatients, nondepressed psychiatric
outpatients and nondepressed or depressed nonpsychiatric
outpatients.

If, as Beck's theory predicts, people with

psychiatric disorders will have more dysfunctiona’ attitudes
than those without psychiatric disorders, it is important to
test whether the DAS is sensitive enough to reflect this.
In addition, a specific test of whether dysfunctional
attitudes can be identified in a normal population and
subsequently correlated with psychopathological symptomatic
expression in individuals endorsing dysfunctional attitudes
has not yet been undertaken.

In order to conduct such a

study, it would be necessary to identify a large subject
population having the capacity to follow prospectively and
measure repeatedly both their attitudes and their psychopathological symptoms.

Furthermore, it would be important

to identify specific life-stresses for the subject population
in question.

A study should be conducted to test the hypothesis

that dysfunctional attitudes in normal subjects will be pre
dictive of subsequent psychopathological symptomatology.

Based

on data reported in this study, it would be hypothesized that
the greater the degree of endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes,
the more frequent and/or the more severe the psychopathological
symptomatology to be expected.

Also, that specific life-stresses

will interact with previously endorsed dysfunctional attitudes
to result in psychopathological symptomatology.
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Relationship Between Depression and Distortion
Additional research is required to demonstrate the nature of
the relationship between depression and schemas, or, more generally
between affect and depressogenic attitudes.

The cognitive theory

of emotional disorders (Beck, 1976) specifies the nature and degree
of cognitive distortions in the specific psychopathological states.
The theory suggests that cognitive changes precede the development
of symptoms and the relief of symptoms.

According to Beck (1976):

"In formulating his approach to depression,
it is important for the therapist to dis
tinguish among symptom, technique, and
underlying attitudes. For example, the
symptom may be affective, such as crying
spells, sadness, loss of gratification,
loss of sense of humor, apathy. The
therapeutic approach may be behavioral,
for example, mobilizing the patient into
more activity and positively reinforcing
certain types of activity. The under
lying attitude, however, is the component
that needs to be changed ultimately if
the totality of the depression is to be
influenced. Thus, the goal is cognitive
modification." (pp. 267-268)
Data from this study did not fully support this view, primarily
because of a number of methodological problems:

(1) I was unable to

control events in this study, i.e., schemas may or may not have
been activated, and this affected my correlations and therefore,
the "quasi-causal" conclusions;

(2) The DAS was such a stable

measure that the cross-correlations took on similar values and
predicted differences in correlations has little opportunity to
appear;

(3) The interval of remeasurement may have been larger or
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smaller than the causal interval;

(4) There is the possibility that

other factors are affecting one's level of depression.

Since Beck's

(1967; 1976) theory is stating that the affect comes directly from
the cognition (which is a result of the depressogenic attitude), it
may be this factor which has an intermediate effect; and, (5) the
cognitive view of emotions may not fully explain the etiology of
depression.
Additional research on this issue is required, especially that
which employs seme behavioral indices, rather than exclusively selfreports, on depressogenic schemas and their consequences.

This

multimodal approach to research is most likely the best way to
facilitate one's understanding of dysfunctional attitudes.
Implications for Beck's Position
To the extent this study was structured to do so, the results
show confirmation of Beck's theoretical system and position.

Kis

theory of dysfunctional attitudes in depressives was shown to be
accurate in that they are functionally distinct constructs
measurable in a normal, college population.

Although causal

relationships were not fully confirmed, the existence of highly
significant functional relationships as hypothesized between
dysfunctional attitudes (as measured by the DAS) and other indices
of psychopathological symptomatology leaves strong implications of
validity for Beck's approach.
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Data must now be collected from a psychiatric population to see
if one's dysfunctional attitudes can be changed in therapy and to get
a better estimate of a remeasurement interval.

The DAS has been

shown to be a valid and reliable measure of dysfunctional attitudes
in a population of normal college students, the next test is in a
psychiatric population.

The goal of cognitive-behavioral therapy

is not simply to modify emotional behavior, percepts, and thoughts,
but to help the individual to discover the operation of his'
cognitive unconscious so that he may learn how to learn, to
truly develop, and thus to develop beyond therapy.

The process

of therapy is therefore a cognitive one which attempts to bring
the patient closer to reality by rational methods even though it
deals much of the time with the irrationalities of the patient.
Potential Value of the DAS
A psychotherapy change measure such as the DAS has a number
of important uses:
(1) Assess how various types of psychotherapies influence
attitudes.
(2) Identify effective ingredients in psychotherapy; i.e., to
identify the techniques in various psychotherapy treatment packages
which produce significant cognitive change and/or symptomatic
relief.

A measure of dysfunctional attitudes is essential to

determine whether many of the techniques which espouse to change
faulty beliefs do in fact perform as hypothesized.
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(3) Identify subtypes of depressive syndromes which may be
more or less responsive to cognitive-behavioral therapy.
(4) Identify patients at risk for relapse from depression.
Recent evidence (Hauri, 1976) suggests that remitted neurotic
depressives continued to evidence cognitive distortions (based
on dream content studies).

Beck (1976) suggests that relapsing

patients continue to hold hypervalent schemas and therefore
evidence cognitive distortions even when not symptomatic.

If

the DAS were used to identify these patients, additional treatment
could be given to them.
(5) Identify persons who are at particular risk for developing
depressive states before they are symptomatic (i.e., those with
specific depressogenic attitudes).

If these people could be

identified, prevention techniques could be developed to preclude
the onset of these kinds of disorders.
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CHAPTER VI
Summary
The development and validation of an instrument to identify
the common assumptions underlying the typical dysfunctional
attitudes in depression was described.

The questionnaire,

called the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS), arose from the
need to operationalize and evaluate Beck's (1967; 1976) hypotheses
regarding the role of negativistic schemas in the origin and
maintenance of depression.
Two parallel forms of the scale, each consisting of 40 items,
elicit information on an individual's dysfunctional attitudes
which act as schemas by which he construes his world.

The

validation of these two forms was made in a sample of 355 subjects,
with the following results:
(1) Homogeneity reliability for the DAS-A and DAS-B ranged
from .89 to .92.

Stability based on eight-week test-retest

correlations of scores was .84.
(2) Within this group of relatively normal college students,
depressed students have higher DAS scores than nondepressed
students.

Support for this is based on the positive relationship

between depressive affect (measured by the BDI or the POMS D-Scale)
and dysfunctional attitudes (measured by the DAS).

Individuals

who had a tendency to think more negatively were likely to feel
more depressed.
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(3) Depressogenic attitudes were found to be more persistent
over time than depressed mood, i.e., the test-retest data for the
DAS was significantly higher than the results for either the BDI
or the POMS D-Scale.
(4) The presence of depressogenic attitudes was more
associated with depressed mood than with other mood disturbances.
(5) In the total populations employed there was no strong
evidence to support the notion of depressogenic attitudes causing
depressive affect.

However, this aspect of the study was affected

by a number of methodological problems and needs further controlled
research.
(6) Differences in DAS scores among college students with
varying levels of depression were investigated and found to be
highly significant.
(7) The relationship of age, sex, race, and educational level
to dysfunctional attitudes as measured by the DAS was also
investigated.

3oth sex and educational level were related to

DAS scores.
DAS-A and DAS-B are sufficiently reliable and valid as a
measure of dysfunctional attitudes in a normal college student
population.

The next step is to determine the scale's psychometric

properties in a psychiatric population as well as its utility for
research and its

effectiveness as a therapeutic screening device.
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Additional suggestions for refinement of the DAS were made.
Beck* s theoretical position concerning the concept of
depressogenic schemas was substantially confirmed.

Further

controlled investigations are needed to determine causal
aspects of the relationship between dysfunctional attitudes
and affect.
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APPENDIX A

BIOGRAPHIC AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION FORMS
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

(First 4 letters of your mother’s maiden
name, then the first initial of her
first name. Examole: GROSB)

Subject Code:

Last Grade Completed:

Male

Sex:

Less than 7 years school

Female

Junior High School
(Grades 7,3,9)
Partial High School
(Grades 10,11)

Black

Race:

Caucasian
High School Graduate
Latin American
Partial College Training
Other

(

)

College Graduate
Graduate Professional Training

Age (in years):

Occupation:
Housewife
Student

Marital Status:

Unskilled Blue Collar (manual
laborer, waitress, etc.

_____ Single
_____ Married

Skilled Blue Collar (mechanic
carpenter, policeman, etc.)

Cohabitation

Clerk, secretary, office
worker

_____ Widowed
Sep/living apart

Teacher
Divorced
Executive or owns business
Professional
None
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Religion:

Employment:

(Do NOT answer if
housewife or student)

Atheist
_____ Employed in a regular job
Agnostic
Employed, but in a part-time
job

Protestant
Catholic

Marginally employed (lawn
cutting, babysitting)

Jewish
Unemployed
Other (
Retired

If you are presently enrolled in any courses, what is your grade point
average equal to? ____________
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1.

Have you had any contact with a helping professional (Therapist,
Physician, Social Worker, or Probation Officer) within the last
month?
YES
NO

2.

Have you had prior inpatient psychiatric treatment?
None
One inpatient experience (How long ago?
More than one

3.

(How long ago?

___

____________ )

If you had prior inpatient treatment, do you feel it was successful?
YES

4.

_____

NO

_____

NOT APPLICABLE

Have you ever had prior outpatient therapy?
NOne
Single evaluation session only
One therapy experience

(How long ago?

More than one (How long age?
5.

(How long ago?

___________ )

____________ )

____________ )

Was the outpatient therapy successful?
YES
NO
_____

6.

NOT APPLICABLE

Are you presently involved in therapy?
YES
_____

7.

(What type?

_________________________________J______ )

NO

How has your life been during th past month? Has anything stress
ful occurred to cause you to become very sad? Has anything
exciting occurred to cause you to become very happy? Explain
these events in detail in the space below.
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APPENDIX B

BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY
(BDI)
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BECK INVENTORY
Name

Date

On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each
group of statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement in
each group which best describes the way you have been feeling the PAST
WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY! Circle the number beside the statement you
picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally
well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each
group before making your choice.
1

0I
1 I
2 I
3 I

do not feel sad.
feel sad.
am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it.
am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.

2

0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
1 I feel discouraged about the future.
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot
improve.

3

0
1
2
3

4

01
1 I
2 I
3 I

5

0 1 d on’t feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time.
2 Ifeel quite guilty most of the time.
3 Ifeel guilty all of the time.

6

0 1 don't feel I am being punished.
1 Ifeel I may be punished.
2 Iexpect to be punished.
3 Ifeel I am being punished.

7

0
1
2
3

8

01
1 I
2 I
3 I

I do not feel like a failure.
I feel I have failed more than the average person.
As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures.
I feel I am a complete failure as a person.

1
I
I
I

get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
don't enjoy things the way I used to.
don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore.
am dissatisfied or bored with everything.

don't feel disappointed in myself.
am disappointed in myself.
am disgusted with myself.
hate myself.
don't feel I am any worse than anybody else.
am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
blame myself all the time for my faults.
blame myself for everything bad that happens.
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9

10

11

0 1 don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them
out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
0 1 Don't cry anymore than usual.
1 I cry more now than I used to.
2 I cry all the time now.
3 I used to be able to cry, but now Ican't cry eventhough
want to.

I

0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am.
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.
2 I feel irritated all the time now.
3 I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate
me.

12

0
1
2
3

1
I
I
I

have not lost interest in other people.
am less interested in other people than I used to be.
have lost most of my interes u in other people.
have lost all of my interest in other people.

13

0
1
2
3

1
I
I
I

make decisions about as well as I ever could.
put off making decisions more than I used to.
have greater difficulty in making decisions them before.
can't make decisions at all anymore.

14

0 1 don't feel I look any worse than I used to.
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that
make me look unattractive.
3 I believe that I look ugly.

15

0 1 can work about as well as before.
1 It takes an extra effort tc get started at doing something.
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
3 I can't do any work at all.

16

0 1 can sleep as well as usual.
1 I don't sleep as well as I used to.
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get
back to sleep.
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get
back to sleep.

17

0 1 don't get more tired than usual.
1 I get tired more easily than I used to.
2 I get tired from doing almost anything.
3 I am too tired to do anything.
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18

0 My appetite is no worse than usual.
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
2 My appetite is much worse now.
3 I have no appetite at all anymore.

19

0 1 haven't lost much weight, if any lately.
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds.
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds.
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds.
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less.
Yes ________
No
_

20

0 I am no more worried about my health than usual.
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains
or upset stomach; or constipation.
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to
think of much else.
3 X am so worried about my physical problems, that I cannot
think about anything else.

21

0
]
2
3

1
X
I
I

have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
am less interested in sex than I used to be.
am much less interested in sex now.
have lost interest in sex completely.

Copyright (£) 1972 by Aaron T. Beck, M.D.
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APPENDIX C

PROFILE OF MOOD STATES
(POMS)
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The Profile of Mood States:
Permission was not granted to reproduce the Profile of Mood
States

(POMS) within this manuscript because of copyright procedures

followed by the Educational and Industrial Testing Service.
Psychometric information on this scale, as well as copies for future
use may be obtained by writing:
Educational and Industrial Testing Service
(EDITS)
San Diego, California 92107
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APPENDIX D

STORY COMPLETION TEST
(SCT)
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Story Completion Test

Peggy had joined a particular organization a couple of years ago
because she was very committed to its goals and practices. She knew
most of the members by now, and a few had even become fairly close
friends. Peggy had never considered herself the "leader" type.
Earlier in school she had been fairly active but had never really
stood out. Several friends in her current group thought that her
ideas were sound and they began to urge her to run for president of
the organization in the upcoming election. Peggy was very reluctant
at first, feeling she was unqualified, but finally she decided to run
because she thought she did have energy and ideas to contribute. No
woman had ever held the position before, but her friends thought she
had a good chance to win. When elections were held, Peggy ran for
presidency but she lost.

Put yourself in Peggy's place, trying as vividly as you can to imagine
what she probably thought and felt.
1.

When you first heard you'd lost, you immediately:
a.
b.
c.
d.

2.

After the election, you conclude.
a.
b.
c.
d.

3.

feel bad and imagine I've lost by a landslide.
shrug it off as unimportant.
feel sad and wonder what the total counts were.
shrug itoff, feeling I've tried as hard as I could.

I feel really depressed about losing, but I'll continue to
work for my goals once I get my enthusiasm back.
I'ts okay that I lost, since it's a useful illustration of the
inevitable prejudice against female leadership.
I ’m not a winner at anything. I never should have let myself
be talked into running.
The campaign was a good experience even though I didn't win.

When you compare the winner's "platform" to yours, you think:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Mine was good for a first attempt, and was vastly
my opponents.
Despite what my friends said, mine wasn't good at
I feel badly that I didn't do a better job on it,
know next time.
Mine showed some inexperience but was pretty good
first attempt.

better than
all.
but I'll
for a

157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Fred had started working in the main office last week.
It felt like
it had taken forever to find this job after he moved to L.A. He had
grown Tip in a small town some distance away, and since he moved had
met few people. The others who worked in the same office seemed
friendly, although most of them were considerably older than he. One
woman, Carolyn, was about his age, sort of pretty, but she worked down
the hall and he saw her only occasionally.
Taking his coffee break in
the snack bar one afternoon, she came over and satwith him. They
talked for awhile. He found her fun and pleasant, and they seemed to
enjoy each other. The break ended and he had to get back to his
office. He found himself thinking about her that afternoon - fanta
sizing about going out with her, wondering what she’s like. He looked
forward to seeing her the next day. At lunch the next afternoon, he
sat alone in the snack bar and saw her come in. She saw him, smiled
and waved, but she took her lunch to another empty table on the far
side of the room.
Put yourself in Fred's place and try to imagine as vividly as you can
what he might think and feel.
1.

Your first reaction was to think:
a. I might consider being a little assertive and pursue her.
b. I'm unhappy that she prefers to eat alone this afternoon.
c. She dislikes me and wants me to get the message.
d. She's playing hard to get.

2.

Seeing her makes you think of your romantic prospects in L.A.,
you imagine:
a. I get really discouraged about how hard it is to meet good
people, but almost everyone has problems with it, too.
b. I feel like I'll never meet anyone who is interested in me.
c. I can't expect the first woman to come along to be the Big
Romance.
d. Women in L.A. are awfully conceited.

3.

Thinking back on your conversation with
a. I know she really was excited by me
why she's avoiding me.
b. I'm afraid it wasn't as interesting
c. The conversation was pleasant; that
with whether she's interested in me
d. I must have failed at making a good

4.

Carolyn, your judgment is:
and I'm mystified about
as I first thought.
probably had nothing to do
or not.
impression.

Reflecting on your life here in L.A., you think:
a. I'll just have to wait and see what the future
it's too soon to tell.
b. I have just about everything I want and I know
hit in this town.
c. Loneliness is a big problem for me, but then I
also a problem for all newcomers.
d. No one in L.A. will ever really care about me,
I have a job.

will bring;
I'll be a big
suppose it's
but at least
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Lisa and Jason have been dating for the past few months. Lisa is
neither pretty nor ugly and has a pleasant personality. Jason is
usually fun to be with and often takes her to nice restaurants and
theaters. Tonight she seemed to be somewhat unhappy despite his
attempts to start light-hearted conversations. He asked her if any
thing was wrong. She replied that she was having some problems at
work that she didn't want to talk about, but was grateful for his
concern. She seemed a little more cheerful after that.
Put yourself in Jason's place, trying to imagine as vividly as you can
what he probably thought and felt.
1.

You think about the future of this relationship and you imagine:
a. It's a pretty good relationship, and we're getting to know
each other better as time goes on.
b. It's a pretty good relationship and I'm generally satisfied
although I think the relationship has a few problems.
c. I would probably have a hard time finding someone else who
would care about me, so I want to make this relationship
work out.
d. It is not what I really want it to be, and that makes me sad,
so I will leave myself open to contacts with other women.

2.

You
a.
b.
c.
d.

wonder why Lisa hasn't called for several days.
I decide I don't really know why and figure I should ask her.
All I can think of is that she must not care about me.
I imagine that she thinks so highly of me that she sometimes
is afraid of risking rejection or pushing me too hard.
I feel unhappy about it but figure that things sometimes do
not happen exactly the way one would like.

3.

Why do you think her mood changed after you asked her if there was
ci pjTCfclSIS?
a. I feel pleased and imagine I can be very therapeutic for her
and most others.
b.
I don't know why since it may have been due to any number of
things, but I am happy that her mood changed.
c. I just don't understand her moods, which worries and upsets
me even though I know it's very hard to really understand
another person.
d. I wish I could believe that I had something to do with it,
but I rarely have the ability to cheer anyone up.

4.

You wonder why she got in the bad mood, and imagine that:
a. I feel badly that I don't understand her, but it's really
difficult to understand everything about somebody else.
b. Like most people, she has a few problems that bother her.
c. It's because she's extremely immature and moody; but I, on
the other hand, am calm and happy.
d. It's because she's dating the most bleak, plain man in the
city.
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Janice is a senior at a large university. She dislikes the lack of
faculty-student contact, so she usually makes an effort to talk to her
teachers outside the classroom. So after she received an average
score on a midterm, she went to the professor. Dr. Smith, to talk over
the test. Dr. Smith pointed out the correct answers and the reasons
for them on the questions she missed. He also gave her some helpful
tips on studying. After about 45 minutes, Dr. Smith said he was quite
busy and hoped she would excuse him. He then walked her to the door
and said it was nice talking to her.
Put yourself in Janice's place, trying to imagine as vividly as you
can what she probably thought and felt.
1.

Are you satisfied with your meeting with Dr. Smith?
a. Yes, because he was quite pleased with my visit and will pro
bably give me a good grade in the course.
b. Although it's upsetting for me to realize it, I probably
needed tips on studying.
c. Yes, he answered all my questions and I made a good contact.
d. No, he probably thinks I'm dumb, which is why he gave me tips
on study habits.

2.

Looking over the questions you missed, you decide:
a.
It's not my fault, the teacher should make a better test.
b.
Unfortunately, my performance on this test is indicative of
my true ability. I'm a mediocre student.
c. I feel bad that I missed those questions.
d. Now that you've talked to the teacher, you hope you'll do
better on the final.

3.

You thought Dr. Smith was rather nice in walking you to the door.
Your reaction to his gesture was:
a.
Embarrassment. He was trying to hurry me out.
b.
Appreciation that he realized that it was worth his time to
help me.
c. Appreciation. He seemed interested and concerned.
d. Sort of sad and let down that the meeting had to end.

4.

How did your meeting with the professor change your view of the
large, impersonal university?
a. Dr. Smith helped to make the university seem less impersonal.
b. You realize that the faculty is always happy to talk with
students.
c. Although Dr. Smith was willing to talk to me, I still feel
lost and a little lonely at the largo impersonal university.
d. Even though the professor was polite, I still felt that he
resented my taking up so much of his time, and that made
me feel bad.
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Ellen was a graduate student, and she aspired to be a good teacher.
It was very important to her to communicate well with others, and she
liked the idea of turning students on to particular viewpoints that
they may never have considered before. Her father had been a pro
fessor in a small college and although their relationship was strained
at times, she had always respected her father and thought that being a
professor was a good life. Ellen was a sensitive person - perceptive
and insightful - and she was aware that part of her motivation stemmed
from the role of being an "expert" and having people be impressed by
her knowledge.
fin opportunity to test her teaching skills arrived in the form of a
class presentation that all the students in one of her seminars were
required to make. Ellen probably put in a bit more than average
preparation on her topic. When the day came for her presentation, she
seemed calm and poised (although rather nervous on the inside).
During her talk, students commented and asked questions; no one yawned
or dosed. One question had been rather hard to answer. No one said
anything to her afterwards since it was late in the day, everyone left
immediately afterward.
Put yourself in Ellen's place and try to imagine as vividly as you can
what she probably thought and felt.
1.

You
a.
b.
c.
d.

try to judge how well your talk went. You decide:
I clearly did the best job of anyone.
According to my own standards, I think it went okay.
I'm disappointed that no one complimented me.
I hoped someone would tell me it went well, but since no one
said anything, I'm afraid it wasn't very good.

2.

When you thought about it afterwards, the thing that mostly comes
to mind is:
a. I feel good; relieved that the whole thing is over.
b. I feel disappointed that I didn't get feedback about how I'd
done.
c. I feel bad about that one question I couldn't answer. I think
it made me look ridiculous.
d. I feel good because now the teacher will see my genius.

3.

You're wondering what grade you might be given for the presen
tation by the instructor.
a. I feel that because of that one question that stumped me,
he'll conclude that I didn't really prepare well enough to
earn an A.
b. I saw him nod once or twice, so he was really impressed and
I'll get an A.
c.~ I'm quite worried about the grade but I don't know how he'll
grade.
d. I think I'll get an A because it's a graduate seminar and
because I clearly did as much as anyone else and an A is usual
under these circumstances.
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4.

With respect to your future career as a college teacher, you
conclude:
a. I'm afraid I won't make it because I know the competition for
jobs is stiff.
b. I'm optimistic because I've always been lucky.
c. Since my seminar presentation didn't go very well, I feel
pretty pessimistic about my chances.
d. I'm optimistic since my grades are good.
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Lou is a sophomore, living in one of the dorms. He’s moderately good
looking, friendly, a bit on the quiet side, an A student. He fre
quently admires men of his age who appear to be outgoing, although
he's aware of the disadvantages of that personality as well. One of
his concerns is making friends. In his freshman year he kept busy
with school work and maintained relationships he'd had in high school.
But this year he has become more aware that he wants to meet people
and make friends on campus. He's uncertain quite how to go about it.
Tonight is Friday night, and Lou can't deny to himself that he feels
lonely. Most of the men on his floor are out for the evening or gone
for the weekend. At the far end of the hall the men in two or three
rooms are in tonight as well. While he's in the shower, he hears one
of them mention plans for going out later for pizza to a place where
they know some women are going to be.
Put yourself in Lou's place and try to imagine as vividly as you cam
how he might think and feel.
1.

Your first reaction when you hear that they are going out is:
a. Unhappiness. They probably would have asked me to ccme if
they liked me more.
b. Unhappiness and increased loneliness. Sounds like I'll be
practically alone on the floor.
c. TO wonder if they'd mind if I'd come along.
dRelief. They seem unfriendly for not asking me, soI'm happy
since I don't have to be with them.

2.

Being alone on a Friday night:
a. doesn't bother me because I figure I'll have a date next week
end for sure.
b.
upsets me and makes me feel lonely.
c.
upsets me and makes me start to imagineendless days and
nights by myself.
d. I can handle it because one Friday night alone isn't that im
portant; probably everybody has spent one night alone.

3.

You sit at your desk trying to get some reading done. Your mind
keeps flashing on:
a. pleasant memories of a recent date I've had.
b. an upcoming blind date which I expect will go very well.
c. I'm lonely and down but everybody is lonely once in awhile.
d. the feeling that not having a date tonight is one of the most
painful things I can imagine.

4.

People have always told you that you have a nice smile. You're
thinking about your looks now and feel:
a. it's unimportant what people think about m y looks or anyone
else's looks.
b. fairly satisfied about my looks.
c. really ugly and undesirable. When someone compliments my
looks I think they're just being polite.
d. unhappy because even though I feel fairly good looking it
didn't seem to be an asset in getting a date tonight.
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APPENDIX E

DYSFUNCTIONAL ATTITUDE SCALE - FORM A
(DAS-A)
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FORM A

DAS

This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs which people
sometimes hold. Read EACH statement carefully and decide how much you
agree or disagree with the statement.
For each of the attitudes, show your answer by placing a check
mark ( v O under the column that BEST DESCRIBES HOW YOU THINK. Be sure
to choose only one answer for each attitude. Because people are
different, there is no right answer or wrong answer to these state
ments.
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of
looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like MOST OF THE
TIME.
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SLIGHTI
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TOTALLY

ATTITUDES

AGREE

AGREE

SC

DISAGREE

SLIGHTI

%

DISAGREE

EXAMPLE:

1.

Most people are O.K. once
you get to know them.

1

Look at the example above. To show how much a sentence describes
your attitude, you can check any point from totally agree to totally
disagree.
In the above example, the checkmark at "agree slightly"
indicates that this statement is somewhat typical of the attitudes
held by the person completing the inventory.
Remember that your answer should describe the way you think MOST
OF THE TIME.
NOW TURN THE PAGE AND BEGIN
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.

1.

It is difficult to be happy unless
one is good looking, intelligent,
rich and creative.

2.

Happiness is more a matter of my
attitude towards myself them the
way other people feel about me.

3.

People will probably think less
of me if I make a mistake.

4.

If I do not do well all the time,
people will not respect me.

i1 5 *
6.

It is possible to gain another
person’s respect without being
especially talented at anything.

7.

I cannot be happy unless most people
I know admire me.

8.

If a person asks for help, it is a
sign of weakness.
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Talcing even a small risk is foolish
because the loss is likely to be a
disaster.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.

9.

If I do not do as well as other
people, it means I am an inferior
human being.

•
o
H

If I fail at my work, then I am a
failure as a person.

11.

If you cannot do something well,
there is little point in doing it
at all.
|

12. Making mistakes is fine because I
can learn from them.

13. If someone disagrees with me, it
probably indicates he does not
like me.

14. If I fail partly, it is as bad as
being a complete failure.

i
1
1
1

"

f

15. If other people know what you are
really like, they will think less
of you.

16. I am nothing if a person I love
doesn't love me.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.

17. One can get pleasure from an
activity regardless of the end
result.

18. People should have a reasonable
likelihood of success before under
taking anything.

19. My value as a person depends greatly
on what others think of me.

20. If I don't set the highest standards
for myself, I am likely to end up a
second-rate person.

21. If I am to be a worthwhile person, I
must be truly outstanding in a least
one major respect.

22. People who have good ideas are more
worthy than those who do not.

23. I should be upset if I make a
mistake.

24. My own opinions of myself are more
important them other's opinions of
me.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
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25. TO be a good, moral, worthwhile
person, I must help everyone who
needs it.

26. If I ask a question, it makes me
lock inferior.
1
!
1
!

27. It is awful to be disapproved of
b y people important to you.

J

!S

28. If you don't have other people
to lean on, you are bound to
be sad.
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29. I can reach important goals without
slave driving myself.
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30. It is possible for a person to be
scolded and not get upset.
•
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31. I cannot trust other people because
they might be cruel to me.

I

i

%

\

1
i

32. If others dislike you, you
cannot be happy.

1

1

\

33. It is best to give up your own
interests in order to please
other people.

1
\
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1

|
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
i

i

34. My happiness depends more on
other people than it does on me.
i
i

J

35. I do not need the approval of
other people in order to be happy.

|

\

i
J

i

i
1
i

36. If a person avoids problems, the
problems tend to go away.

37. I can be happy even if I miss out
on many of the good things in life.
!
38. What other people think about me
is very important.
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1

39. Being isolated from others is
bound to lead to unhappiness.

i
!
)

5
i

i
i
i
:
1
n

i
»
1

j
!
i

i

!

!
.

!
1
1
t

|

i
!
<
t

!

40. I can find happiness withoug being
loved by another person.
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APPENDIX F

DYSFUNCTIONAL ATTITUDE SCALE
(DAS-B)

FORM B
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FORM B

DAS

This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs which people
sometimes hold. Read EACH statement carefully and decide how much you
agree or disagree with the statement.
For each of the attitudes, show your answer by placing a check
mark (✓) lander the column that BEST DESCRIBES HOW YOU THINK. Be sure
to choose only one answer for each attitude. Because people are
different, there is no right answer or wrong answer to these state
ments.
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of
looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like MOST OF THE
TIME.

EXAMPLE:

ATTITUDES
H

H

Most people are O.K. once
you get to know them.

Look at the example above. To shew how much a sentence describes
your attitude, you can check any point from totally agree to totally
disagree. In the above example, the checkmark at "agree slightly"
indicates that this statement is somewhat typical of the attitudes
held by the person completing the inventory.
Remember that your answer should describe the way you think MOST
OF THE TIME.
NOW TURN THE PAGE AND BEGIN
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.

You can be a happy person without
going out of your way in order to
please other people.

2.

I have to impress new acquaintances
with my charm, intelligence, or wit
or they won't like me.

3.

If I put other peoples' needs before
my own, they should help me when I
want them to do something for me.

4.

It is shameful for a person to
display his weaknesses.

People will like me even if I am
not successful.

6.

People who have the marks of
success (good looks, fame,
wealth) are bound to be happier
than people who do not.

7.

I should try to impress other
people if I want them to like me.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.

8.

! 9.

If a person I love does not
love me, it means I am
unloveable.

I ought to be able to solve my
problems quickly and without a
oreat deal of effort.

!
I
I 10. If a person is indifferent to me,
i
it means he does not like me.

11. I should be able to please
everybody.

12. Others can care for me even if they
know all my weaknesses.

13. If people whom I care about do not
care for me, it is awful.

I

14. Criticism need not upset the
person who receives the criticism.

15. My life is wasted unless I am
a success.

16. People should prepare for the
worst or they will be disappointed.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
]
17. I must be a useful, productive,
creative person or life has no
purpose.

18. A person should think less of
himself if other people do not
accept him.

19. I do not need other people’s
approval for me to be happy.

20. I can enjoy myself even when
others do not like me.

21. My value as a person depends
greatly on what others think of me.

22. If I make a foolish statement, it
means I am a foolish person.

23. If a person has to be alone for a
long period of time, it follows
that he has to feel lonely.

24. A person should be able to
control what happens to him.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.

25. If a person is not a success, then
his life is meaningless.

i

26. A person doesn't need to be well
liked in order to be happy.

27. If someone performs a selfish act,
this means he is a selfish person.

.
00

04

I should always have complete
control over my feelings.

29. I should be happy all the time.

30. If people consider me unattractive
it need not upset me.

31. Whenever I take a chance or risk
I am only looking for trouble.

32. A person cannot change his emotional
reactions even if he knows they are
harmful to him.

33. I may be able to influence other
people's behavior but I cannot
control it.

!
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.

I 34. People will reject you if they
I
know your weaknesses.

35. People should be criticized
for their mistakes.

36. One should look for a practical
solution to problems rather than
a perfect solution.

I

37. If I do well, it probably is due
to chance; if I do badly, it is
probably my own fault.

38. The way to get people to like you
is to inpress them with your
personality.
1
39. Turning to someone else for
advice or help is an admission
of weaknesses.

40. A person should do well at
everything he undertakes.
-I---
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INDEX
Accommodation, 4
Affect, 4, 7, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 27, 34, 47, 77, 95, 96, 98,
113, 125, 139
and cognition, 4, 13, 17, 19, 33, 36, 96, 139
depressive, 13, 17, 113, 139
and schemas, 23-29, 45, 113, 125, 139
Age and DAS, 104, 144
Attitude (see Schema)
social psychological definition, 7
Background variables, correlations of, with DAS scores, 90, 101-106,
118, 144
Beck Depression Inventory, 51, 73, 85
description, 74-75
descriptive statistics, 101-103
and DAS, 112, 115, 117, 118, 120-121, 122-128, 129, 131
factor analysis data, 77
and POMS, 112, 118, 123, 125
reliability, 76
and SCT, 112
statistics, 102, 105
used with medical patients, 76, 77
used with psychiatric patients, 76
validity, 76
Behavior, anticipations influencing, 6, 17
Beliefs, see Schemas
Bryne's Repression-Sensitization Scale, 82
Cognition
and affect, 4, 13, 17, 19, 33, 36, 96
arbitrary inference, 21, 28, 53
assumptions underlying, 2, 18, 45
automatic, 19
dichotomous reasoning, 29, 53
distortions of reality, 2, 13, 19, 21, 22, 28, 33, 45
and emotions, 3-9, 19, 24, 33, 34, 36
exaggeration, 21, 29
idiosyncratic, 2, 18, 22, 51
involuntary quality of depressive, 19
linguistic labelling, 34
minimization, 29, 53
overgeneralization, 21, 29, 53
personalization, 29
and psychopathology, 2, 13, 17, 36, 51, 138
and schemas, 23
selective abstraction, 29, 53
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, 32, 141
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Cognitive distortions,
affects related to, 51-52
characteristics of, 51
in depression, 45, 51, 52, 55, 62
Cognitive learning approach, 3
Cognitive modification, 15
Cognitive psychotherapies, 37
Cognitive structures, see Schemas
Cognitive Triad, 1, 20-21
Cross-lagged panel design, 90, 96-97, 99, 122-127
Depression
cognitive model, 1, 12, 15, 17, 22, 36, 81, 82, 123, 134, 139,
140-141
concept of, 9-15
definition, 16-17
historical review of, 9-15
learning theory approaches, 13-14
psychoanalytic orientation, 11, 15, 22
and reinforcement, 13, 31-32
role of ego, 12, 30
and schemas, 139-140, 142
schematic classification of, 11
signs and symptoms, 10, 14, 15
therapy, 2, 22, 33, 36
thought disorders, 12, 18
Depressogenic beliefs, see Schemas
Depressogenic schemas, see Schemas
Design of research, 85, 89, 91
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS),
administration of, 83, 85
and BDI, 112, 115, 117, 118, 120-121, 122-128, 129, 131
congruent validity of, 111
construct validity of, 94-98, 115, 143
construction of, 50-55
content validity, 94
description of, 48, 83, 143
dimensionality of, 55, 83
discriminative ability, 128-132, 137-139, 144
evaluation of, 134-137
external criterion, 73
and extraneous variables, 90, 101-106, 118, 144
face validity, 54, 94
and factor analysis, 57-61, 95
hypotheses tested, 95-98
improvements, 136
item statistics of 108, 109
linear scaling, 93, 100-101
methodological problems, 139-140, 144
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Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (continued)
parallel forms of, 62, 65-72
and POMS, 112, 113-114, 116, 118, 122-128, 130, 133
processing of data, 89-90
rationale for, 2, 45, 48, 134, 143
refinement of, 56-64
reliability of, 62, 92-93, 106-107, 110-111,118, 143,
and SCT, 112, 113, 114
subjects, 83-85
test format, 48-50
validity of, 93-95, 111-133, 143-144
value of, 141, 142
Educational level and DAS,- 104, 106, 144
Ellis Scale, 41
Emotions,
assessment view of, 24
behavioral view of, 8
and cognitions, 19, 24, 33, 34, 36
cognitive view of, 3-9
and feelings, 7
and perceptions, 6, 7
theories of, 5-9
and thinking, 6, 18, 22
Enchiridion, The
Errors in thinking, see Cognitions
Experimental studies of depression, 29-37
Gender and the DAS, 103, 137, 144
Guide to Rational Living, 41
Hamilton Rating Scale of Depression, 51
Hostility and depression, 11
Insight therapy, 23
Irrational Belief Test , 38-39
Learned helplessness, 14
Likert scaling, 49, 83
Mania, 10
Melancholia, 10
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), 42
Mood,
and reinforcement, 31
stability of, 118
Mourning and Melancholia, 11
Perception and emotions, 5, 6
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Personal Belief Inventory (PBI), 39-40
Physiological arousal, and cognitive evaluation, 34, 35
Profile of Mood States (POMS), 73
description, 77-78
factor analysis data, 78, 79
norms, 79
relationship to BDI,112, 118, 123, 125
relationship to DAS,112, 113-114, 116, 118, 122-128, 130, 133
relationship to SCT,112
reliability, 79
statistics, 102, 105, 114
used with normal college students, 79, 80
validity, 79
Race and DAS, 104, 144
Rules, see Schemas
Schemas,
assessment of,46, 82, 114, 115
and cognitions, 23, 24, 45
definition of, 23, 45, 52, 73
depressogenic, 23-29, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 73, 82, 96, 113, 114
115-118, 119, 127, 139-140
distortions of reality, 26
idiosyncratic, 25, 26, 28, 113
irrational, 8, 18
prepotent during depression, 19
and psychpathological symptomatology, 119, 138
relationship to behavior, 23, 48
stability of, 44, 47, 55
and thinking, 2, 25
Self Rating Scale for Rationality, 40-41
Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests, 94
State versus trait measures, 44
Story Completion Test(SCT), 73, 85
de scription, 80-81
rationale, 80
relationship to BDI, 82, 112
relationship to DAS, 112, 113, 114
relationship to POMS, 112
reliability, 82
statistics, 101-103, 105
validity, 82
Technical Recommendations for Psychological Tests and Diagnostic
Techniques, 111
Thinking,
distortions in, 19, 118, 119
dysfunctional attitudes, 2
and emotions, 6, 18, 22
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Thinking (continued),
errors in, 2, 28, 36, 52
and feelings, 136
irrational assessment of, 37-43
processes and mood, 135
and schemas, 25
self evaluative thoughts, 6
Two Factor Index of Social Position, 84
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